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This dissertation studies conflict in a hierarchical international system, the British
Empire. How did the British Empire respond to violent and nonviolent resistance
within its colonies? I develop a theory explaining how and why an imperial metropole
becomes involved in and grant concessions to its colonies. Unlike federal nation-states
and looser relationship like in an international organization, modern European em-
pires were characterized by selective engagement of the metropole with its peripheral
colonies. This has important implications for understanding metropolitan response
to peripheral resistance. In contrast to more recent work, I find that violence was
more effective at coercing metropolitan concessions to the colonies in the British
Empire than nonviolence. I argue that this occurred because violence overwhelmed
the capabilities of local colonial governments, and violence commanded metropoli-
tan attention and involvement. This theory is supported with a wide range of data,
including yearly measures of anticolonial resistance, every colonial concession made
by the British Empire after 1918, daily measures of metropolitan discussions of colo-
nial issues from cabinet archives, and web-scraped casualty data from British death
records. In addition, I present in-depth case studies of British responses to resistance
in Cyprus and the Gold Coast, along with a conceptual schema of different types of
resistance to understand strikes, riots, terrorism, and civil disobedience in a number
of other British colonies. My findings show that the effectiveness of resistance is con-
ditional on the political structure that it is embedded in and that hierarchy matters
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Who was right, Gandhi or Fanon? The fall of the European empires in the 20th
century transformed the international system. Explanations in the International Re-
lations (IR) literature locate this change by referencing Cold War dynamics or the
restructuring of the global economy. Less emphasis is placed on the role of anticolo-
nial resistance within the colonies. This is puzzling, since anticolonial resistance was
a near-constant response to imperial rule, occupied the metropole’s attention, and
factored into colonial policy. Both the violent and nonviolent forms of anticolonial
resistance mobilized populations all around the globe, and the leaders of these move-
ments at the time of independence came to rule their states for decades. Yet little
is known about how the European empires responded to resistance, what the rela-
tive effects of violent and nonviolent resistance were, and how resistance in imperial
structures may differ from the more commonly studied context of the nation-state.
This dissertation studies the effects of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resis-
tance on metropolitan policy in the British Empire during the 20th century. To
understand this phenomenon, I present a model of imperial response. Empires, un-
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like nation-states, are political structures that are segmented into the metropole and
its peripheral units. Peripheral units are directly administered by the local governors,
but the metropole is in charge of large-scale changes in policy and other imperial re-
lations. Metropolitan involvement in the colonies varies spatially and temporally. I
theorize that anticolonial resistance can induce concessions from the metropole when
the resistance is better able to command the metropole’s attention. Violent resis-
tance is more effective at coercing metropolitan concessions because it is better able
to threaten the metropole’s core interests and garner the attention of the metropole.
While disruptive to governance, nonviolent resistance is much less likely to be debated
and discussed by metropolitan policymakers. Nonviolence, because it is less likely to
threaten the interests of the metropole, remains the province of the colonial governor.
However, there are limits to violent resistance. Since imperial metropoles are
mostly concerned with issues of security, the strategic value of an imperial posses-
sion conditions metropolitan response to unrest. In strategically important colonies,
granting concessions (and by extension, increasing suffrage) risks empowering hostile
actors and allowing them to take over the levers of the colonial state. This jeopardizes
the metropole’s post-independence relations with these colonies. The result, in most
cases, is a bargaining failure—concessions reduce anticolonial hostility, but granting
concessions can also cause the metropole to lose access to its colonies. The persistent
refusal of the metropole to grant concessions in response to unrest for strategically
important colonies explains why some colonies experienced large-scale conflicts during
the decolonization era.
This work makes a number of contributions to existing scholarship. By privileging
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the interests of the target of resistance in my theory, I show that this variation mat-
ters for understanding responses to violent and nonviolent resistance. Current work
focuses on aspects of resistance movements themselves. I argue that this approach is
incomplete, and determining why a resistance movement is successful—or why they
chose a primarily violent or nonviolent strategy—requires an assessment of what the
target wants and their willingness to concede or repress (or both). In addition, by
offering an empire-wide analysis of all formal colonies in the British Empire, this work
compares colonies that experience violent, nonviolent, and no resistance, along with
spatial and temporal variation in those variables.
In addition to the theory of imperial response, this work also presents a typol-
ogy of resistance types that allows resistance to vary along two axes: violent and
nonviolent resistance, and whether the resistance is spontaneous or hierarchically or-
ganized. A key difference between a riot and a strike is riots are violent and strikes
are not. Both events, however, are characterized by a mass gathering of individuals
protesting some political or economic issue. Similarly, a civil disobedience campaign
and an armed insurgency obviously differ in their tactics and strategy, but unlike
riots and strikes, these campaigns are characterized by a hierarchical leadership, op-
erate on longer timelines, and are much more deliberate in their choice of actions. I
apply this typology—which can be used to understand more contemporary acts of
resistance—to understand how the metropole responded to forms of resistance within
the colonies that varied along the dimension of violence/nonviolence, and sponta-
neous/hierarchical.
I conclude that violence was overwhelmingly more successful at coercing conces-
3
sions from the metropole to the colonies that nonviolence. This is at odds with recent
research arguing that nonviolence and civil resistance are effective strategies for cre-
ating political change. There are reasons for this disagreement. For one, my study
focuses on a historical time period (British decolonization) that may be substantially
different than, say, the Arab Spring and other urban protests in autocracies. More
importantly, however, my theoretical framework explicitly takes into account the
willingness of the target state to grant concessions, which helps account for some of
the selection effects (whereby the likelihood of a strategy’s success influences which
strategy is chosen) that plague comparisons of violent and nonviolent campaigns.
Armed campaigns of violence are often launched after sustained repression or a lack
of success with less costly tactics, including nonviolent ones. By jointly examining
the determinants and effects of violent and nonviolent activity and the interest of the
target of resistance, this work is able to partially account for these selection effects.
In addition, by examining the relative effects of resistance within a single polity that
faces multiple types of resistance from a large number of separate entities, I am able
to keep a number of important variables constant.
The findings complicate some of the conclusions of the historical literature on both
decolonization and the Cold War. Much of this literature contrasts the rising anti-
colonial United States and USSR with the declining European colonial powers in the
immediate postwar period (Louis and Robinson, 1994). Here, the story goes, the in-
creasingly powerful US and USSR pressured Britain and France to relinquish control
over their empires (with some notable exceptions), making the Cold War an acceler-
ant to decolonization. This, of course, did happen, and both the US and USSR ap-
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peared to have sincerely held anticolonial beliefs that were occasionally compromised.
However, the geopolitical environment of the Cold War—specifically the USSR’s in-
creasing threat to British interests—made Britain less willing to grant concessions to
certain colonies. Britain doubled down on some of their colonial commitments as a
bulwark against Soviet encroachment (Heinlein, 2013, 16). The increasingly powerful
United States did pressure Britain to decolonize in some areas, but Cold War security
concerns prevented the British from doing so in other areas. My argument helps show
that the Cold War and decolonization were not separate global processes but were
deeply integrated and had heterogeneous effects on decision-making within a single
state.
Building on standard assumptions of neorealism (Waltz, 2010; Mearsheimer et al.,
2001), I argue that the British state was primary motivated by security concerns, and
that this had important implications for how it dismantled its empire. While imperial
officials and members of the colonial bureaucracy were concerned with economic ex-
traction and the levels of revenue and expenditure within a colony, I show that these
concerns were largely absent from metropolitan management and the crafting of im-
perial policy. Security concerns dominated cabinet and parliamentary discussions of
the empire. The metropole did discuss the importance of sterling and how some
colonies could be used to alleviate the depreciation of sterling. Even in these discus-
sions, however, anxiety about the falling value of sterling were rooted in how it could
threaten the British state’s ability to defend itself against impending threats from the
USSR. While acknowledging that economic factors best explain the expansion of im-
perialism (Hobson, 2018; Lenin, 1999; Cain and Hopkins, 2014), my argument shows
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that security concerns were paramount in understanding the end of formal European
empires.
Decolonization was “the most important change in word politics” (Jervis, 1989,
34) during the 20th century. Its impact cannot be understated: it shifted the balance
of conflict away from interstate war to intrastate war (Thomas and Thompson, 2018,
453), it created dozens of new-nation states, and helps explain variation in current
levels of political and economic development (Lee and Paine, 2019). As Duncan Bell
writes, “the world in which we live is largely the product of the rise, competition,
and fall of empires” (Bell, 2016, 91). Yet International Relations scholars—the ones
most suited to study large-scale changes in the international system and the relations
between states—have paid relatively little attention to this important global process,
albeit a historically specific one.
0.2 Literature Review
This section situates the dissertation within the broader political science literature
on empires and international hierarchy, the relative effectiveness of violence and non-
violence, and the historiography of British decolonization.
Before reviewing the relevant literature, I offer a brief summary of the argument
in the dissertation. I theorize that the structure of imperial rule of the British Empire
matters for understanding the effects of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance.
Most studies evaluating the effectiveness of resistance do so by examining resistance
in the context of the modern nation-state. The metropole-periphery structure of
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empires means that the metropole can selectively engage in each periphery and change
metropolitan policy in response to events in the peripheral colonies. In most colonies,
anticolonial resistance would garner metropolitan attention, and the metropole would
respond with concessions in order to prevent future anticolonial resistance. Violence
is more effective because violence is better able to command the metropole’s attention
than nonviolence. The metropole’s interest in each colony was not the same, however.
Some colonies were strategically important, and the metropole is not willing to grant
concessions to them, since doing so will jeopardize the security of the metropolitan
state. In these colonies, anticolonial resistance is generally ineffective.
Violence and Nonviolence
This section evaluates the competing arguments regarding the relative effectiveness
of violent and nonviolent resistance.
Most studies examine the effectiveness of resistance within the context of the
nation state. Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) argue that nonviolent resistance cam-
paigns are more successful than violent ones because nonviolent actors are less likely
to be seen as extremists, are better able to garner international support, and facili-
tate mobilization and participation. Moreover, governments pay a higher cost if they
engage in violent repression of a nonviolent movement. Their analysis is primarily
concerned with campaign-level explanations for success. In their quantitative analy-
sis, they only include the polity score of the targeted state as a target-level control
(in effect controlling for whether a state is democratic or not). While they do discuss
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the target’s interests in their case studies, this is not the focus of their examination
and is not systematically analyzed.
More directly related to the present study is the work by Griffiths and Wasser
(2018). Griffiths and Wasser study whether violent secessionism is more successful
than nonviolent secessionism using all data on secessionist campaigns during the 20th
century. They find that, after taking into account whether secessionist groups use
institutional or extra-institutional means to wage their campaign, violent secessionism
is no more successful than nonviolent secessionism. Importantly, their dataset and
definition of secession includes anticolonial movements. While their approach provides
important nuance by taking into account the institutional environment, the interests
of the target remain static.
These studies assess effectiveness by comparing the success rate of violent and
nonviolent campaigns. Applying such an approach—by manually coding a resis-
tance campaign in a colony as successful or not along with its primary method of
resistance—to the British Empire would not tell us much. Indeed, a striking feature
of Griffiths and Wasser’s data is that all anticolonial secessionist movements (regard-
less of the methods they use) are coded as successful. Similarly, in Chenoweth’s
dataset, all anticolonial campaigns that are active at the time of independence are
coded as successful campaigns while those that petered out before independence is
declared are deemed unsuccessful campaigns. Moreover, there are huge inferential
problems arising from the endogeneity between British reluctance to grant a colony
independence and the likelihood that a violent campaign arises at all or that a nonvi-
olent campaign turns violent. For some colonies, de facto independence occurred well
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before de jure independence, which placated more aggressive nationalists. Moreover,
anticolonial resistance occurred in widely different contexts. The Mau Mau revolt,
for example, was largely a civil war among Kikuyu that resulted in the deaths of
about two dozen settlers (Bennett, 2013; Anderson, 2005). The British spent many
lives and resources to combat the Mau Mau rebellion, but in Ceylon, the British were
unwilling to pay those costs. Once there was the spectre of violence in Ceylon, the
British withdrew (Thomas, 2014b, 110).
In order to properly assess the relative effectiveness of violent and nonviolent re-
sistance in the British colonies, a common outcome must be used as a measure of
success. I study the effects of resistance on the likelihood of the British Empire to
grant concessions and reforms to the colonies. This approach has an number of ad-
vantages over assessing the effect of resistance on independence. For one, concessions
were much more frequent. This enables the study of the effects of resistance over time
within the same colony. In addition, the timing of independence was often a strategic
outcome between anticolonial nationalists and the colonial government; it was not
always in the interest of the nationalists to be granted independence, especially if the
colonial government was actively suppressing domestic threats to the nationalist’s
base of power. Concessions, however, were changes in policy that favor those in the
colony, which most frequently took the form of increasing autonomy.
The political science literature on the effects of violence generally uses variation
in the type or intensity of violence as the independent variable and some common
outcome (concession, achievement of goals, etc.) as the dependent variable. Since
most studies focus on the context of the nation state, it is rare to see studies that
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examine a large number of different actors engaging in resistance against the same
target (which of course did occur in many imperial polities). While many studies
acknowledge that different targets of resistance have different sensitives to political
resistance, how this variation matters remains underexplored empirically.
The literature on the effectiveness of terrorism, for example, uses only measures of
regime type to account for differences in casualty sensitivity. Pape (2006) argues that
suicide terrorism is an effective form of resisting foreign occupation because it targets
civilians and imposes costs on democracies. Abrahms (2006) analyzes twenty-eight
terrorist groups on the list of foreign terrorist organizations designated by the United
States Department of State. He finds that these groups accomplished policy objects
only 7 percent of the time. Abrahms’s explanation for why terrorist groups perform
poorly is that terrorists groups cannot coerce targets because they miscommunicate
their policy objectives. When a group commits violence against civilians, this signals
that the violent group has maximalist objectives, when in reality their objectives
may be quite limited and specific. Variation in the effectiveness of terrorism is left
unexplored.
The absence of a theory of how the target’s interests matter for understanding the
effectiveness of violence is puzzling when considering the recent studies on the effects
of terrorism within the context of civil wars. Rebel groups fighting a democratic oppo-
nent are more likely to use terrorism (Stanton, 2013). Thomas (2014a) uses monthly
data on African civil conflicts to assess whether terrorism by rebel groups increases
the probability of state extending negotiations to those groups. Her results show that
more terrorist attacks lead to more concessions in the form of negotiations between
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rebel groups and the state, primarily because terrorist acts have the power to hurt.
How much hurt the state can endure, however, is assumed to be static. These studies
show that terrorism can have positive effects for rebels and that the regime type of
the target matters. Fortna (2015) finds that groups primarily using terrorism are less
likely to win a civil war, but terrorism is associated with longer conflicts, suggesting
that weaker groups may use terrorism to prolong a conflict to their advantage. She
presents evidence that terrorism in a civil war is less ineffective against democracies.
Peter Krause has expanded the theoretical framework about non-state violence to
include the the movements themselves (Krause, 2013). Krause argues that non-state
violence is successful when it does two things: achieves the organizational goals of
the group and the strategic goals of the group. While expanding our knowledge of
how violence achieves organizational goals, the role of the target remains unexplored
in Krause’ framework.
I theorize that the interests of the target of the resistance matters for under-
standing the effectiveness of a resistance campaign. The strategic interests of the
British conditioned whether any resistance is effective, while their concern with se-
curity and political stability meant that metropolitan attention responded more to
violence than nonviolence. A target that is particularly sensitive to having their
soldiers or civilians killed will be more susceptible to changing their behavior due
to violent action then nonviolent action, while a target that is particularly sensitive
to economic difficulties will be more susceptible to changing their behavior due to
nonviolent action such as boycotts. In the context of the British Empire, strikes may
have severely harmed the economic extraction from Britain’s African colonies—more
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than any violent activity—but this would have little effect on the decision makers
in London largely because they were not terribly concerned with economic matters,
relative to strategic ones. In colonies that were deemed strategically essential, both
violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance were met with repression and a denial
of meaningful reforms. The approach of most political science research would be to
look at specific group-level or colony-level factors to understand why some forms of
resistance against British imperial rule were effective. The British, however, did not
treat each colony equally, and its willingness to concede was much lower in strategi-
cally important colonies than it was in others. The onset of hierarchically organized
violent campaigns in some colonies can not only be understood by examining political
dynamics within the colony. Metropolitan policymaking must be incorporated into
an explanation of why colonial subjects rebelled.
Empires
Empires are a form of international hierarchy (Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Lake,
2009a). While many definitions of empire include one group dominating the other,
my study theorizes how the structure of imperial rule—especially modern overseas
empires—matters for understanding imperial dynamics. Empires, regardless of how
control is acquired, are characterized by a metropole and periphery. I present a theory
of how events in the periphery affect metropolitan involvement and response. This
theory explains dynamics between actors in a hierarchical international system. One
of my key variables (metropolitan attention to a colony) helps explain why some types
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of resistance are effective at granting concessions. Variation in metropolitan attention
only occurs in the context of an imperial structure and has no clear analogue to the
nation-state.
Many scholars agree that a unique feature of empires is that they are divided into
a core and periphery (Münkler, 2007). Doyle describes empires as “a relationship,
formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of
another political society”(Doyle, 1986, 45). More recently, Nexon and Wright define
empires as multiethnic polities that “involve the dominance of one polity over other
political communities, and that core-periphery relations are an important component
of empire” (Nexon and Wright, 2007, 258). The distinction between a metropolitan
core and a peripherial colony is an essential feature of many definitions of an empire
(e.g., (Wimmer and Min, 2006; Jordheim and Neumann, 2011; Cooley and Nexon,
2013; Howe, 2002; Lake, 2009b).
Hierarchy and empire also provide useful frames to study international relations
outside of Western Europe. David Kang argues that “the fundamental organizing
principle in historical East Asia was hierarchy, not sovereign equality” and hegemony,
rather than the balance of power, dominated East Asia during the Qin/Han era
from 221 BCE to 220 CE (Kang, 2019, 1). Empire has also been used to refer
to more modern, even postwar institutions. Mark Beissinger notes that “empire has
become a common frame through which the Soviet state and its collapse are analyzed,
with regard both to the relationship between the Soviet state and its multicultural
population and to Soviet control over eastern Europe” (Beissinger, 2006, 294). This
risks reading the history of empire and the Soviet state backwards—in the 1920s
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few believed that the Soviet state was an imperial polity (Lieven, 2002). While
the Soviet state had a structure of land-based empire, its policies were designed to
modernize the state and integrate peripheral areas (Slezkine, 2000). In contrast to
European colonial empires, ties between the Soviet metropole (to the extent that
it did exist) and the segmented states it attempted to integrate were much more
direct and bilateral than the empires of Britain or France. Nevertheless, the imperial
frame for studying the rise and fall of the Soviet state is useful for understanding
why the term “empire” was so easily and forcefully applied to Soviet rule. Beissinger
concludes that “Empire is not a clearly bounded transhistorical model but rather
a Wittgensteinian ’family resemblance’ whose meaning and referents have altered
significantly over time” (Beissinger, 2006, 303). Postwar nationalism helped unravel
European empires and in the process also did violence to the concept of ’empire’
itself. Recent uses of “empire” have applied it to European Union (Khanna, 2008;
Zielonka, 2007; Marks, 2012).
A consequence of the core-periphery structure of an empire is that the metropole
can selectively engage and disengage with its peripheral units. This tendency was
higher in the modern European overseas empires than the more traditional land-based
empires like the Russian 18th century empire (Kumar, 2019, 161). Heterogeneous
contracting between the metropole and periphery means that there is variation in au-
tonomy, obligations, and importance across colonies. The metropole can place larger
demands on some colonies than others. While many historical accounts acknowledge
this variation (for example in studies of France’s relationship to West Africa and
Algeria), less is known about what drives variation in metropolitan involvement and
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attention to its colonies.
Despite acknowledgment that the core-periphery structure characterizes impe-
rial rule, there are few studies examining how hierarchical links between states in a
core-periphery relationship are contested. Moreover, less is known about how formal
hierarchical links break and are replaced by informal ones. One of the characteristics
of international hierarchy is some form of compromised sovereignty by the subordi-
nate state. How can the subordinate state restore some of its sovereignty from the
dominant state? Why does the dominant state devolve power to some peripheries
but not others?
This dissertation integrates the state back into the study of empires. The core-
periphery structure matters here. However, I argue that how the core responds to
activity in the periphery rests on the interests of the state that makes up the core.
Building on standard realist assumptions, states in a self-help system are concerned,
above all, with security. The British Empire consisted of the British state apparatus
(the cabinet, parliament, Foreign Office, etc.), along with a mix of private (missionar-
ies, the East India Company) and state-operated bureaucracies (the Colonial Office,
the India Office). During the 20th century, I argue that policymakers in the British
metropole—members of parliament and cabinet officials—were almost entirely un-
concerned with colonial extraction, taxation, and revenue in the colonies. Rather,
their focus was on international security and how each individual colony could con-
tribute to the security of the British state. The political economy scholarships that
examines the spatial variation and impact of colonial investments and taxation does,
of course, answer important questions about development and politics in the colonies
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(Huillery, 2009). However, these decisions were made by on-the-ground colonial of-
ficials. Metropolitan concern with issues of revenue and taxation was generally low
and was confined the regular and periodic review of colonial reports (Frankema and
Van Waijenburg, 2014).
0.3 Decolonization, Historiography, and IR
Scholarship
Despite reshaping the entire international system, creating dozens of new nation-
states, and influencing contemporary politics in numerous ways, recent work in In-
ternational Relations has not attempted to understand decolonization. Political the-
orists have taken up the mantle and written important analyses of the long-term
legacies of imperial thought (Pitts, 2018) or how anticolonial activities envisioned
the postcolonial world order (Getachew, 2019). Why have IR scholars paid rela-
tively little attention to decolonization? I suggest that there are two reasons. One
is that previous works have done a very good explaining changes in the international
system (Crawford, 2002), comparing changes in empires across time periods (Aber-
nethy, 2000), and providing a social science approach to specific historical questions
(Kahler, 2014). The other reason, I suspect, is that decolonization does not facilitate
quantitative empirical analysis. The most obvious quantifiable outcome related to
decolonization is the timing of independence for each state. Independence, however,
was overdetermined, making it difficult to tease out exactly why some colonies re-
16
ceived independence when they did. Moreover, formal independence often resulted
after substantial reforms that granted autonomy to the colonies. For many anticolo-
nial nationalists, formal independence was important, but was one goal among many.
Even after independence, many colonies remained subject to unwanted influence from
their former metropoles.
Studies that try to explain the timing of independence from colonial rule privilege
proximate causes of decolonization over systemic or longer-term ones. For example,
Hager and Lake (2000)’s work offers a systemic theory of imperial breakup by focus-
ing on how struggles between states in the international system affect pressure on the
metropole to grant independence to colonies. In their discussion on the historical lit-
erature of decolonization (much of which consists of case histories of specific colonies)
they write that “this literature provides a useful baseline and even a null hypothesis
for our study, namely that decolonization is the result of an autonomous struggle
by indigenous peoples to throw off the yoke of imperialism” (Hager and Lake, 2000,
118). They argue that there is little support for this claim, since third-parties (those
not residing in the metropole or the colony) played an active role in the timing of
independence. Focusing exclusively on the timing of independence ignores the erosion
of ties between the metropole and colony in the decades prior to independence.
Other works have provided theoretical frameworks to understand decolonization as
a form of large-scale change in the international system (Gartzke and Rohner, 2011).
Gartzke and Rohner (2011) present a formal model that helps to explain why states
do not seek to control physical territory abroad. In their theory, as colonies become
economically developed there is a decline in the benefit derived from controlling land,
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minerals, and capital. Technological changes make it too costly for states to control
territory and they are better able to realize their goals by participating in a global
marketplace rather than in vertical integration of the control of territory. The thrust
of their argument is that the United State’s penchant for choosing influence over
territorial control lies not in any characteristic of the United States. Rather, this
behavior is determined by systemic forces (an argument supported by (Go, 2011)).
There is a tension between systemic level explanations that relate large-scale tech-
nological change to the tendency of all empires to abandon a particular tactic with
a study aimed at assessing the short term impact of anticolonial resistance. In some
sense, describing the immediate effects of anticolonial resistance pushes system-level
explanations onto the backburner. My argument that violence eroded the British
Empire is not incompatible with systemic explanations for decolonization. Rather,
these explanations provide an important scope condition to my theory: violent resis-
tance in the colonies only coerced concessions from the metropole when the metropole
was somewhat willing to grant these concessions. Violent and often sustained anti-
colonial resistance plagued the era of imperial expansion. Large anticolonial revolts,
such as the 1857 Indian Mutiny and the 1865 Morant Bay uprising, led Britain to
double-down on their imperial holdings and reduce colonial autonomy. This study is
more concerned with how states manage their decline rather than the root causes of
that decline. Moreover, system-level explanations cannot explain variation in decol-
onization across empires (Spruyt, 2005), let alone the heterogeneous responses of a
single metropole to its different colonies.
The historiographical literature on Britain’s decolonization has presented com-
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pelling and detailed portraits of individual personalities and the choices they made
under bureaucratic and political constraints. These works, often consisting of con-
structed narratives built from a jumble of archival documents from the Colonial Of-
fices, the Foreign Offices, and the personal papers of important colonial officials,
necessarily privilege the decisions made by these men (and they were almost al-
ways men) (Hyam, 2007). Systemic explanations for the relinquishing of colonies are
largely absent—as Darwin (1984)’s query as to whether Britain’s postwar decoloniza-
tion was a “pattern” or a “puzzle” illustrates. Indeed, explanations regarding why
some colonies were granted freedom earlier than others is often attributed to the ease
with which colonial officials were able to negotiate the terms of independence. Settlers
compounded these negotiations (Paine, 2019), but the role of domestic politics—or
even metropolitan politics more broadly—is largely absent from these works. In 1997,
David Cannadine wrote that “as far as the majority of the population concerned, [the
British Empire] was given away in a fit of collective indifference” (Cannadine, 1998,
6). Porter (2006) presented a portrait of British politics whereby the empire was
something that happened elsewhere, and never came home.
0.4 Outline of Dissertation
To investigate the relative effects of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance
in the British Empire, the following chapter presents a theoretical framework that
specifies my key variables and the expected patterns of interaction between these
variables. I also articulate a model of imperial response within an imperial structure,
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and contrast that structure with more integrated federal nation-states and less inte-
grated international organizations. In addition, I also theorize how imperial response
to unrest may differ in colonies that are deemed as strategically important. This
theoretical framework will be supported by a number of empirical chapters. Follow-
ing the presentation of my theory, the third chapter in the dissertation provides a
brief primer on the British Empire and decolonization. The goal here is to present an
overview of the historiographical literature and specific historical information required
to understand the arguments made in the later chapters.
Following these two chapters is the main chapter that presents the quantitative
empirical evidence in support of my argument. I describe the quantitative data I
collected and run a number of statistical models to estimate the effect of violent
and nonviolent resistance. Briefly, I collected data on every concession made by
the British to their colonies after 1918, yearly and monthly measures of the level of
violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance within each colony, and daily measures
of metropolitan attention from cabinet archives and the parliamentary debates. In
addition I collected multiple measures of a colony’s strategic importance. The data
are analyzed using a variety of models where the unit of analysis ranges from the year-
colony to the month-colony. The results provide strong evidence that violence was
more effective at coercing concessions than nonviolence, and the reason this occurred
was because nonviolent anticolonial activity was less likely to command metropolitan
attention and involvement than violent anticolonial activity.
The statistical models and quantitative data I use group different types of vio-
lent and nonviolent resistance together, in effect flattening important variation. To
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remedy this, the fifth chapter presents a typology to understand important varia-
tion within each category of anticolonial resistance, disaggreating strikes from civil
disobedience and riots from insurgencies. Here I demonstrate the utility of this ty-
pology by providing brief descriptions of important acts of anticolonial resistance and
discussing how those events affected (or did not affect) metropolitan discussion and
whether there was a policy change in response to the resistance.
A core part of my argument is that in strategically important colonies, resis-
tance does not lead to concessions because British policymakers feared that granting
concessions would jeopardize British security. In the Chapter 6 I investigate these
dynamics in the case of Cyprus. Using official documents from the Colonial Office, I
present extensive qualitative evidence that British policy towards Cyprus was above
all concerned with the island’s strategic importance and that these concerns were the
prime motivation for Britain’s unwillingness to grant concessions in the aftermath of
the 1931 riots and later during the Cyprus emergency.
Following that, in Chapter 7 I again use Colonial Office documents to study
Britain’s response to the 1947 Accra riots in the Gold Coast and the ensuing process
by which Britain appointed commissions, issued recommendations, and implemented
constitutional reforms that increase autonomy and suffrage in the colony. This chap-
ter helps to provide texture and detail to the causal process connecting violence and
concessions. In addition, I provide evidence of nonviolent events in the Gold Coast,
mostly in the form of strikes and boycotts, were ignored by the metropole and easily
dealt with by local colonial officials.
Chapter 8 offers a quantitative examination of the British parliamentary debates.
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Here, I present results from a number of text-analytic methods to try and assess the
extent to which the British parliament discussed violent and nonviolent activity in
the colonies. Many British politicians would use euphemisms to describe anticolonial
activity. Rather than call a riot a riot, Colonial Office officials and Members of
Parliament would refer to ’disturbances’, ’unrest’, or ’disorder’ in the colonies. To
assess what exactly these words were referring to, I use word embeddings, which
are commonly used in the computer science literature and are becoming increasingly
adopted for interesting applications by political scientists (Rheault and Cochrane,
2020; Rodman, 2020). I present evidence that euphemisms were much more likely to
refer to violent than nonviolent anticolonial activity. In addition, I show that the use
of euphemisms decreased over time, suggesting that Members of Parliament became
more honest about anticolonial resistance during the era of decolonization.
The concluding chapter wraps up and contextualizes the information presented in
the dissertation, addresses shortcomings, and provides suggestions for future work.
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Theory
0.5 A Theory of Imperial Response
This section develops my theory of imperial response. I use this theory to generate
predictions about how different variables interact and the relative effects of violent and
nonviolent resistance within an imperial structure. My approach takes seriously the
interests of the metropole in predicting how the metropole will respond to resistance in
the periphery. This theory will provide the framework to understand the quantitative
and qualitative empirical chapters that follow.
This chapter begins with the definition of key terms and variables. I then ar-
ticulate my theory of imperial response and show, graphically, how these variables
fit together and their relationship in different contexts. I draw explicit distinctions
between a loose hierarchical structure of informal empire, formal empire with direct
ties to each colony, and a vertically integrated polity like a land-based empire or
federal nation-state. The theory is used to generate hypotheses, which I test in later
chapters, and scope conditions are provided.
23
0.6 Variable 1, Resistance
The first variable in my theory is anticolonial resistance. A number of works have
examined anticolonial insurgencies, rebellions, and civil resistance campaigns. All of
these are included under my variable of anticolonial resistance. The main difference
with my variable is that the definition is more expansive. While many historical works
have debated whether a mass rebellion was truly nationalist (Syria, Iraq) (Gelvin,
1998; Kadhim, 2012), my theory sidesteps the issue of whether a rebellion was sim-
ply one that reflected a desire to change policy or reflected the growth of nationalist
consciousness. I do this because the British were intensely skeptical that any form of
resistance to the colonial state was nationalist. Indeed, critics have argued that the
British engaged in the criminalization of nationalism as a way to further the impe-
rial project and deny international support for truly nationalist movements (Kelly,
2017). Whether a episode of resistance contains the seeds of a broader nationalist
consciousness is, of course, an important question, and the ability for those leading
the resistance to tap into nascent nationalist sentiment can facilitate mobilization.
However, since my theory is target-centered, and the colonial mindset flattened na-
tionalist and proto-nationalist resistance into criminal unrest and rebellion, I include
nationalist and non-nationalist forms of anticolonial resistance in my key independent
variable.1
The variable for anticolonial resistance is also limited to non-institutional forms of
contentious politics. All colonies possessed some form of representative institutions for
1In this sense, my variable is entirely unconcerned with whether an episode of resistance is truly
nationalist or not.
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colonial subjects. In some colonies, like India, these institutions were quite powerful.
In others, like in Palestine, fractionalization and infighting between the native elites
prevented any effective form of resistance. These institutions allowed the native elites
to shape British policy through conventional means: negotiations, meetings, petitions,
etc. Institutional resistance was an important form of colonial politics. However,
these elites were also collaborationist. They benefited, sometimes handsomely, from
the colonial regime and facilitated the colonial project. Their interactions with the
British were not contentious. They were part of, and not separate from, the colonial
state. For these reasons, institutional forms of resistance conducted by the native
elite are not included in my variable of anticolonial resistance.
This variable includes common and visible forms of resistance such as riots,
protests, strikes, boycotts, and bombings. More organized forms of resistance are
included as well, such as an armed insurgency, as happened in places like Kenya,
Cyprus, and Palestine. Notably, most discussions of anticolonial resistance focus on
these types of mass conflicts and counterinsurgency operations, or with Gandhi or
Nkrumah’s use of nonviolent civil resistance. These campaigns relied on a nationalist
framework to resist the colonial power. They were also led by elites. Focusing only
on mass, elite-led resistance excludes the common—but not quite everyday—forms
of resistance that was endemic in the colonial project. My variable is much more
expansive. I define anticolonial resistance as contentious political actions that were
in any way related to the colonial state. Variation in the level of organization of the
resistance was important as well, while I explore in Chapter 0.25.
My theory explicitly considers the relative effects of violent and nonviolent forms
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of resistance. The distinguishing feature between violence and nonviolence is whether
there is any physical destruction or harm to individuals. Deaths (intentional or not)
as a result of an act of resistance will almost always mean that the resistance was
violent. Riots, even when no one is physically harmed, are also considered violent
because they result in the destruction of property. Acts of nonviolent resistance
include mass protests, organized boycotts, and strikes. Strikes were a common tool
of colonial subjects that were used to coerce concessions from local industry but were
also, in some cases, explicitly nationalist. For example, during the war in Cyprus, over
1,000 Cypriots organized a hunger strike to protest British policies, and in Palestine,
the 1936-1939 Arab nationalists successfully orchestrated a general strike for months
until it petered out and devolved into a more conventional violent insurgency.
0.7 Variable 2, Concessions
The second variable, and my main dependent variable, is a concession from the
metropole to the colony. I define a concession as a substantive policy change that
favored the colony. This definition excludes smaller favorable actions made by the
local colonial government and larger repressive actions made by a combination of
metropolitan and local police forces. The revocation of a constitution or the declara-
tion of an emergency was a substantive policy change, but did not favor the colony.
Other colonial acts did favor colonial subjects, such as a reduction in the amount
of taxes collected or increasing investments in specific areas. These types of changes
were often made at the local level by colonial or district governors and did not require
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metropolitan input.
Colonial concessions by the metropole to the colony consisted of three main cat-
egories. The first category consists of constitutional reforms or amendments. These
reforms often expanded suffrage, increased internal self-government, and established
institutions with native control. The second category consists of expanding the leg-
islative council. Expanding the legislative council was an easy concession to make
that increased local representation without requiring the process of a constitutional
amendment. In the vast majority of cases, the seats added to the legislative council
were seats earmarked to be held by native, and not European, elites. This helped
dilute the power of the European seats. In theory and in practice, expanding the
legislative council increased the representation of the non-European population. The
third category includes all other substantial reforms. In Palestine, these reforms con-
sisted of restricting or relaxing immigration for one of the two ethnic groups engaged
in conflict. During the decolonization era, the British recognized native national-
ist leaderships by holding a constitutional conference to discuss independence plans.
These acts are coded as concessions.
In my theoretical model, concessions are enacted by the metropole in order to
provide some benefit to the colonies. Concretely, these benefits usually resulted in
the granting of rights, increased representation, or increased suffrage. Concessions
are also directed to one specific colony and not an empire-wide reform, such as the
British Colonial Development Act which changed widespread imperial policy but did
not take into account facts on the ground in each colony. Within the colonial empires,
concessions were not a tactic used only by the metropole. Colonial governors and even
27
district governors used concessions as well. However, these were more often smaller
concessions that related to the day-to-day governance of a colony, namely tax relief
and colonial investments. Local level officials could accede to the demands of colonial
subjects by redistributing colonial investments or by selectively choosing not to collect
legally mandated taxes. This, however, required no change in colonial policy, and was
determined by local and colonial governors, not metropolitan politicians.
0.8 Variable 3, Strategic Importance
As in any hierarchical relationship, the metropole benefited or perceived to benefit
from ruling its colonies. In modern imperial systems, the value of each colony to the
metropole can vary considerably. Indeed, the importance of some colonies can be
high enough that maintaining colonial rule is analogous to maintaining the territorial
integrity of the state, as was the case with France’s attachment to Algeria. In the
British Empire, colonies were also symbolically important, with India acquiring the
moniker of the “Jewel in the Crown” of Britain.
Colonies varied in their importance to the metropole. While some colonies pro-
duced economic benefits in terms of large amounts revenue to the colonial office,
the primary way in which a colony was important was for strategic reasons. In the
20th century, the metropole was almost entirely unconcerned with the finances of
the colonies. Strategically important colonies were colonies where it was important
for the British to maintain sufficient control over the inner workings of the colony
in order to provide quick and uninterrupted access to its military bases. A colony’s
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geographic location helped elevate the colony’s strategic importance. Colonies like
Malta, Cyprus, and Palestine spanned small geographic areas but were proximate
to the main theaters of potential conflict in Asia. The Middle Eastern mandates,
namely Iraq, Kuwait, and Bahrain, were important as well but the main strategic
goal of keeping the oil flowing could be achieved without too much meddling in in-
ternal affairs.
The strategic value of a colony was commonly discussed in the metropole during
the decolonization era. While there was rarely a unanimous agreement among British
policymakers that a colony was strategically essentially, there was a general lack of
debate around these issues. This was possibly due to the rather technical military
information required in order for a policymaker to make an informed judgment of a
colony’s strategic value, including the depth of the water near its accessible ports and
how changes in naval technology altered the mobility of naval vessels and the flying
range of airplanes. In many cases, the archives show Cabinet, Foreign Office, and
Colonial Office officials taking their cue on what colonies were strategically important
from rather dry analyses authored by military specialists.
Importantly, this variable in my theoretical model is concerned with perceived
rather than objective strategic importance. The British excelled at generating post-
hoc justifications for their behavior and maintaining mythologies about the unique
characteristics of colonies. Objective measures of strategic importance—for exam-
ple by counting the number of military bases or geographical distance to potential
theaters of war—risks misunderstanding how British policymakers understood their
colonial empire and how they made decisions based on that understanding. For
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these reasons, any discussion of strategic importance will be in reference to perceived
strategic importance, rather than any objective measure.
Strategic importance varied over time. This occurred for a number of reasons. The
strategic importance of a colony was linked to other colonial possessions. When India
became independent in 1947, for example, the British downgraded the importance of
maintaining control over nearby Ceylon. Relinquishing India also encouraged British
withdrawal from the formerly strategically essential Mandate Palestine. With India,
Palestine, and Ceylon independent, maintaining a foothold in Cyprus became a pre-
ferred option in the metropole. Non-colonial factors mattered as well. Troubles with
sterling increased the importance of colonies like Malaya. Malaya possessed abundant
rubber plantations which were exported and used to convert sterling into dollars and
ease monetary pressures (Sutton, 2015). Importantly, the metropole viewed troubles
with sterling as a threat to the security of the British empire and less as a direct
economic benefit (Krozewski, 2001).
Strategically important colonies made successful bargaining between the metropole
and the native colonial leadership difficult in the era of decolonization. In colonies
that were not strategically important, the metropole was able to grant concessions and
devolve autonomy without jeopardizing their core interest. In the era of widespread
capital markets and international exchange, a former metropole would be able to
enjoy access to trade and raw materials with its former colony once it achieves in-
dependence. Sovereignty for colonies did not threaten economic exchange. What
it did threaten was the metropole’s access to military bases and the strategic use
of a colony’s territory. No postcolonial leader would be able to credibly commit to
30
the metropole that, after they received independence, they would allow the metropole
continued access to their colony by the former metropole’s military forces, which sym-
bolized the very force that dominated the colony prior to independence. Metropolitan
reluctance to grant concessions in response to anticolonial resistance made it more
likely in the postwar era for hierarchically organized violence to occur. As Howe
writes “it was already apparent by the later 1940s that two types of colonial territory
would pose particular problems: those with substantial white settler populations and
those of strategic importance to Britain and/or the USA” (Howe, 1993, 146).
0.9 Variable 4, Metropolitan Attention
In contrast to nation-states, the core-periphery division in an imperial polity means
that metropolitan territorial control may not be consolidated throughout the empire.
Areas under control of the metropole are much more in flux as well—territorial gains
can come and go in an empire without jeopardizing the fundamental institutional
core of the state itself. Britain could lose India and remain Britain but Spain without
Catalonia would perhaps be a fundamentally different entity. The sheer number of
formal colonies and areas with informal territorial control or even informal influence
that are under metropolitan control in an imperial system means that metropolitan
attention to each area is not constant. Quite simply, the metropole can safely ignore
some areas at the expense of others.
I argue that metropolitan attention is the mechanism linking resistance in a colo-
nial territory with any substantive change in metropolitan policy. The hierarchical
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structure of imperial systems provides local-level governors with sufficient powers
and resources to run colonies with limited metropolitan intervention and only occa-
sional or regular oversight. Large-scale policy changes become more likely when the
metropole becomes involved in colonial affairs simply because the metropole controls
the resources and means in order to make these changes. Empire-wide reforms may
occur but are likely to apply to regional groupings of colonies or to the entire colonial
system and not to any specific colony.
Metropolitan attention is a mechanism less in the Elsterian sense of a explanation
without a prediction, and more of a necessary condition for resistance to cause con-
cessions (Elster, 2015). In order for the metropole to grant policy concessions to the
colony, they must at first know about the unrest. When anticolonial resistance occurs
in a colony, the metropole may discuss the colony more to figure out the proper way
to address the colonial unrest. Unrest without attention does not lead to reforms.
This is, admittedly, a low bar—metropoles receive fairly regular information about
the goings on in their territories, so there will be some level of metropolitan attention
paid to each territory. One of the reasons why violence is, on average, more effective
than nonviolence in changing metropolitan policy is because violence is much more
likely to increase metropolitan attention. In Chapter 0.33, I examine the parliamen-
tary debates in the House of Commons to see how violence and nonviolence affects
the character of that attention. While metropolitan attention is theoretically impor-
tant, the variable’s high level of variation and ease of measurement makes it useful
for empirically assessing the effects of violent and nonviolent actions.
How does understanding metropolitan attention matter for understanding the rel-
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ative effects of violence and nonviolence on concessions? The answer is that resistance
causes concessions via attention. This happens in two ways: resistance increases the
amount of attention to a colony from the metropole, and resistance also changes the
discourse about the colony in the metropole. The empirical implication here is that
when resistance occurs, the metropole will discuss the colony and will do so in dif-
ferent ways depending on whether the type of resistance is violent or nonviolent. My
theory predicts that violence in a colony will lead to increased attention to that colony
relative to nonviolence, and that violence changes the character of the attention in
important ways, while the impact of nonviolent resistance is smaller.
My theory maintains that violence will have a bigger impact on concessions than
nonviolence because violence leads to more metropolitan attention that is conducive
to granting concessions. Why then does violent resistance capture the attention of
the metropole more than nonviolence? What is it about actions like riots, bomb-
ings, physical attacks, gun raids, etc. that capture so much attention while strikes,
boycotts, and protests can be safely ignored by the metropole?
One potential answer is that violent actions are simply more costly in terms of
resources than nonviolent actions. The destruction of buildings, infrastructure, and
the lives of colonial rulers harm the economy of the colony itself and reduce colonial
extraction. Nonviolence, while not conducive to economic growth, simply doesn’t
have the immediate ability to cripple an economy. Numbers matter as well. Doing
serious economic harm via a boycott requires a coordinated effort from a large group
of people. Strikes also have a negative economic impact but are usually concentrated
in a specific industry or place of employment. For violence, a small group of terrorists
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can inflict serious economic harm simply by planting a few bombs in key locations.
Riots need large numbers of people to matter but a semi-spontaneous riot can inflict
serious harm to infrastructure in a short period of time and produce substantial
negative economic consequences.
This argument, while plausible, assumes a number of things about the metropole’s
relationship to its colonies. The most basic assumption is that the metropole is aware
of, and has regular and accurate information about, the economic situation in each
colony. Another assumption is that the metropole cares about the economic situation
and the costs of administering colonial rule and colonial extraction. When the eco-
nomic situation in a colony worsens, so the argument goes, achieving metropolitan
goals with respect to that colony become more difficult. Since the metropole cares
about the economic output of each colony and violence harms that output, violence
in a colony will lead to more discussion in the metropole about that colony, and that
discussion will be primarily concerned with the economic output of the colony.
Ultimately, then, this argument is based on what the goals of imperialism are. This
has been the subject of numerous debates and has important stakes for understanding
why states expand their territorial control. Most theories, even ones that locate
the source of imperial expansion in great power politics, concede that economics
plays some role in encouraging states to expand, whether that is through planned
expeditions to extract resources or by haphazardly seizing control of non-state actors
(as in the case of the Dutch and British East India companies). However, the sources
of imperial expansion need not be related at all to the sources of imperial contraction.
While there is no logical connection as to why the cause of imperial expansion should
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lead to contraction at a later time, the fundamental changes in the international
system and the world economy make it even more likely that centripetal pressures
for imperial contraction are unrelated to centrifugal ones.
Economics, of course, plays a role. However, my theory contends that metropoles,
because they are states themselves engaged in a hierarchical relationship to other colo-
nial states, are fundamentally concerned about security in an era of imperial decline.
This does not deny that colonial extraction matters, but what it does deny is that
colonial extraction matters for those in the metropole during the era of imperial
decline. Extracting revenue mattered tremendously to colonial governors and more
local-level colonial officials. However, for those in the metropole, the metropole’s
relationship to its colonial possessions is one hierarchical relationship between units
among many. Declining metropoles attempt to manage their existing imperial pos-
sessions and foster beneficial post-independence relationships with their colonies. In
the era of imperial decline, security concerns are paramount because today’s colonies
will be tomorrow’s independent states.
British leaders in London could not pay equal attention to all of their colonies.
Indeed, metropolitan negligence was baked into imperial rule. Colonial governors
ruled over district administrators, and the metropolitan government was quite happy
to let the agent in the principle-agent relationship rule the colony without unnecessary
interference. In some sense, metropolitan attention to a colony was a failure of local
colonial governing. Moreover, there were regularly scheduled avenues for metropolitan
oversight of the colonies. Territories administered by the Colonial Office were subject
to Question Time in Parliament. The production of annual reports–collected for
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posterity in the appropriate nicknamed ’Blue Books’—occupied substantial resources
of colonial officials and the numbers contained in these reports contained enormous
detail about colonial happenings. For example, if the metropole cared to know about
how many pairs of socks Iraq exported to Palestine in 1937—including whether the
socks were made out of plain cotton yarn mixed with shoddy of wool and cotton or
plain cotton yard mixed with artificial silk–they could consult the Blue Books. The
relevant point here is that metropolitan attention to each one of its colonies by the
cabinet and parliament was attention outside of regularly scheduled channels.
0.10 How Do These Variables Fit Together? A
Theory of Imperial Response
My theory posts that the structure of imperial rule matters for understanding the
differential effects of violent and nonviolent resistance. The British Empire commonly
granted concessions to its colonies. This is in contrast to federally structured nation-
states where segmented states within the federal structure may seek concessions. In
those cases, reputational effects and the need to preserve territorial integrity make
concessions that increase autonomy to secessionists risky (Walter, 2009). The nature
of imperial structures means that concessions can more easily be granted to one colony
without substantially encouraging other colonies to demand similar concessions. (The
British feared that giving concessions to one African country would inspire demands in
a nearby one, but most of the anticipated contagion was for geographically proximate
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colonies, not all of those within the empire.) In response to violence, then, concessions
can be granted without jeopardizing the entirety of imperial rule.
What is a colony? I adopt Go and Watson (2019)’s definition of a formal colony
(which echoes (Osterhammel, 1997)’s) as “a territory that is under the sovereign
power of a state but which is classified and treated as juridically and administratively
inferior to other areas and peoples under the sovereign” (Go and Watson, 2019, 35).
Go and Watson also distinguish formal colonial empires from federalist systems (akin
to Russia’s land empire and the United States in the 19th century) and monarchist
regimes like the Hapsburg Empire. The main difference between these structures and
a formal colonial empire is that in federalist systems and monarchist regimes “the
territories are equal in the sense that they are each equally subject to the control and
power of the center. Everyone except the king or group of rulers is a subject; the
citizen-subject binary does not apply” (Go and Watson, 2019, 35).
I argue that, unlike federally structured nation-states, the distance (in terms of
geographic but also in terms of information and control) between the metropole and
its colonies meant that policymakers in the metropole were much less frequently
concerned with the goings on in each individual colony. Metropolitan attention to
colonies was at a premium. In order for subjects to do something that led to a change
in policy, they needed to get the attention of the metropole. Since the amount of
attention devoted to each colony was low and the default position in most cases was
to delegate authority and control to local-level officials, metropolitan policymakers
were quite happy to not discuss a colony and let colonial governors administer the
colony and perform other, non-imperial tasks.
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Resistance had the potential to disrupt this equilibrium. Resistance could over-
whelm the capacity of local colonial state to repress, contain, or defuse the resistance.
Resistance was also visible to outside and domestic observers. Unrest in the colonies
undermined the reputation of the British as benevolent colonial rulers who were
shepherding their subjects into the next stage of development. Resistance in the
colonies could also inject colonial issues into metropolitan politics. Since resistance
signaled that local colonial officials were unable to maintain order in their colonies, the
metropole responded by discussing the situation in the colony. For the British Em-
pire, important discussions of colonial unrest occurred in the House of Commons and
the Cabinet. Both institutions routinely conversed with local officials in the Colonial
and Foreign Offices. It was in these institutions where the appropriate metropolitan
response was discussed and debated.
All else equal, metropolitan governments preferred no resistance in their colonies.
Resistance inhibited tax collection, the building of the colonial state, the extension
of colonial investments, and perhaps most importantly, entangled empires in colonial
wars. At the same time, metropoles would prefer not to devote extra-institutional
metropolitan attention to colonies. The structure of imperial rule created local gov-
ernors and colonial officials whose job it was to oversee and administer the colonies.
As in any principal-agent relationship, the principal (the metropole) preferred that
the agent (colonial officials) do what the principal delegated the agent to do with as
minimal oversight and interference as possible. The default state of the metropole
was thus to spend as little attention and hope for as little resistance as possible in
their colonies.
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If the theorized overall effect of resistance is to increase metropolitan attention,
why does the difference between violence and nonviolence resistance matter? I argue
that violence is effective against imperial rule for two reasons. Violence was better
able to increase metropolitan attention to the colonies. This attention made it pos-
sible for the metropole to respond by offering colonial concessions. Violence is more
effective at garnering metropolitan attention because violence made it very difficult
to maintain colonial rule. Nonviolent resistance simply did not garner the attention of
the metropole because strikes, protests, and boycotts could be easily dealt with using
traditional colonial methods of concessions made by the local colonial government.
Increasing wages, for one, was a tried and true tactic of officials in colonial Africa.
It is not that nonviolent resistance was futile or ineffective—indeed, nonviolent re-
sistance by colonial subjects likely had a serious impact on the development of the
colonial state and patterns of taxation and investments. The fiscal state of a colony
was, of course, important and affected the lives of colonial subjects. However, the
metropole controlled the most important political features of the colonial state: its
constitution, level of suffrage, political representation, etc. Nonviolence may grant a
wage increase but could not bring about a reformed constitution or self-government.
The defining feature of violent relative to nonviolent activity is that violence
can kill. The threat of armed resistance raised the possibility that colonial subjects
and colonial officials could be killed. Deaths and property damage signaled to the
metropole that the local colonial government could not adequately govern the colonial
state. Therefore, my theory posits that violent resistance will have a more substan-
tial effect on metropolitan attention that nonviolent resistance. Violence will both
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increase the amount of attention and also change the character of that attention.
Violence will lead to more attention simply because violence is much less likely to be
ignored. In addition, violence demands a response. Attention is increased since there
is generally more discussion on how to respond to violent resistance.
For nonviolent resistance, the effects are different. The agent in the principal-agent
imperial relationship can be tasked with dealing with nonviolent more than violent
resistance. In the British Empire, containing strikes, protests, and boycotts was the
province of local officials. Crushing violent resistance often required metropolitan
troops. Nonviolent resistance can more easily be combated with local police (rather
than military) forces. Colonial governors did not want the increased oversight that
came with using metropolitan resources to combat unrest. They preferred to use
their own resources to quell unrest, and were better able to do so when the unrest
was nonviolent rather than violent.
Therefore, violent activity in the colonies is more likely to invite metropolitan
involvement and attention. Nonviolent activity is more likely to be ignored by the
metropole. Why then does metropolitan attention lead to colonial concessions?
The goal of imperial rule was to maintain control of colonial possessions at a
low cost. Granting concessions that increased colonial autonomy was a cheap way
to defuse future anticolonial resistance. Concessions could be granted to the colonies
that both demonstrated metropolitan goodwill and delegitimized nationalist grievances
against colonial rule. Metropoles could also choose to repress anticolonial resistance.
Importantly, concession and repression were not mutually exclusive. Indeed, in the
20th century metropoles commonly deployed troops to colonies to repress an upris-
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ing while at the same time instituting policies to increase colonial autonomy. Local
colonial police forces often engaged in wanton repression of resistance movements.
Since the importance of colonies to the metropole varies, the response from the
metropole when resistance occurs in a colony should differ. I argue that the perceived
strategic importance of a colony determines the metropolitan response to unrest.
When a colony is strategically important and resistance occurs, the metropole will
be much more reluctant to grant concessions. Granting concessions when violent
resistance occurs in strategically important colonies risks empowering violent actors,
increases the autonomy of the colony relative to the metropole, and jeopardizes the
metropole’s access to these military bases.
Perceived strategic importance is a subset of the more general tendency to be
unwilling to grant concessions. Colonies with substantial settler populations created
bargaining problems between the metropole and the local colonial government, which
also inhibited the granting of concessions. In Palestine, the British government faced
the difficult task of crafting policy that satisfied both the Arab and Jewish popula-
tions, while fulfilling the terms of the League of Nations and later United Nations
mandate. The pervasive view that relinquishing Algeria would cause a civil war in
mainland France (which almost did happen) encouraged the metropole to actively
fight Algeria’s independence movement.
Concessions, however, are not all the same. My theory predicts that strategically
important colonies will be less likely to receive concessions in the face of anticolonial
resistance. However, concessions are still a policy tool that the metropole did use
in their relationship with strategically important colonies. Since the metropole did
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not want to relinquish control over strategically important colonies, but concessions
did occur, then we would expect that concessions in strategically important colonies
are in some ways different than concessions in colonies that were not strategically
important colonies. Increasing the suffrage share was an effective way to increase
representation and defuse anticolonial sentiment. In strategically important colonies,
increasing the suffrage share risked the metropole losing control over the colony to
colonial subjects. This suggests that concessions should increase the suffrage share
of a colony, but in strategically important colonies, concessions should have no effect
on the suffrage share.
Graphical Schematics
Here I graphically present how these variables interact and the predicted effects of
different combinations of variables. I first illustrate the classic hub-and-spoke struc-
ture of formal imperial rule. Figure 0.1a presents the structure of imperialism under
ideal conditions (at least from the metropole’s perspective). The black lines represent
formal and regular connections. Here, the metropole has regular and institutional-
ized oversight of the colonial government. The colonial government reports to the
metropole on the goings on of all the colonies. The arrows running from the colonial
government to the metropole indicate the metropole’s role of providing oversight to
the colonial government while allowing the colonial government to manage the polit-
ical situation in the colonies. The arrow running from the local government to the
colony indicates that the local government administers the state in these contexts.
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In this scenario, the metropole has no direct involvement with colonial affairs and
delegates colonial policy to the local colonial government.
When resistance happens, the relationship between the nodes change. Figure 0.1b
shows direct connections between the colony and the metropole when anticolonial re-
sistance occurs. The red arrow indicates that happenings in the colony are being
discussed in the metropole and bypass the local colonial government. This infor-
mation can travel in a number of ways, via personal contacts between local colonial
officials and domestic critics of empire within the metropole, newspaper reporting,
or by metropolitan oversight of colonial affairs outside of regular reporting (in the
British Empire, for example, each colony issued periodic reports on the state of the
colony, and on occasion officials from the Colonial Office would be publicly queried
during parliamentary Question Time). In turn, the metropole becomes directly in-
volved in local colonial politics, as represented by the blue line. Once involved in
local politics, the metropole can either grant a concession, deploy imperial troops, or
do both. The relevant point here is that resistance in the periphery overwhelms the
capacity of the local colonial government, forcing the metropole to become involved
in colonial politics outside of regular channels. This allows for the possibility of non-
violent resistance, provided that its is large and coordinated enough, to overwhelm
the capacity of the local colonial government and invite metropolitan involvement. In
Chapter 0.25, I examine a particularly effective case of nonviolent resistance during
the early phase of the Arab Revolt in Palestine where most of the Arab Palestinian
population participated in a nonviolent general strike that crippled the colonial econ-
omy. My argument is that violence is on average more effective than nonviolence
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because violence is much better able to overwhelm the capacity of the local colonial






















(b) Imperial Rule and Anticolonial Resistance
The relevance of the structure of imperial rule for understanding the effect of
resistance may become clearer by distinguishing imperial rule from other contexts.
In a federally structured nation-state or even a mass land-based empire, metropolitan
involvement in the peripheral units is much more frequent and integrated with larger
metropolitan policy. Figure 0.2a displays this relationship. Lines connecting the
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metropole to the local colony indicate these formal relationships. Figure 0.2b reflects
a more decentralized relationship between the metropole and its constituent units.
In contrast to a more loosely connected international organization, like the Hanseatic
League or the European Union, the metropole (or core) has no formal authority to
implement substantial policy changes at the local level.2 The imperial rule of 19th
and 20th century European empires was not rule over entities possessing territorial
sovereignty, nor was it analogous to the territorially contiguous United States in the













(b) Hierarchical rule under an informal empire or in-
ternational organization.
The above models illustrate the structure of imperial rule and how metropolitan
involvement in colonial affairs changes due to anticolonial resistance. Here I present
simpler models that represent testable hypotheses about the differential effects of
violent and nonviolent resistance on metropolitan attention and concessions from the
2For an argument for viewing the EU as an imperial polity, see Marks (2012).
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metropole to the colony.
First, I separate resistance into its violent and nonviolent forms. As argued above,
violence is more likely to overwhelm the resources and capabilities of local colonial
governments and invite metropolitan attention. Increased metropolitan attention in
turn demands a response to the unrest. I this case, I assume that granting conces-
sions is politically feasible and not terribly costly to the metropole. The metropole
responds to unrest by granting concessions and reforms, which they hope will defuse
future unrest. Nonviolence does not increase the likelihood that the metropole will
grant concessions because nonviolence is handled by the local colonial government.
Metropolitan attention does not increase, and thus does not prompt the need to
reform the government. Figure 0.3 displays these relationships.
Concession Attention Local Gov’t
Violence
Nonviolence
Figure 0.3: Relative Effects of Violent and Nonviolent Resistance
These dynamics differ for strategically important colonies. Colonies where it is too
costly for the metropole to grant reforms will not respond to increased metropolitan
attention with reforms. In these colonies (see Figure 0.4), granting reforms jeopardizes
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the metropole’s interest in the colony. Reforms can empower nationalists which risks
the wholesale loss of a colony and important accesses to the colony’s military bases.
The metropole can always simultaneously repress the subjects in a colony and grant
reforms; in strategically important colonies, only repression occurs. Over time these
colonies continually fail to coerce autonomy from the metropole. In turn, a much
larger scale campaign of violence may erupt. Today’s refusal to concede can lead to
tomorrows guerrilla warfare. Importantly, for strategically important colonies, the
link between violence, nonviolence, and metropolitan attention generally remains the
same as in other colonies. There are two important difference for these colonies.
First, even when attention is high, the metropole will not respond to the unrest with
concessions for the reasons argued above. Second, both violence and nonviolence may
lead to higher levels of metropolitan attention than in other colonies. Strategically
important colonies are, by definition, colonies that are important to the metropole.
The metropole may pay more attention, on average, to events in those colonies, which
means that even sufficiently coordinated nonviolent activity can garner metropolitan
attention (even though that attention will not lead to concessions). I explore these
dynamics empirically in Chapter 0.25.
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Concession Attention Local Gov’t
Violence
Nonviolence
Figure 0.4: Resistance in a Strategically Important Colony
However, the effect of violence on metropolitan attention is not constant. In a
large-scale colonial conflict (where the metropole has decided to engage in widespread
repression and an armed group has launched an insurgency) the effect of violence on
attention attenuates over time. Violence works in part because it shocks the status
quo. In colonial wars, the metropole expects violence. Figure 0.5 represents the
declining effect of violence on attention with a dotted line. Since violence has a de-
creasing effect on metropolitan attention over time, and the metropole has already
decided that the colony is worth repressing with a counterinsurgency war, the atten-
tion in this scenario has no effect on concessions. In these scenarios, nonviolence has
very little effect on metropolitan attention, as the example of thousands of protesters
engaging in a hunger strike during the Cyprus emergency shows (Correspondent,
1957).
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Concession Attention Local Gov’t
Violence
Nonviolence
Figure 0.5: Violence During a Colonial Conflict
Clarifying the Role of Violence
As articulated, the role of violence in my theory of imperial response is, at different
times, a cause of concessions and a result from not receiving enough concessions. This
is by design. Violence in purposefully endogenous in the theory because otherwise,
the empirical analysis would treat the manifold forms of violence that resisted the
British Empire as interchangeable. They were not. In Chapter 0.25, I disaggregate
both violence and nonviolence into hierarchically organized and spontaneous forms of
resistance, in effect splitting the variable of violence into terrorist campaigns and mass
riots. The relationships between violence, concessions, and attention were different
when the British metropole was engaged in an counterinsurgency campaign against
anticolonial rebels. Attention becomes less responsive to violence as a campaign goes
on. Concessions against hierarchically organized resistance was often not designed to
increase the welfare of the masses but to placate the hierarchically organized resistance
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group. Hierarchically organized violence was more likely to occur after the metropole
failed to improve the welfare of the masses after an episode of spontaneous violence.
0.11 Hypotheses
In this section I connect my broader theory on imperial response to specific hypotheses
regarding the relationship between resistance, attention, concessions in the British
Empire.
The British imperial project had two main goals in the 20th century: extracting
resources from the colonies and providing strategic military bases. Nonviolent activity
was unable threaten the stability of colonial rule. The colonial project could operate
relatively smoothly despite strikes, protests, and boycotts. Violence, however, killed
people, destroyed colonial investments, and made ruling a colony more difficult. This
generates hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Violent resistance within a colony should be more likely to lead
to concessions by the colonial state than nonviolence.
Alternatively, if the theorized mechanisms for why nonviolent resistance works
are present, then we would expect nonviolence to precede concessions. Nonviolence
could threaten the stability of colonial rule if it was large enough and sufficiently
coordinated. Moreover, if the cost of devolving power to the colonies was less than
the cost of repressing nonviolent activity and possibly encouraging a turn to violence,
then we would see nonviolent activity be more likely to precede concessions. This
generates hypothesis 2.
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Hypothesis 2 (H2). Nonviolent resistance within a colony should be more likely to
lead to concessions by the colonial state than violence.
To test the causal mechanism, I investigate the determinants of metropolitan
attention. The metropole was involved with many of the concessions granted. Theo-
retically, the reasons to expect violence and/or nonviolence to predict concessions are
the same reasons we would expect violence and/or nonviolence to explain metropoli-
tan attention to the colonies. That is, imperial rule was sensitive to costs and when
anticolonial resistance imposed cost on colonial rule, the metropole became more in-
volved. Attention can be reflected in the level of discussion of a colony by the British
Cabinet. The corresponding hypotheses regarding the effect of the type of resistance
on metropolitan attention that I test are hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Violence should be a larger predictor of mentions in the cabinet
than nonviolence.
My theory predicts that the metropole’s response to resistance should vary across
colonies. Specifically, violence should be less effective at coercing concessions in strate-
gically important colonies. Granting concessions risked losing control over a colony,
and the British were simply unwilling to do this for colonies that they deemed were
vital to their national security. Accordingly, I test hypotheses 4.
Hypothesis 4 (H4). The effect of violence on concessions should be lower in strate-
gically important colonies.
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As articulated above, my theory also predicts that concessions should have dif-
ferential effects on the suffrage share of a colony, based on whether that colony is
strategically important or not. This generates the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 (H5). Concessions should increase the suffrage share in a colony,
except for strategically important colonies.
In the empirical chapters I test these hypotheses.
0.12 Scope Conditions
What are the scope conditions of this theory? To answer this question it is impor-
tant to decouple the dynamics of imperial expansion and contraction (Abernethy,
2000). Briefly, this theory only applies to an era of imperial decline. This era is
one where imperial retrenchment and withdrawal are realistic policy options and the
goal of metropolitan policymakers is to reduce their colonial commitments. When
empires are seeking to expand, anticolonial resistance can be used a pretext to more
aggressive repression and the formalization of control over colonial subjects. This
pattern occurred in the British Empire during the 19th century after the Morant
Bay uprising in Jamaica and the Indian Mutiny. In both cases, these largely violent
rebellions resulted in significant metropolitan discussion (Gopal, 2019). Metropoli-
tan policy, however, did not result in concessions, but resulted in making Jamaica a
Crown Colony and assuming control from the British East India company. Similar
formalizations of control in response to resistance occurred in the French conquest of
Algeria (Sessions, 2015).
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There are other scope conditions. For one, there must be some formal control
from the empire over a colony. Informal rule, like Britain’s influence of Argentina
and more recent examples of ’neocolonialism’ are not explained by the theory since
informal rule, almost by definition, means that the metropole is not involved in
constitutional issues. In the face of widespread violent resistance in an informally
controlled territory, the metropole has the option to completely disengage and leave
the local (non-colonial) government in charge of responding to the resistance. When
the local government is a colonial one and staffed with metropolitan officials, it is
not a realistic option for the metropole to wash their hands of the local colonial
government and leave them to fend for themselves in response to rebellion.
0.13 Conclusion
This chapter has introduced and discussed the theory of imperial response. The
hub-and-spoke structure of empires matters for understanding state responses to
resistance. When anticolonial resistance is violent, it is more likely to command
metropolitan attention and overwhelm the capabilities of the local colonial govern-
ment. When the anticolonial resistance is nonviolent, it is less likely to command
attention. In an era of imperial decline, metropolitan attention due to violent re-
sistance encourages the metropole to grant reforms to the colony in order to stave
off future unrest. Strategically important colonies make bargaining harder—granting
concessions to these colonies jeopardizes metropolitan security. In these colonies,
concessions are not used to defuse unrest. In the following chapters, I test this theory
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This chapter presents the relevant historical background on the British Empire. My
goal here is to present an overview of how the British Empire operated, how it de-
clined and fell, and to discuss the historical debate on anticolonial resistance and
Britain’s decolonization. I also provide textual detail to some of the major acts of
resistance and the types of reforms that were implemented along with a brief overview
of the counterinsurgency campaigns that the Empire fought. A key part of my the-
ory stipulates that the structure of modern European colonial empires matters for
understanding the effects of anticolonial resistance. To support this claim, I also dis-
cuss how the apparatus of empire—the Colonial Office, Foreign Office, India Office,
etc.—managed the colonies.
The British empire was the largest polity in history (Taagepera, 1978). It con-
tained a wide variety of subordinate states within its hierarchy: crown colonies, pro-
tectorates, UN and League of Nations Mandate trust territories, and states with no
formal colonial apparatus that experienced substantial informal pressure from Lon-
don. The peak of the empire’s geographic reach occurred immediate after World War
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I, when both Britain and France acquired the former colonial possessions of the fallen
German and Ottoman empires. In addition to these dependent possessions, there
were the dominions: Canada, Australia, and South Africa, which in the 20th century
had little formal or legal connection to Britain but British influence still mattered.
Britain also practiced informal empire. Britain was the dominant external actor in
Argentina’s financial and monetary policy (Cain and Hopkins, 2014), and exerted
substantial influence over the internal affairs of its former Middle Eastern colonies,
specifically Egypt and Iraq (Darwin, 1999). Britain’s informal relationships with
the newly independent Middle Eastern colonies revolved around specific issues. For
Egypt, Britain cared most about access to its military bases in the Suez Canal, while
for Iraq, the main goal was controlling its oil.
Britain’s Empire began declining from its height after World War I (Hyam, 2007).
While Britain was severely harmed by the war, the global conflagration did more
damage to Germany and the Ottoman Empire, allowing others to pick up the pieces.
The newly acquired formerly Ottoman territory of Palestine was administered under
the auspices of the League of Nations. This was the last colonial possession that
Britain would acquire. From this point forward, the balance of control slowly shifted
from the metropole to Britain’s colonies. Some colonies formed nationalist organiza-
tions. The Indian Nationalist Congress was founded in 1885. During the 1920s, it
became the main institution agitating for Indian independence. Other organizations
and resistance movements would follow, both inspiring and emulating each other.
The expansion of the British empire was driven by why Cain and Hopkins called
“gentlemanly capitalism”—that is, the confluence of financial interests located in
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London that encouraged British expansion abroad and benefited from access to ex-
port markets and raw materials (Cain and Hopkins, 2014). In their view, geopolitics
mattered for where Britain expanded, but the main impetus behind the pressure to
expand was the combination of financial interests in “the City” and landed interests.
Provincial manufacturers, the traditional bugbear of imperial expansion (Hobson,
2018), were secondary. Part of this global financial network was the sterling sys-
tem of monetary exchange, which included the dominions. The empire’s role in this
system (whereby colonies sold goods and raw materials on the world market and con-
verted sterling into dollars) helped cushion some of the negative impact from Britain’s
postwar sterling crises (Krozewski, 2001). Generally, sterling was the primary way in
which colonial economic issues mattered to policymakers in London largely because
they viewed sterling issues through the lens of domestic politics and international
security.
This study ignores partisan politics largely because there was an established con-
sensus about the role of Britain’s empire and the need to maintain it across parties,
with the exception of the radical flank of the Labour party (Howe, 2002). Both
the Labour’s base in the manufacturing sector and the Conservative’s base in the
’gentlemanly capitalism’ of the London-based financial sector benefited from British
imperialism (Narizny, 2007). For example, the 1945 Labour Party’s manifesto only
made one vague reference to imperial politics (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2016, 24). Why then
did these interest groups not resist the slow devolution of power from the metropole
to the colonies? Part of the answer lies in the changing international system and
how those changes altered the costs and benefits of imperial annexation. In short,
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as markets became more integrated globally, Britain’s manufacturing and financial
sector could maintain their interests in peripheral markets without formal annexa-
tion. This helps explain why, for example, the Middle Eastern territories of Iraq and
Egypt were so easily relinquished. For Iraq, Britain’s control over the oil industry was
secure without formal control. For Egypt, which was under heavy informal influence
by Britain for decades, formal control was essentially superfluous. After each colony
received independence, British military and economic influence remained prominent
(Narizny, 2007, 223).
For much of the British Empire, there was little partisan difference between the
Labour and Conservative parties on imperial issues. Labour could hardly be de-
scribed as anticolonialist, although they did advocate for a more gentle and efficient
form of colonial rule. Yet a substantial number of colonies received independence
under the conservative rule of Harold Macmillan. There were few strident critics
of colonialism within the British government. Exceptions include Fenner Brockway
and the short-lived Movement for Colonial Freedom. It is debatable to what extent
these anticolonial activists within the metropole changed British policy (Howe, 1993;
Goldsworthy, 1971; Gopal, 2019). The relevant point is that, with few exceptions,
the so-called imperial consensus present in British high politics was that questions of
Empire revolved around the costs and benefits of colonialism, and not on any moral
argument.
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0.15 What are the explanations for Britain’s
decolonization?
Imperial historians have long debated the causes of Britain’s decolonization. Decolo-
nization was a global process that meant different things to different empires and to
different colonies.
Standard explanations for Britain’s decolonization can be categorized in the fol-
lowing way. There is the argument that Britain granted independence to each of
its formal colonies due to her benevolent nature. In this view, decolonization was
altruistic and pragmatic and Britain chose this path not out of weakness, but out
of strength. This was the view of Harold Macmillan and much of the conservative
establishment, which helped to garner broader support for the granting of indepen-
dence. Others have argued that as global capitalism spread, businesses viewed the
end of formal colonialism as profitable, and therefore pressured the British estab-
lishment to abandon their colonies (Baran, 1962). Strachey (1961) has argued that
changes in the domestic political environment led to changes in British colonial pol-
icy. Colonialism had become at best passé and at worst an embarrassment. There
is also the view that Britain’s economic and political decline was the root cause of
decolonization. Darwin (2017) counters this claim by pointing out that many other
empires experienced even more drastic declines without abandoning their imperial
possessions. Then there is the peripheral account of Britain’s decolonization: an-
ticolonial nationalists within the colony replaced willing collaborators, exposing the
weakness of the colonial state and making colonies more trouble than they were worth
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(Holland, 1985). Darwin, perhaps unsatisfyingly, attributes Britain’s decolonization
to three competing forces: “the domestic politics of ’decline’; the tectonic shifts of
relative power, wealth, and legitimacy at the international level; and the colonial (or
semi-colonial) politics of locality, province, and nation” Darwin (2017, 552). Ronald
Hyam offers a cricket analogy to categories the different explanations for decoloniza-
tion: “Either the British were bowled out (by nationalists and freedom-fighters), or
they were run out (by imperial overstretch and economic constraints), or they retired
hurt (because of a collapse of morale and ’failure of will’), or they were booed off the
field (by international criticism and especially by United Nations clamor)” (Hyam,
2007, xiii).
This study is not concerned with adjudicating between these competing explana-
tions. All explain some variation in colonial policy. My goal, rather, is to show that
conflating anticolonial resistance with the postwar nationalism within the colonies
misses the frequency and intensity of resistance in the prewar era that may or may
not have been explicitly nationalist. In addition, the pattern of violent resistance and
response with concessions accelerated in the postwar era but was not confined to it.
The seeds of decolonization and independence were planted before the end of World
War II and indeed began sprouting before that period.
How did anticolonial resistance affect decolonization? Krozewski (2001) offers
a qualification of accounts that attribute independence to anticolonial nationalism.
Krozewski’s thesis is that resistance only mattered when it threatened Britain’s ster-
ling relationships. This is a bold claim. Krozewski’s study confines itself to the
immediate postwar period, when Britain experienced a sterling crisis that threatened
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to destabilize its imperial relationships along with the daily functioning of the British
state. Nevertheless there is some evidence to support his claim. He cites the Gold
Coast and Malaya, where concessions in response to anticolonial resistance assisted
metropolitan management of sterling. This was indeed the case (perhaps more so in
the case of Malaya) but as I argue, the imperative to manage imperial sterling rela-
tionships did not lead to concessions—they merely facilitated their implementation.
Krozewski offers additional reasons as to why anticolonial resistance was ultimately
a cause of decolonization are. He argues that in most territories resistance had little
effect on imperial economic relations, “Britain’s retreat from the empire in 1960 was
unexpected” (Krozewski, 2001, 207) and thus not driven by events in the colonies,
and that external changes in the international system led to both anticolonial resis-
tance and concessions. In other words, both resistance and concessions were jointly
caused by international changes.
Things did change in 1960, and did so unexpectedly. In Cape Town, South Africa,
Prime Minister Harold Macmillan delivered a shocking speech to the Parliament of
South Africa, which became known as the “Wind of Change” speech (Ovendale,
1995). Here, Macmillan signaled that the conservative government would no longer
block reforms to the colonies and decolonization would be allowed to unfold with
little metropolitan resistance. It was an acknowledgment that the nationalist genie
could not be put back in the colonial bottle. Interestingly, Macmillan had delivered
an almost identical speech earlier that year in the Gold Coast, but the British media
largely ignored it. What led to this speech and pivot towards independence for the
colonies? Goldsworthy (1971) argues that the driving force in the change of policy
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was the new secretary of state for the colonies, Iain Macleod, and his realization
that continued colonial rule would lead to bloodshed. Darwin (1988) also argues that
many officials in the Colonial Office feared that what happened in Malaya would
happen all over Africa. Moreover, officials did not wonder how a sustained coun-
terinsurgency campaign in Africa would fare for a colonial power. France’s failure
in Algeria and the war in the Belgian Congo demonstrated to British officials the
immense costs that resistance to concessions could impose on a metropole (Ovendale,
1995, 457). The Suez debacle, of course, changed things as well and displayed the
limits of Britain’s military prowess abroad while also highlighting the importance
of world opinion. Macmillan delivered the “Wind of Change” speech in 1960. By
1964, Cyprus, Malta, Kuwait, Jamaica, Malaya, and Trinidad and Tobago, received
independence (Stockwell, 2017, 77).
In Heinlein’s study of British imperial policy, he explains Britain’s decision to
grant independence to a colony as driven by their belief that “the goodwill of lo-
cal nationalists [was] the best guarantee for [preserving British] interests” (Heinlein,
2013, 6). The prospect of favorable postwar relations determined the course of de-
colonization. Colonial leaders that favored maintaining a strong post-independence
relationship soothed Britain’s concerns about how independence would harm their
interests. Pressure to grant independence had to be balanced against the need to
cultivate a colonial elite that could insure favorable post-independence relations. In
Burma, for example, policymakers feared that maintaining colonial rule past its ex-
piration date would lead to ill-will among the colonial elite and lead Burma to leave
the Commonwealth (and Britain’s sphere of influence) after independence (Heinlein,
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2013, 45-46). In Malaya, concessions were used to garner support for the population
as a way to reduce the appeal of communism (Heinlein, 2013, 109). Heinlein offers
qualified support for the argument that nationalist pressure encouraged Britain’s de-
colonization: “in some cases, [nationalists] proved a nuisance, in others it was the
prospect of a strong nationalist movement emerging which prodded Britain towards
action. More often than not, however, the demands of nationalist groups only some-
what accelerated constitutional advance without being at the root of any radical
changes” (Heinlein, 2013, 303).
In her overview of British decolonization, Stockwell summarizes the current view
among historians that decolonization resulted from “some combination of metropoli-
tan weakness and anti-colonial political movements in bringing about post-war im-
perial dissolution...the British empire fell victim to the same global forces as other
modern empires as world war reconfigured colonial politics and tilted power away
from the old western European imperial powers and towards new centres” (Stock-
well, 2017, 65). This is a systemic argument, that locates the cause of Britain’s
decolonization in global processes that make it harder for empires to thrive and favor
a system of sovereign nation-states.
In his influential article on British decolonization, John Darwin identifies four
issues that must be studied in order to understand why Britain’s empire ended and
the decisions that policymakers took. They are: “How rapidly and how completely
would British power contract? How swiftly would self-government be conceded to
the extremely heterogeneous collection of territories that constituted the imperial
system? What would self-government amount to when and if it were granted? And
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what kind of post-colonial relationship would be established between Britain and
her ex-colonies?” (Darwin, 1984, 88). In answering these questions Darwin cautions
scholars of empire not to interpret the plans articulated by colonial officials as being
more than self-serving justifications for their haphazard improvisations to quickly
changing political pressures. The mandarins of the Colonial Office reacted quickly
to changing circumstances, he argues, and the actual policies of the empire reflected
the decisions made in response to these circumstances, and not a blueprint of how
to handle imperial decline. This has important implications for understanding the
cause of Britain’s decolonization—the sheer chaos of transferring sovereignty makes
it difficult to view it as a benevolent gift from enlightened bureaucrats in London.
Elsewhere, Darwin has written that “those who ’made’ colonial policy were guessing,
hoping, gambling - and miscalculating” (Darwin, 1988, 20). This is a reasonable view
to take from someone ensconced in the colonial archives. Finlayson agrees as well,
writing that “Britain fabricated an account of its colonial policies from a mass of
incoherent actions to make them appear more altruistic, and to make past decisions
appear to be the obvious precursor to future policy” (Finlayson, 2002, 6). Colonial
documents do reflect a jumble of incentives, goals, tactics, and seemingly apolitical
personal conflicts between officials. However, viewing Britain’s decolonization as an
inscrutable puzzle misses some broad patterns.
There was no grand strategy of British decolonization. At the time Britain was
devolving power to nationalists in sub-Saharan Africa, they were launching a war in
Suez. However, the reactive nature of British imperial policy does not mean that there
were no broad patterns that emerged. As I show, the British did grant concessions
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in response to resistance. Importantly for understanding the scope of my argument
and its import, this was not a stated policy. If it was, it would have been fought over,
mis- and re-interpreted, ignored, and amended. Granting concessions in response
to resistance was a result of a structural artifact of colonial rule. In the same way,
the pattern of local colonial officials reducing tax rates after strikes and protests was
not stated policy. These choices were simply the best available response to colonial
unrest.
Wm. Roger Louis & Ronald Robinson present an even more complicated view of
what decolonization actually was. They state that “to see the transformation of an
imperial coalition as if it were the collapse of an imperial state is like mistaking the
melting tip for the iceberg” (Louis and Robinson, 1994, 462). In their view, imperial
decline did not lead to decolonization: granting independence to colonial states was
not a necessary result from a weakening imperial center. They point out that Canada,
Australia, and South Africa received independence when Britain was at the height of
its power. The ties between the former dominions and Britain remained strong after
independence, which served Britain’s interests. Britain’s declining postwar Empire
coincided with the rise of the US, which helped forge an enduring Anglo-American
alliance and the replacement of Britain’s formal empire with the US’ informal eco-
nomic hegemony. They conclude that “American influence expanded by imperial
default and nationalist invitation” (Louis and Robinson, 1994, 495).
This study is primarily about the concessions that Britain granted to their colonies,
not decolonization as a global process or even why some colonies were granted inde-
pendence earlier than others. As mentioned earlier, independence for each colony was
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overdetermined, which partly accounts for why the various explanations for the end
of the European empires (metropolitan, peripheral, economic, strategic, etc.), con-
sidered individually, are convincing. Studying the proximate causes for independence
can tell us something about how complex negotiations are conducted and which is-
sues make these negotiations more difficult, but they will tell us little about the
relative effects of violent and nonviolent resistance. The variation of interest is not
what happens in the year or two before independence is granted. Assessing the ef-
fects of anticolonial resistance immediate prior to independence is a bit like studying
the hinges on a stable door to find out why the horses had bolted. As Stockwell
writes, “the momentum established by earlier constitutional reform had led to the in-
dependence or impending independence of Malaya, Ghana, and Nigeria, as successive
British governments sought to accommodate nationalism as the best means of pre-
serving influence and of protecting British interests” (Stockwell, 2017, 78). Reforms
empowered nationalists, increased suffrage, and demonstrated that revolting worked
(Darwin, 1988, 31).
Reforms were an important part of decolonization. Decolonization was a process,
not an event. Darwin identifies four different definitions of decolonization. These
are 1) the legal-constitutional transfer of sovereignty (formal independence), 2) the
removal of all foreign influence from a subordinate state 3) the breakdown of global
colonial order and the denial of self-government to subordinate societies, 4) a system
of economic relations states where subordinate states served as export markets and
provided raw materials for more powerful states (Darwin, 2017).
By exploring anticolonial resistance’s effect on British politics, this work shares
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similarities with Priyamvada Gopal’s Insurgent Empire: Anticolonial Resistance and
British Dissent. A scholar of postcolonial literature, Gopal explores how large-scale
colonial uprisings shaped British politics by performing close readings of key texts that
were produced by policymakers, political officials, and journalists. Most of her work
examines resistance outside the era of imperial decline during the 19th century. These
uprisings, partly because of their violent nature, created major debates about how
to address anticolonial resistance and exacerbated divisions in British politics. The
British political elite viewed the empire as an essentially benevolent force that spread
democracy and civilization to backwards savages. For some, violence committed by
those resisting colonialism forced supporters of empire to grapple with the question: if
empire benefited colonial subjects, why did they react to purported imperial benefits
with violence? Gopal (2019)’s work shows that activists on the fringes of British
politics did debate these questions, and that criticism of the imperial project within
the metropole was driven by anticolonial dissent.
Gopal’s project is unabashedly presentist: it is designed in part to demolish the
notion, common in present day British discourse, that British politicians granted
colonies their independence after the colonies achieved political maturity. Gopal
rightly argues that this view ignores the frequent forms of resistance committed by
colonial subjects. My work goes farther and shows that an important feature of
the process of decolonization was the concessions that the British granted to their
colonies in response to this resistance. Colonial autonomy and independence were
not benevolently granted, rather, they were violently earned: Gopal writes that “The
making of an empire that was forced over time to make concessions, offer reforms,
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attend to human rights (if only notionally), embrace ’humane’ considerations, and
even regard itself as an emancipator in the first instance, must be read as a response
to resistance” (Gopal, 2019, 27).
The most important and well-known example of large-scale anticolonial resistance
in the 19th century was the Great Rebellion in India of 1857. Discontent with British
rule had started in the Army of Bengal, which was the largest of the three armies
operated by the East India Company. Rumors spread about the troops (or sepoys as
they were called) being deployed overseas, where they would likely have their religious
traditions violated. On May 10, 1857 in the city of Meerut, the troops mutinied after
some were punished for refusing to use ammunition cartridges that had been prepared
with animal fat, in contravention of both Muslim and Hindu religious law. These
troops killed their British officers, then marched to Delhi, where the revolt spread
throughout most of the colony. The British responded by moving troops from Iran,
China, and the Crimea to suppress the uprising. Here, the British were successful:
by July 1958, the rebellion was officially over. The rebellion made a huge impact
on metropolitan and international audiences, largely due to the work of a Times of
London correspondent, William Howard Russell (Osterhammel, 2015, 551-553). In
his thematic survey of 19th century history, Osterhammel (2015) places the Great
Rebellion in comparison to other revolts of the time period. He argues that “it was
a rebellion, not a revolution” largely because those rebelling had no new vision of
order, unlike the 1848 revolts in Europe or the Taiping revolt (Osterhammel, 2015,
551).
Insurgent Empire also corroborates a key argument of my work: that violence
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increased metropolitan involvement in colonial politics. The Morant Bay Uprising of
1965, when Jamaican peasants protested, rioted, and killed twenty five people, dis-
rupted the view that colonialism was essentially benevolent. Metropolitan attention
to Jamaican affairs led to “the views and aspirations of black Jamaican peasants”
being made available “in a striking variety of forms: petitions, memorials, speeches,
addresses, resolutions, letters, placards, and leaflets” (Gopal, 2019, 87). The local
colonial government in Jamaica responded to the uprising by engaging in severe re-
pression and abuses. Governor Eyre declared marital law and metropolitan politics
deemed him responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Jamaicans during this time.
The appropriateness of this response led to an even fiercer debate in Britain. Gopal
refers to the Eyre controversy as a local classicus, that is, “a characteristic moment of
internal moral crisis leading to self-correction” (Gopal, 2019, 84-85). Unlike British
policy in the era of decolonization, metropolitan response to the Morant Bay uprising
was the incorporation of Jamaica as a Crown Colony in 1866, which further reduced
self-government.
0.16 Historical Background & the theory of
Imperial Response
This section provides additional background to the British empire, with three main
goals. The first is to show that British interest in the colonies varied spatially and
temporally. The second is to review the types of reforms and concessions that were
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granted to the colonies. The third discusses the importance of metropolitan involve-
ment for the granting of concessions.
Heterogeneous Importance
Not all colonies were equally important to the metropole. For example, India was
the ’Jewel in the Crown’ of the British empire, while much smaller island colonies
rarely received any attention from London. Geostrategic dynamics altered the value of
colonial possessions over time. When colonial control became less useful to the British
in the era of decolonization, one response was withdrawal. For example, independence
to India was granted in part because India became a net creditor to Britain. Extensive
use of the Indian Army in World War II led to a massive outflow of sterling from
London to India. By 1945, India’s sterling balances totaled £1,400 million (Brown
and Louis, 1999, 440). India’s drain on the sterling reserves, combined with a friendly
collaborationist elite in the form of the Indian National Congress meant that post-
independence relations would continue the close relationship between Britain and
India without exacerbating the sterling crisis. As Judith M. Brown put it, “In 1945-
46 the British recognized, however reluctantly, that in the particular and unique
circumstances of post-war India an Imperial Raj no longer achieved the goals they
sought” (Brown and Louis, 1999, 444). This, in turn, affected the value of controlling
other territories. An independent India lowered the value of a foothold in the Indian
Ocean, which made control over Ceylon less important and prompted independence
for the island.
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The postwar anxiety over declining sterling reserves also raised the importance of
some colonies. British interests in Malaya grew rapidly after the loss of India due to
Britain’s need to convert sterling into dollars and rising great power rivalry in the
region (Stockwell, 1995a, liv). Maintaining rule over Malaya became essential during
the sterling crises since the large volume of rubber exports from Malaya enabled
the easy exchange of dollars into sterling. Hinds goes as far as to say that “it was
virtually impossible for Britain to relinquish political control over its main dollar
earning colonies” during the Sterling crises (Hinds, 1999, 107).
The Cold War also changed the value of colonies. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin
argued in the immediate postwar period that Britain must maintain control of all
their Middle Eastern territories in order to prevent Soviet encroachment. This stance
became encapsulated in the motto “what we have we hold,” which characterized how
the official mind of those in the Foreign and Colonial Offices viewed informal control
in the Middle East (Heinlein, 2013, 15-16). The Chiefs of Staff agreed with Bevin and
viewed the maintenance of informal control as one of the three “cardinal requirements
for the future defense of the British Commonwealth” (Heinlein, 2013, 18).
While some colonies produced economic benefits, the primary way in which a
colony was important was for strategic reasons. In the period after World War I, the
economic benefits that a colony provided were secondary to its strategic importance.
The metropole was almost entirely unconcerned with the finances of the colonies.
Decision makers in the cabinet largely ignored questions of budgets, revenue, and
expenditures of the colonies. The impetus for much imperial expansion and the set-
tlement of colonies was the search for raw materials and resource extraction (Cain
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and Hopkins, 2014). The desire for economic resources explains the expansion and
intensity of colonialism but is less relevant for understanding the dynamics of de-
colonization. The exceptions to this is tendency were Britain’s attempt to maintain
access to Middle Eastern oil through informal influence in former colonies like Iraq
and Britain’s interest in export materials that eased the sterling crisis in the imme-
diate postwar period. For example, rubber from Malaya became a concern of the
metropole in the postwar era because rubber exports could be used to exchange ster-
ling into dollars, which eased the sterling crisis by strengthening the value of sterling.
Here it is difficult to disentangle strategic from economic considerations. Oil is an
economic commodity whose strategic and military uses were paramount. Malayan
rubber is less clearly related to security issues. The relevant point here is that these
commodities were not important to the metropole because financial firms in London
exerted their influence on colonial policy and encouraged resource extraction, as had
happened through much of the 19th century. Rather, these commodities were part
of Britain’s “external economic policy” and were integral to Britain’s strength as a
world power (Krozewski, 2001, 9-10).
Some colonies were viewed as strategically essential for the defense of the Empire.
The British fought to maintain control of Cyprus largely because the loss of India
and Palestine reduced their strategic foothold in the Middle East. Withdrawal from
Cyprus would mean immediate unification with Greece and decline in British influence
(Heinlein, 2013, 57). Informal control over the Middle East was important partly
because of the region’s location on the route to India (Cain and Hopkins, 2014, 407).
In October 1938, the Chiefs of Staff recommended that “the first commitment of our
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land forces, after the security of the United Kingdom, should be the security of Egypt
and of our interests in the Middle East” (Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, xxxvi). After
World War II this assessment persisted. Prime Minister Eden described defending
the Middle Eastern colonies as “a matter of life and death to the British Empire”
(Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, xliii). British interests in Iraq were primarily “strategic
and political” (Fieldhouse et al., 2006, 70) due to its oil and geographic location.
The main goal of the British in operating the Mandate was to maintain access to
their military bases without any serious foreign threat (Fieldhouse et al., 2006, 71-
72,88). Protecting British commerce in Iraq was a “relatively minor consideration”
(Fieldhouse et al., 2006, 88). Similarly, Palestine’s importance was primarily strategic
since it provided easy access to its military bases in Egypt and India (Fieldhouse
et al., 2006, 196,218). No clear relationship existed between geographic size and
importance. The Committee of Imperial Defense in 1923 believed that Aden was of
“general strategic importance to the Empire” because of its wireless telegraph and
fueling station (Hankey, 1996, 47).
Concessions and Resistance
Throughout the 20th century the British Empire routinely granted concessions to the
colonies. These concessions took the form of constitutional reforms or increasing au-
tonomy of colonial subjects. The main reason these concessions occurred was due to
unrest within the colonies (Smith, 1978). Concessions were either a response to past
unrest or an attempt to stave off future unrest (Rathbone, 1992, xxxvii). In the era of
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anti-colonial nationalism, colonial officials engaged in a policy of “making reasonable
concessions [to the colonies] without conceding any points which are genuinely essen-
tial” (Heinlein, 2013, 24). The goal was the gradual advance to self-government and
the empowerment of native elites that would ensure favorable relations with Britain
in the post-independence period. For example, the Governor of Burma quickly con-
ceded demands to the Anti-Fascist PFL in 1946 after a series of strikes threatened to
paralyze the colony in order to defuse the situation (Heinlein, 2013, 43). The strategy
of granting concessions to quell unrest was also used in Malaya alongside conventional
counterinsurgency tactics (Heinlein, 2013, 52).
After the 1948 Accra riots in the Gold Coast, the Colonial Office responded by
appointing the Watson Commission of Inquiry to investigate the causes of the distur-
bances and to find ways to prevent future unrest. Their recommended remedy was
constitutional reform. In their view, the constitution of Ghana “must be reshaped as
to give every African of ability an opportunity to help govern the country, so as not
only to gain political experience but also to experience political power. We are firmly
of the opinion that anything less than this will only stimulate national unrest” (Rath-
bone, 1992, xliv-xlv). Recommendations also included increasing voting rights and
the size of the Legislative Council to include more Africans (Rathbone, 1992, xlv).
These recommendations were in line with current colonial thinking about British
Africa. In response to the recommendations of the Watson Commission, the colonial
office appointed a committee to formulate a draft of a new constitution (Rathbone,
1992, xlvi). The goal here was to prevent further riots though concessions while main-
taining control over external affairs and defense (Heinlein, 2013, 54). These dynamics
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of concessions and nonviolent resistance in the Gold Coast will be explored further
in Chapter 0.46.
This pattern occurred again after the rise of Kwame Nkrumah and his Convention
People’s Party (CPP). Nkrumah’s organizing of strikes, boycotts and demonstrations
lead to his imprisonment in 1950. To further combat Nkrumah’s influence, the Gov-
ernor set up a committee to review proposals for further constitutional reforms. The
logic behind this approach was that voluntarily offering concessions would preserve
British influence better than appearing to be coerced into granting concessions. While
Nkrumah was not the ideal colonial elite from the British perspective, officials feared
that Nkrumah and the CPP could be outflanked by more radical elements. Britain’s
economic interests in the Gold Coast made it vital that cocoa exports continued and
convertibility of sterling into dollars was maintained (Hinds, 1999, 105). The result
was the new constitution of 1950 (Heinlein, 2013, 54-56). This strategy was present
in Ceylon and Malaya as well. Frank Heinlein concludes that, “the sudden upsurge of
nationalist demands ... led Britain to accelerate constitutional development beyond
anything imagined feasible immediately after the war” (Heinlein, 2013, 63).
The metropole reacted to unrest across colonies in different ways. Despite their
best efforts, the campaign of West African cocoa farmers to withhold supplies from co-
coa manufacturing firms and European merchants failed to garner significant metropoli-
tan attention. The 1935 Copperbelt strikes in Northern Rhodesia resulted in repres-
sion by local police forces and a number of fatalities, yet never became as significant
a topic of discussion in London as the widespread rioting that occurred in the West
Indies from 1935-1938 (Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, lxvi). Ashton and Stockwell
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claim that the labor unrest in the West Indies was “the single most important occur-
rence which confronted officials during the inter-war years” (Ashton and Stockwell,
1996, lxxxvi) largely because of the violent nature of the unrest combined with the
importance of sugar production.
London granted concessions to the colonies mostly by reforming the constitution
or expanding the legislative council. Constitutional reforms often expanded suffrage,
increased internal self-government, and established institutions with native control.
Expanding the legislative council (the primary legislative body within a colony) was
an easy concession to make that increased local representation without requiring a
the process of a constitutional amendment. In the vast majority of cases, the seats
added to the legislative council were seats earmarked to be held by native, and not
European, elites. This helped dilute the power of the European seats. In theory
and in practice, then, expanding the legislative council increased representation the
non-European population.
Metropolitan Involvement
While the Colonial Office was mostly in charge of implementing concessions, they
did so under metropolitan pressure. For example, Howard Johnson argues that the
Colonial Office focused their attention on the implementation of labor legislation
reforms in the wake of the West Indian disturbances of 1937-1938 due to criticism
from the Labour Party in Parliament (Brown and Louis, 1999, 608). Lord Moyne,
then the Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1941 proposed a constitutional reform
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for Jamaica and an increase in suffrage to the Jamaican Governor (Wallace, 1977,
56). For the reform of the Gold Coast constitution in 1954, the Colonial Office
drafted recommendations which were then formally accepted by those in Whitehall
(Rathbone, 1992, lx). Palestine was briefly under the control of the Foreign Office
but power was transferred to the Colonial Office in 1922. According to Roza El-Eini,
“few decisions could be taken without prior knowledge and approval of the metropolis”
(El-Eini, 2004, 32). Decisions by district governors were referred to Jerusalem which
then consulted with officials in London, including the Prime Minster. In 1950 the
Secretary of State for the Colonies appointed a board to review the constitutions
of British colonies in the Caribbean (Wallace, 1977, 75). Ultimately the decision
to grant independence was a metropolitan one. Before Ceylon became fully self-
governing, the House of Commons passed the Ceylon Independence Bill in November
of 1947 (Heinlein, 2013, 50).
The shift towards development in Colonial Policy was spearheaded by the metropole.
The first Colonial Development Act of 1929, enacted by Parliament, was ostensibly
designed to further British financial interests, but in the West Indies its more promi-
nent effect was to increase native participation in the civil service (Wallace, 1977, 31).
In response to the West Indian disturbances of 1937-1938, colonial development be-
came the primary framework for dealing with the colonies of the West Indies, largely
because commissions of inquiry after large-scale strikes and protests in the West In-
dies blamed poor wages rather than the denial of self-government as the root cause
of the disturbances (Wallace, 1977). For example, the commissions of inquiry for
Barbados and Trinidad located the cause of the disturbances in poor social services
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and recommended large-scale investment. According to Howard Johnson, “this infor-
mation was not new to Colonial Office officials, but in 1938 they feared unflattering
scrutiny of colonial administration in the Caribbean when the British government was
on the defensive about the Empire, especially in the face of US criticism” (Brown and
Louis, 1999, 608). The value of the colony also conditioned the response to unrest.
For example, after the West Indian labor unrest of 1937-1938, the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, William Ormsby-Gore, himself established a Commission of Inquiry
in Trinidad due to the colony’s strategic importance (Brown and Louis, 1999, 608).
Metropolitan concerns were paramount in determining how the colonies responded
to resistance.
Large scale revolts served to discredit the policy of the local colonial government.
Metropolitan involvement in Iraq after the 1920 revolt was partly a response to the
inability of the India Office (which, for purely idiosyncratic reasons, controlled Iraq) to
properly govern the mandate (Kadhim, 2012, 31). The Jamaican disturbances of 1938
demonstrated that local budgets were unable to provide sufficient reforms and that
substantial Treasury assistance was necessary. This resulted in large-scale financing
from the Treasury and approval from the House of Commons (Brown and Louis,
1999, 609). The colonial governor consistently referred to the October 1931 riots in
Cyprus as “disturbances” in discussions with the metropole in order to downplay the
extent of the unrest (Ioannides, 2019, 160-170). The use and effect of these types of
euphemisms for anticolonial violence in parliament will be discussed in Chapter 0.33.
The British Cabinet also was heavily involved in Colonial Affairs, particularly
in areas related to federation and constitutional changes. For example, the Cabinet
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devoted considerable attention to the constitution of Ceylon in 1928 and 1929, and
again during World War II. During the war, the Cabinet also discussed the consti-
tutions of Jamaica, Malaya, and Malta. After World War II, constitutional changes
in more peripheral colonies were discussed, including Zanzibar, the Gold Coast and
Nigeria. The Arab Revolt and the ethnic conflict between Jews and Arabs in Pales-
tine commanded considerable Cabinet attention during the 1930s and 1940s. Unless
there was a direct impact on security issues, the Cabinet left the handling of trade,
finance and raw materials to issue-specific committees (Thurston, 1998, 3-4).
While the interest of the colonial governors was to maximize revenue (Xu, 2018),
the metropole was overwhelmingly concerned with imperial security. A 1945 report
by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (PHPS) on the security of the British Empire
in the wake of World War II distilled the essentials of imperial security as maintaining
“the integrity of the British Empire against both external and internal threats” and
the security of “world-wide sea and air communications on which depend the cohesion
of the Empire, and access to essential raw materials and industrial capacity” (Staff,
1996, 340). The report listed internal security as a necessary goal of Britain’s strategic
policy. The report goes on to note that “threats to the security of British interests,
which may call for use of British armed forces, fall into three main categories:- A.
Aggression by minor Powers against British territory. B. Wars between minor Pow-
ers affecting British interests. C. Internal unrest. These commitments, particularly




This chapter has provided the historical detail that will be useful for understanding
later chapters and to facilitate matching the theory of imperial response with the em-
pirical analysis I conduct. In the following chapter, I present my main quantitative
data collection on concessions and resistance, along with a number of statistical mod-
els showing the relationship between resistance, metropolitan attention, and colonial
concessions.
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Empirics & Quantitative Models
0.18 Introduction
This chapter provides quantitative empirical support for my theory of imperial re-
sponse. I present and describe the quantitative data I collected on anticolonial resis-
tance, metropolitan attention, and colonial concessions. I estimate a large number of
statistical models that explore the relationships between these variables. The results
provide strong empirical evidence for the hypotheses derived from my theory.
The results show that violence is a bigger predictor of a colonial concession that
nonviolence. This effect is attenuated for strategically important colonies because the
British were less willing to concede access to the colonies. I also show that violence is
a bigger predictor of metropolitan attention, which is a key mechanism in my theory
that links resistance to metropolitan responses. I addition, I also estimate the effect
of violence on metropolitan attention within a anticolonial insurgency to see how
this effect changes over time, along with an investigation as to the effect of colonial
concessions on suffrage levels within a colony.
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0.19 Research Design
To test the empirical implications of my theory of imperial response, I run a number
of statistical models to analyze the relationship between variables. Since concessions
were relatively infrequent events that were not immediate reactions to anticolonial
resistance, I use colony-years as the unit of analysis when the dependent variable is
whether a colony receives a concession from the metropole. However, metropolitan
attention was more frequent and also responded quicker to events in the colonies. For
this reason, and to limit the threat of unobserved heterogeneity that may bias my
inferences, I use a colony-month as the unit of analysis when estimating the effect of
unrest on metropolitan attention. Since the choice to use violence or nonviolence by
imperial subjects was a strategic one, it is unlikely that there exists a scenario where
there is as-if random variation in violence and nonviolence, and it is even more unlikely
that such a design examining this hypothetical scenario would have any meaningful
external validity. Using a granular unit of analysis such as the colony-month—while
not equivalent to complete randomization of the independent variables—aids infer-
ence by ensuring that similar units of analysis are being compared. Moreover, the
private nature of metropolitan attention as measured by cabinet discussions helps
limit reverse causality as one other potential threat to inference. While endogeneity
is present in nearly all observational studies—and especially those involving the disso-
lution of centuries-old international phenomena involving dozens of countries around
the globe—this approach helps increase the likelihood that the effects uncovered in
the statistical models reflect a causal relationship.
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Temporally, my study is limited to the so-called ’Second’ British Empire, which
began after World War I (Parsons, 2014). I chose this cutoff for two reasons. One is
that there is better quantitative and qualitative data available after World War I. The
other is that, after the fall of the Ottomans, the British acquired some of its former
possessions, including Palestine. These territories were the last important territories
acquired by the British empire, which simplifies the analysis by not having units
enter into the sample. Colonies are removed from the sample after they are formally
granted independence. This time period also maps onto my scope conditions discussed
in Chapter 0.4.
I include territories formally administered by the Colonial Office and the India
Office, and exclude the Dominions, since there was almost no variation in either
the independent or dependent variable.3 During the entirety of the 20th century,
the Dominions were fully autonomous and British influence was largely informal.
Moreover, there was rarely (if any) contentious politics in the Dominions related to
British influence.
There are a number of potential threats to reliable inference. One potential threat
is the presence of a selection effect. If actors strategically choose the type of resistance
based on the likelihood of the colonial state to grant concessions, then the parameter
estimates will be biased. This is, indeed, a likely prospect. However, in order for the
bias to work against the predictions made by the theory, nonviolence would have to
3The colonies in the study are: Aden, Bahamas, Basutoland, Bechuanaland, British Guiana,
Bechuanaland, Burma, Ceylon, Cyprus, Gambia, Gold Coast, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Malaya,
Malta, Nigeria, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Palestine, Sudan, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika,
Transjordan, Trinidad, Uganda, Yemen, and Zanzibar.
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be chosen in cases where the colonial state is less likely to grant concessions. Given
that violence is more likely to occur after nonviolent protests are violently repressed,
this is unlikely (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008). I also try to explicitly account for
the onset of different types of resistance in empirically in the qualitative chapters and
theoretically in Chapter 0.25.
Very often the reasons that smaller-scale riots, strikes, protests, and insurgent
attacks occurred were unrelated to decisions made by the colonial state. In Palestine,
for example, the strength of the Palestinian leadership determined whether the na-
tionalist movement was primarily violent or nonviolent (Pearlman, 2011). Lawrence
(2010) argues that competition and strife within a nationalist movement explains
variation in anticolonial violence in the French empire. Outbidding and competi-
tion between groups also helps explain tactical choice and the escalation of violence,
especially in Mandate Palestine (Kydd and Walter, 2006). Similar patterns help
explain nonviolence as well (Cunningham et al., 2017). In the British Caribbean,
intra-union squabbles led to more frequent strikes and protests (Wallace, 1977, 74).
Exogenous commodity shocks decreased prices and reduced income, which also exac-
erbating grievances. The cause of the so-called Womens War of 1929 in Nigeria can
be explained by a variety of factors: resentment towards direct taxation, corruption
by chiefs and the collapse of palm kernel prices (Ashton and Stockwell, 1996, 376).
Another potential problem is that movements and concessions were not indepen-
dent. Larger-scale resistance movements fed off each other and learned from each
others successes and failures. A successful episode of violent resistance in one colony
could spur another colony to take up arms. This tendency was not confined to colonies
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under British rule. The FLN’s fight against the French in Algeria inspired revolution-
ary movements around the globe (Connelly, 2002). Moreover, the British may have
learned from their past mistakes and may have become more likely to concede in one
colony after failing to do so in another. In statistical terms, the observations are not
independent and identically distributed. The relevant point for understanding the
non-independence of observations in the statistical models is that, while observations
were very likely dependent, it is not clear exactly which direction the bias may run.
The British engaged in a brutal counterinsurgency campaign in Aden that started
in 1963, which was after the failures of Palestine, Kenya, Malaya and Cyprus. Since
the pattern of dependence between observations is extraordinary complex, there is
no reliable way to statistically control for the dependence between observations that
would then render the estimates unbiased.
The problem of selection effects, learning, and dependence between observations
plagues nearly all statistical models of contentious politics. The enormity of these
problems shows the usefulness of the models that estimate the effect of resistance
on metropolitan attention, which rely on much more fine-grained data that is aggre-
gated to the month level. In these models, which compare the short-term effect of
resistance on attention within the same year, these problems are mitigated because
the dependent variable is completely unknown and unobservable to those doing the
resistance—while the parliamentary debates were public, the cabinet discussions were
confidential and only known to those within the British cabinet. The inability of anti-
colonial activists to observe the effects of resistance on attention likely made learning
quite difficult. Our confidence in the results of these models should be higher than
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those using a less granular unit of analysis.
0.20 Data
Instead of relying on hand-coded measures of violence and nonviolence, I perform a
textual search of the entire Times of London newspaper corpus. This results in a
granular independent variable that includes smaller-scale acts of resistance. I con-
struct this data by executing a query on the Gale Historical Newspapers Database.
First, I select all news articles where the colony name is in the subject or keyword of
the article in the Times. Then, I filter the articles to ones that include words from a
selected list that refer to violent and nonviolent activity.4 I then sum the number of
articles containing each word for every year. To aggregate the words referring to each
type of resistance, I take the average of all news articles containing the nonviolent
and violent words, separately. For example, to construct the colony-year variable for
Palestine in 1936, there were 12 news articles about Palestine discussing terrorism,
13 articles discussing riots, and 0 articles discussing an insurgency. I then take the
average of these three variables to create the measure of violence for Palestine in
1936. Since the result is a skewed distribution, I log both the violent and nonviolent
variables to improve normality. The result is two colony-year variables measuring
violent and nonviolent activity in the colonies. The data are presented in Figures 0.6
4Words related to nonviolence are: boycott, protest and strike. Words related to violence are:
terrorism, riots and insurgency. In choosing these words, the main goal was to use words that
would be more likely to describe actions by the colonized rather than the colonizer. For example,
“massacre” or “atrocity” could refer to colonial or anticolonial activity. Words with a pejorative
meaning would be more likely to be applied to activity by the colonized. To avoid ambiguity about




These data have a number of possibly important biases that I try to address with
statistical models and other data sources. The obvious problem is that the data are
built using newspaper sources, which create biases related to the undercounting of
events and the choice of events that are covered (Barranco and Wisler, 1999). For the
British empire in the 20th century, newspaper coverage was generally much higher for
a colony like India than for Britain’s much smaller island colonies. Newspaper cover-
age also changed over time. To fix these two problems, all models estimated include
colony and year fixed effects, which force the coefficient estimates to be driven by
within-colony variation. Year fixed effects control for increased empire-wide newspa-
per coverage over time and other temporal shocks. The main threat to the quality of
these data would be when variation in newspaper reporting was driven by variation
in resistance. This is likely. The Times of London almost certainly sent reporters to
cover events during the large-scale colonial conflicts of the postwar era and in other
periods of upheaval, such as the riots in the Caribbean during the 1930s. There is
also an important bias across variables. The Times of London was probably more
likely to report on acts of violence and nonviolence, especially smaller-scale acts of vi-
olence. Unfortunately there is no statistical method to account for these biases since
the true distribution of violence and nonviolence in the colonies is unknown. What
can be assumed, however, is that since the data on nonviolence is likely to have higher
levels of undercounting and miss smaller acts of nonviolence. This should bias the
coefficient estimate upwards, since we only observe acts of nonviolence when they are
above some threshold, and smaller acts of nonviolence will have a lower probability
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of inducing a concession than larger acts of nonviolence. I also try and triangulate
the measures of violence and nonviolence by using administrative data on British ca-
sualties during colonial conflicts and by using discussions of violence and nonviolence
in the British parliament.
The dependent variable in my study is whether the colonial government grants
a concession to those in the colony. I define a concession as any formal substantive
change in colonial policy that favored colonial subjects. In almost all cases, a conces-
sion was a reform that devolved autonomy, usually through increased representation,
to colonial subjects.5 In Palestine, which was the only colony without a legislative
council (Miller, 1985), concessions were given to specific ethnic groups and took the
form of restricting immigration from other ethnic groups. Data on concessions was
hand-coded at the year level through examining historical dictionaries, encyclopedias,
and the vast secondary literature on British imperialism. The full list of concessions
is included in the Appendix. The variable used in the analysis is simply a binary
variable indicating if a concession was granted in that year. In addition, I also use a
ordinal measure of concessions. This variable ranges from 0-3 and rates constitutional
changes (coded as 3) as being larger concessions than those related to expanding the
legislative council (coded as 2). All other concessions are coded 1, and these include
policies such as recognizing a nationalist leadership in a constitutional conference,
facilitating self-government at the local level, or other types of policy.
I also use a number of time-varying controls. To control for the level of repression
in a colony, I use two measures. One is the government censorship effort, which
5I also code the year the colony achieved independence as a concession.
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captures the government’s attempt to censor print or broadcast media. Censorship
was a common tactic by the British to repress nationalist dissent in the colonies. The
other variable is the physical violence index. This measures the freedom from political
killings and torture by the colonial government. Other controls intended to capture
variation in the political and economic development of a colony include the number
of political parties that have national organizations, whether a political party has
unified control over the government, the distribution of power across social groups,
the suffrage level, the urbanization rate, and educational equality in the colony. All
of these measures are at the colony-year level. These measures come from Varieties
of Democracy dataset and (Coppedge and Ziblatt, 2018).
To construct a measure of metropolitan attention by the cabinet, I use the cabinet
archives containing the conclusions of each cabinet meeting during the time period
studied. These documents contain brief information on each cabinet meeting, in-
cluding what issues were discussed and the conclusions reached. Which topics were
discussed at a cabinet meeting was the discretion of the prime minister, and the
departmental ministers could request an issue to discuss during a meeting. These
documents were circulated to all those present at the meeting, and on occasion the
Cabinet Secretary would send them to the heads of the Treasury, Foreign Office and
Chiefs of Staff (Thurston, 1998). For each document, I note what colonies were dis-
cussed and the date of the discussion.6 Since the data are right-skewed, I take the
log of the total discussions. These data are presented in Figure 0.8.
6The reference groups for these documents is: CAB 23, CAB 24, CAB 65, CAB 66, CAB 67,
CAB 68, CAB 128, CAB 129, CAB 181, and CAB 195.
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Since the measures of resistance are at the year level, they are suitable for ana-
lyzing the effect on concessions, which were not immediate reactions to events but
were the product of lengthy deliberations. However, metropolitan attention varied
considerably over time and quickly responded to events on the ground. Comparing
the yearly level of resistance to the yearly level of attention likely smooths over impor-
tant variation. To remedy this, I collect additional data on large events of violent and
nonviolent resistance in colonies, along with the date the event occurred. I do this by
performing a textual search through the Times of London archive on a narrower range
of articles, using only auto-tagged keyword searches on news dispatches. This limits
the scope of the search but allows me to manually scan each article and extract the
date of the event of interest. Both the cabinet discussions and the granular measure
of larger acts of violent and nonviolent resistance are aggregated to the month level.
Measuring the strategic importance of a colony is difficult. The British excelled
at generating post-hoc justifications for their behavior and maintaining mytholo-
gies about the unique characteristics of colonies. Objective measures of strategic
importance—for example by counting the number of military bases or geographical
distance to potential theaters of war—risks misunderstanding how British policy-
makers understood their colonial empire and how they made decisions based on that
understanding. While there was rarely unanimous agreement among British policy-
makers that a colony was strategically essential, there was a general lack of debate
around these issues. This was possibly due to the rather technical military informa-
tion required in order for a policymaker to make an informed judgment a colony’s
strategic value, including the depth of the water near its accessible ports and how
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changes in naval technology altered the mobility of naval vessels and the flying range
of airplanes. In many cases, the archives show Cabinet, Foreign Office, and Colonial
Office officials taking their cue on what colonies were strategically important from
rather dry analyses from military specialists.
To remedy these problems, I offer three measures of the strategic importance of a
colony. The first is simply a time-invariant binary variable indicating if the colony was
viewed to be strategically important. I manually coded this measure from primary
and secondary sources. The primary sources consists of a handful of military assess-
ments that were circulated in the Colonial Office. This variable is mainly generated
from the assessments of historians who have written about Britain’s decolonization.
This coding is generated by reading a large number of secondary historical works and
recording which colonies were described by historians as strategically essential. The
shortcoming of this approach is that it relies on subjective assessments by historians
and a colony may have been strategically important to the British but the secondary
literature simply never mentions it.
The second measure is a time-varying ordinal measure that ranges from 0-3. This
measure helps account for variation in a colony’s strategic importance over time,
again coded from primary and secondary sources. Most of these changes in strategic
importance occurred after World War II. Strategic importance varied over time for
a number of reasons. The strategic importance of a colony was linked to other colo-
nial possessions. When India became independent in 1947, for example, the British
downgraded the importance of maintaining control over nearby Ceylon. Relinquish-
ing India also encouraged British withdrawal from the formerly strategically essential
91
Mandate Palestine. With India, Palestine, and Ceylon independent, maintaining a
foothold in Cyprus became a preferred option in the metropole. Non-colonial factors
mattered as well. Troubles with sterling increased the importance of colonies like
Malaya. Malaya possessed abundant rubber plantations which were exported and
used to convert sterling into dollars and easy monetary pressures. For most colonies
and years, this variable takes a value of 0. It takes a value of 2 for Cyprus from 1953-
1960 and Aden from 1940-1956. It takes value of 1 for Malta from 1918-1964, Cyprus
from 1918-1952, Nigeria from 1948-1960, Kenya from 1918-1963, Palestine from 1940-
1948, Aden from 1918-1940 and 1956-1967, India from 1918-1943, and Malaya from
1918-1957.
However, manually coded measures may capture the post-hoc justifications of
British officials for their behavior or the biases of hindsight by historians, in addi-
tion to all the problems associated with subjective coding of qualitative data into
quantitative data. To provide another measure, I refer to the House of Commons
parliamentary debates. If a British policymakers viewed a colony as strategically
valuable, then we should see some discussion of that strategic value whenever policy
toward the colony is discussed. To create this time-varying measure, I first identify
contributions from members of parliament that mention a colony. This is performed
by simply using regular expressions to see if the name of a colony is mentioned in the
contribution. While crude, the sheer volume of contributions (over one million) for
the time period under study makes it extremely efficient and precludes alternative
options. Within this set of contributions, I then identify whether a MP uses the
phrase “strategically important”. If a MP uses this phrase while also mentioning
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Cyprus, then this would count as a event where Cyprus was viewed as a strategically
important. I then sum up all these events and then aggregate them to the year level
to create a time-varying continuous measure of strategic importance for each colony.
This measure and the manually coded measures are qualitatively similar.
Summary statistics are presented in Table 0.1.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Violence 1,134 0.197 0.487 0 0 0 3
Nonviolence 1,134 0.540 0.739 0 0 0.8 4
Strategic Importance 1,134 0.265 0.442 0 0 1 1
Strategic Importance (Weighted) 1,134 0.265 0.489 0 0 0 2
Terrorism 1,134 0.163 0.574 0 0 0 4
Riots 1,134 0.255 0.583 0 0 0 4
Strike 1,134 0.584 0.845 0 0 1.1 4
Boycott 1,134 0.255 0.611 0 0 0 4
Time since concession 1,134 21.697 14.098 0 10 33 53
Concession 1,134 0.113 0.317 0 0 0 1
Cabinet Mentions 1,134 0.392 0.787 0.000 0.000 0.693 3.912
Suffrage Level 1,127 20.479 36.300 0.000 0.000 14.000 100.000
Party Organization 1,134 −1.098 1.267 −2.989 −2.113 −0.071 2.252
Freedom of Expression 1,134 −0.148 1.248 −2.379 −1.086 1.016 2.447
Physical Violence Index 1,134 −0.434 1.123 −2.502 −1.260 0.439 1.910
Party Organization 1,134 0.511 0.250 0.062 0.278 0.739 0.934
Suffrage Share 1,128 21.785 35.020 0.000 0.000 20.000 100.000
Table 0.1: This table shows summary statistics of the data.
0.21 Model and Estimation
To estimate the effects of my independent variables on my dependent variables, I use
normal linear models with colony and year fixed effects, with standard errors clustered
at the colony. I estimate two sets of models for each hypotheses being tested. One
model includes only the independent variable of interest and two-way fixed effects
for controls, the other model includes a wider range of control variables. Since a
concession is measured using a binary dependent variable, I use cubic time splines to
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Figure 0.6: This plot shows the yearly level of violent relative to nonviolent activity
in the colonies. Vertical lines indicate years in which a concession was granted.




I first discuss the results of models where a concession to the colony is a dependent
variable. Figure 0.9 presents the coefficient plots for the effect of violent and nonvio-
lent resistance on the probability of a concession. There is a positive and statistically
significant effect for violence on concessions, while a slight negative and not signifi-
cant effect for nonviolence on concessions. A one unit increase in the level of violence
is related to a 10% increase in the probability of a concession in the following year.
The standard deviation of the violence variable is 0.47, meaning that an increase in
one standard deviation of the variable increased the probability of a concession by
five percent in any given year. The coefficients and and associated standard errors
are stable across specifications.
Table 0.2 shows the results of these models with control variables included. In ad-
dition, the effect of violence and nonviolence on concessions using an ordered variable
in included as well. The results for the ordered model show a similar pattern, with









Effect of Resistance Type on Concessions
Figure 0.9: This shows the coefficient estimate of three linear probability models
where the independent variables are the level of violent and nonviolent activity as
measured by British newspaper articles. The dependent variables are the probability
of a concession. All models include colony and year fixed effects with standard errors
clustered at the colony. Cubic time splines, along with a battery of controls, are









Physical Violence Index 1.578∗∗
(0.643)







Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.2: This table shows the results of linear probability models where the de-
pendent variable is whether there is concession to the colony. The main independent
variables measures the level of violence and nonviolence in the colony. All models
include cubic time splines along with colony and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the colony.
My theory also predicts that null effects of violence and nonviolence should be
produced when estimating the effect for strategically important colonies. Table 0.3
presents the results of models where a measure of strategic importance is interacted
with the variables measuring violence and nonviolence. I use three different mea-
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sures of strategic importance: a binary indicator, a time-varying ordinal measure,
and a time-varying continuous measure of mentions of strategic importance from the
parliamentary debates.
The results show that the effect of violence on concessions is higher for non-
strategically important colonies. The coefficient for the interaction term between a
variable measuring strategic importance and the level of violent resistance is nega-
tive and statistically significant in all but two of the models. The effect is stronger
and more precisely estimated for the time-varying measures of strategic importance.
This is likely due to the increased relevance of strategic considerations in the British
Empire during the postwar era when Cold War dynamics became prominent. The
unconditional effect of strategic importance on concessions is not estimated because
the colony fixed effects force the coefficient for the time-invariant variable to drop
out. The interaction term on this variable simply represents the effect of violence
and nonviolence on concessions in strategically important colonies relative to non-
strategically important colonies. To make this more concrete, the coefficient for
violence in model 1 is 0.157 and nonviolence is −0.047. These coefficient estimates
represent the effect of violence and nonviolence in colonies that are not strategically
important. To calculate the effect of violence and nonviolence for colonies that are
strategically important, we simply add the interaction terms to these variables. For
strategically importance colonies, the coefficient for violence is 0.050 (0.157 − 0.107)
while the coefficient for nonviolence is −0.017 (−0.047+0.030). The interaction term
between violence/nonviolence and strategically important colonies attenuates the ef-
fect of resistance on concessions. In effect, according to models 1 and 2, political
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Violence 0.156∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.195∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.059) (0.063) (0.062) (0.048) (0.044)
Strategic Importance
(0.000) (0.000)
Strategic Importance (Weighted) −0.058 −0.089
(0.071) (0.074)
Strategic Mention 0.049 0.058
(0.189) (0.199)
Nonviolence −0.047 −0.037 −0.046 −0.038 −0.037 −0.028
(0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.039) (0.028) (0.028)
Physical Violence Index 0.488∗ 0.452∗ 0.489∗
(0.262) (0.263) (0.286)
Freedom of Expression 0.070 0.078 0.069
(0.053) (0.051) (0.054)
Educational Equality 0.021 0.016 0.021
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Suffrage Level −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Violence * Strategic Importance −0.107 −0.085
(0.071) (0.069)
Nonviolence * Strategic Importance 0.030 0.030
(0.059) (0.063)
Violence * Strategic Importance (Weighted) −0.130∗∗ −0.117∗∗
(0.056) (0.058)
Nonviolence * Strategic Importance (Weighted) 0.033 0.036
(0.050) (0.053)
Violence * Strategic Mention −0.176∗∗ −0.175∗∗
(0.077) (0.076)
Nonviolence * Strategic Mention 0.048 0.048
(0.094) (0.099)
Observations 1,108 1,102 1,108 1,102 1,108 1,102
R2 0.209 0.222 0.218 0.231 0.215 0.228
Adjusted R2 0.146 0.156 0.155 0.165 0.151 0.162
Residual Std. Error 0.296 (df = 1025) 0.292 (df = 1015) 0.294 (df = 1024) 0.291 (df = 1014) 0.295 (df = 1024) 0.291 (df = 1014)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.3: This table shows the results of linear probability models where the variables
for violence and nonviolence are interacted with three different measures of strategic
importance: a binary variable, an ordinal variable, and a continuous measure derived
from the parliamentary debates. All three measure produce substantively similar




In my theory of imperial response, attention is the variable linking anticolonial resis-
tance to metropolitan concessions. Resistance is more likely to result in a concession
when the resistance increases metropolitan attention. Violent resistance is more likely
to command attention, which helps explain why violent resistance is more likely to
result in a concession. In this section I present results of models using a more fine-
grained unit of analysis to show that violence is more likely than nonviolence to lead
to increased metropolitan attention.
Table 0.4 shows the results of models estimating the effect of violence and nonvio-
lence on the amount of discussion of that colony by the cabinet. Both the independent
and dependent variables are logged to account for skewness. The unit of analysis is
the colony-month. The results show that violence in the previous month predicts the
level of cabinet discussion in the subsequent month, while no such effect is present
for nonviolence. This pattern holds when the variable measuring levels of violence
and nonviolence are lagged by two months. Year fixed effects ensure that the com-
parisons are made between months within the same year, which compares like units





Violence (t-1) 0.188∗∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.040)








Adjusted R2 0.124 0.132
Residual Std. Error 0.172 (df = 13198) 0.171 (df = 13172)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.4: This table shows the results of models where the independent variables
are measures of violent and nonviolent activity within a colony and the dependent
variable is the level of discussion in the British Cabinet about the colony. The unit
of analysis is the colony-month. Measures of activity are lagged by one (t-1) and two
(t-2) months. Both models include colony and year fixed effects with standard errors
clustered at the colony.
My theoretical model argues that resistance garners metropolitan attention and
that this attention leads to concessions to the colonies. To examine the link between
attention and concessions, I run models where the main independent variable is the
level of cabinet discussion in a colony and the dependent variable is whether there is
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a concession in the following year. Table 0.5 presents the results. Models 1 and 2 use
the binary measure of concessions as the dependent variable, while models 3 and 4
use the ordered measure. The results show that increased discussion by the cabinet
leads to a higher probability of concessions.
Dependent variable:
Concession Concesssion (Weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cabinet Discussion 0.040∗ 0.041 0.110∗∗ 0.119∗
(0.023) (0.026) (0.052) (0.062)
Physical Violence Index 0.501 1.580∗∗
(0.306) (0.641)
Freedom of Expression 0.072 0.084
(0.050) (0.114)
Educational Equality 0.023 0.026
(0.035) (0.081)
Suffrage Level −0.0002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Observations 1,108 1,102 1,108 1,102
R2 0.194 0.206 0.207 0.223
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.144 0.149 0.162
Residual Std. Error 0.297 (df = 1032) 0.295 (df = 1021) 0.692 (df = 1032) 0.680 (df = 1021)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.5: This table shows the results of linear probability models where the inde-
pendent variable is the amount of discussion of a colony within the British cabinet,
and the dependent variable is a measure of a concession to the colony. The results
show that cabinet discussions increase the probability of concessions to a colony.
The results of the statistical models in this section support my theory of imperial
response by showing that violence, more than nonviolence, increases metropolitan
attention, and that increased metropolitan attention leads to an increased probability
of a concession to a colony. Next, I examine the limits of violence in commanding
metropolitan attention during a colonial war.
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Were There Limits to Metropolitan Attention?
My theory stipulates that during a sustained anticolonial insurgency campaign, the
effect of violence on metropolitan attention will attenuate over time. More intense
colonial conflicts where the British were engaged in sustained counterinsurgency cam-
paigns lasted years. This section examines how variation in violence within five
colonial conflicts (Kenya, Aden, Palestine, Cyprus and Malaya) affected the level of
metropolitan attention.
Doing this requires more fine-grained data on the level of violence within a colony.
To gather this data, I collected the date of every British military casualty that oc-
curred in these colonies from the start of the conflict until independence was declared.
This was performed by web-scraping the death records of databases of colonial deaths
from https://www.findmypast.co.uk/. I scraped the name of each individual casualty
in each conflict, extracted the date of their death, and summed over each death for
each week to create a dataset on the number of casualties in each week for each
colony.7 I then use the data on the cabinet discussion and the parliamentary debates
to measure the level of discussion for each colony at the week level. Since no database
exists for colonial deaths during the Kenya emergency, I use Douglass and Harkness
(2018)’s dataset on events during this conflict built from British intelligence reports.
Figure 0.10 presents the the log of British casualties for each insurgency over time.
7When aggregated to the year, the measure from British casualties and the measure of anticolo-
nial violence have a correlation coefficient of 0.76. The casualty measure and nonviolent resistance
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Figure 0.10: This plot shows the log of the number of British casualties for five colonial
counterinsurgency campaigns. The data is collected from British administrative data
of death records. The plots are smoothed to highlight the temporal variation. The
data only exist for time periods the counterinsurgency campaign was active.
This data is then analyzed using linear models with conflict fixed effects. I create
a variable measuring the number of weeks that have elapsed since the first casualty
was recorded. I then interact this weekly time trend with the log of casualties that
occurred during that week to see how the effect of violence on metropolitan attention
changes during the conflict. The dependent variable is the log of times that the colony
is mentioned in the parliament and the log of times that the colony is discussed in
the cabinet. The unit of analysis is the conflict-week.
104
The results are presented in Table 0.6 and graphically in Figure 0.11. They show
that metropolitan attention was driven by the level of violence within each conflict,
but that this effect attenuated over time. The results are the same when using
parliamentary debates or cabinet discussions to measure attention. This shows that
there were limits to the effect of violence during colonial conflicts on metropolitan
attention.
Dependent variable:
Mentions Commons (Log) Cabinet Discussion (Log)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Casualties (Log) 0.223∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.111) (0.097) (0.029) (0.028)
Weekly Time Trend −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Casualties (Log) * Weekly Time Trend −0.0005∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0001)
Observations 2,197 2,197 2,197 2,197
R2 0.104 0.058 0.079 0.105
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.057 0.069 0.104
Residual Std. Error 1.162 (df = 2173) 1.186 (df = 2193) 0.226 (df = 2173) 0.221 (df = 2193)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.6: This table shows the results of models where the dependent variable is the
amount of parliamentary discussion of a colony and the amount of discussion of a
colony by the British cabinet. The unit of analysis is the conflict-week and the main
independent variable is the number of British war deaths for each colonial conflict
that occurred that week. The log of the casualties is interacted with the weekly time
trend to show how metropolitan attention declined over time. The colonial conflicts
included are Kenya, Aden, Palestine, Cyprus and Malaya.
What Was Effect of Reforms?
My theory predicts that the metropole will grant concessions to the colony in response
to violent resistance, but will not grant concessions to strategically important colonies
in response to unrest because granting concessions increases the suffrage of the colo-
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nial population and jeopardizes metropolitan access to the colony. The metropole,
however, did grant concessions to strategically important colonies. Were the con-
cessions granted to strategically important colonies different in some way than the
concessions granted to other colonies? The ordered measure of concessions attempts
to account for the different size of the concessions. It does this by using objective
characteristics of the concession—whether they amended the constitution, whether
they expanded the legislative council, etc. However, within these categories there ex-
ists variation. It is possible that the constitutional reforms to strategically important
colonies were different than constitutional reforms to other colonies.
To investigate this, I estimate a number of linear models where the dependent
variable is the suffrage share of the adult male population. This data comes from
Coppedge and Ziblatt (2018). The independent variable is whether there was a
concession in the previous year. I also include the standard controls and an interaction
variable between concessions and strategic importance. We should expect concessions
in strategically important colonies to have a smaller effect on the suffrage level than
concessions to non-strategically important colonies.
The results are presented in Table 0.7. On average, concessions have a positive
effect on the suffrage share. This finding has important implications. A number of
works have examined the long-term political and economic effects of colonial rule
by comparing spatial variation in colonial investments within a colony, comparing
the identity of the colonizer (Lee and Paine, 2019), or whether there was a violent
movement for independence. This result shows that one of the reasons for spatial and
temporal variation in suffrage levels is the direct result of metropolitan policy.
106
In addition, the negative and statistically significant coefficient on the interac-
tion term between a concession and strategic importance shows that, even when the
metropole granted concessions to strategically important colonies, they did so with-
out substantially increasing suffrage in the colony. This provides further support for
my theory that metropolitan policy toward strategically important colonies aimed to
limit increasing suffrage in these colonies.
Dependent variable:
Suffrage Share
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Concession 8.863∗∗∗ 11.272∗∗∗ 8.464∗∗∗ 10.078∗∗∗
(1.956) (2.661) (1.872) (2.312)
Strategic Importance
(0.000) (0.000)
Concession * Strategic Importance −8.793∗∗ −5.928∗
(4.125) (3.378)
Physical Violence Index 70.132∗ 68.388∗
(35.963) (35.805)
Freedom of Expression 10.280 10.607
(12.506) (12.520)
Educational Equality 13.851∗∗ 13.724∗∗
(6.453) (6.443)
Observations 1,128 1,128 1,102 1,102
R2 0.662 0.663 0.695 0.695
Adjusted R2 0.637 0.638 0.671 0.671
Residual Std. Error 21.093 (df = 1051) 21.074 (df = 1050) 20.235 (df = 1022) 20.231 (df = 1021)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.7: This table shows the results of linear models where the dependent vari-
able is the share of suffrage in a colony. The main results show that a concession
from the metropole to the colony, on average, increases the suffrage share by about
10%. However, for strategically important colonies, granting a concession results in
almost no increase in suffrage. This finding provides support for my argument that
metropolitan policymakers were reluctant to increase the suffrage of strategically im-
portant colonies. Since strategic importance is time-invariant, the colony fixed effects
drop the coefficient where there is no interaction term.
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Alternative Measures of Violent and Nonviolent Activity
The above measures of violent and nonviolent anticolonial resistance all drawn from
newspaper reports in the Times of London. There are a number of reasons why this
measure may be biased. It is almost certain that there was an increased level of news-
paper coverage of activity in the colonies from 1918 to 1960 (although the year fixed
effects used in all the models estimated accounts for this problem). Undercounting is
also an issue, since smaller and more distant colonies had less newspaper coverage. To
address these shortcomings, I provide an alternate measure of violent and nonviolent
resistance within the colonies that is constructed from the parliamentary debates.
These measures are constructed in the following ways. For each colony, I extract
the colony name from the parliamentary debates along with the year that the colony
was mentioned. I also extract the text within a specified range around the colony
name. I then count the number of times words related to violence—terrorism, riots,
bombings—are mentioned, along with words related to nonviolence.8 Then, these
counts are summed by year to produce a colony-year measure of violent and nonvi-
olent mentions. I also do this for mentions of strategic importance, to capture the
heterogeneous effects for strategically important colonies. To ensure robustness, I
vary the range around each colony mention from 10 words to 100.
These measures are then used in linear models presented in Table 0.8. Across
varying ranges around the mention of a colony name, violence is a significant positive
predictor of a concession. This effect is attenuated when a colony is mentioned
8I use regular expressions to minimize error to ensure that “riot” and “riots” are included.
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strategically, which is in line with the results from the main models estimated in the
paper.
It should be noted that these measures do not capture resistance in the colonies
but rather are better understood as measures of metropolitan discussions of violent
and nonviolent resistance in the colonies. Its quite likely that some colonial subjects
resisted the colonial state, but either due to inadequate newspaper coverage or a
colonial state’s ability to crush the resistance before it ever got off the ground, that
resistance never became known in the metropole. The relevant point here is that
metropolitan discussions of violence in a colony led to an increased probability of a
concession, while no such relationship exists for metropolitan discussions of nonvio-
lence (indeed these models show a slight negative effect). This should strengthen our
confidence in the main models presented in Figure 0.9.
The data on violence and nonviolence within a colony is built from newspaper
reports and is thus subject to reporting bias. The casualty data is not affected by
this bias at all since is collected from administrative records. This enables us to
validate the measures of violence and nonviolence driven by newspaper reporting. If
the casualty data are correlated with the measures of violence, and not correlated
with the measures of nonviolence, then this should increase confidence in the data
and model estimates. There are two important qualifications. The first is that the
data do not measure the same underlying concept. Violent anticolonial resistance
includes acts that result in property damage and deaths of settlers, British colonial
officials who are not members of the military, and deaths of other native colonial





























Violence * Strategic (10) −0.150∗∗∗
(0.052)
Nonviolence * Strategic (10) −0.043
(0.093)
Violence * Strategic (25) −0.119∗∗∗
(0.044)
Nonviolence * Strategic (25) −0.059
(0.087)
Violence * Strategic (50) −0.095∗∗∗
(0.035)
Nonviolence * Strategic (50) 0.007
(0.068)
Violence * Strategic (100) −0.102∗∗∗
(0.032)
Nonviolence * Strategic (100) 0.034
(0.057)
Observations 1,102 1,102 1,102 1,102
R2 0.214 0.213 0.210 0.209
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.152 0.148 0.147
Residual Std. Error (df = 1021) 0.291 0.291 0.292 0.292
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.8: This table shows the result of models where showing that discussions of
violence and nonviolence in the parliament are correlated with concessions in the
following year. This shows that when both a colony and violence were mentioned
in proximity to each other in the parliament, a concession was more likely. No such
pattern exists for mentions of nonviolence. The same pattern holds for the interaction
effect of resistance and strategic importance.
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serving abroad—including those who die of disease or accidentally (automobile acci-
dents were quite common). The relevant point here is that if both data sources are
completely free of error, we should not expect a perfect correlation between the two.
The second important qualification is that the casualty data is only collected for a
small number of colony-years (41) for colonies where the British were engaged in an
active counterinsurgency campaign. The dynamics of violence in colonial counterin-
surgency campaigns may very well be different in different time periods and different
forms of colonial rule.
The casualty data are recorded at the day level while the main measures of violence
and nonviolence are aggregated to the year level. To compare the three measures, I
aggregate the total number of British casualties that occur in a colony to the year.
The correlation coefficient for the 41 colony years where there are casualty data is
0.76 for the correlation between violence and casualties, and 0.27 for the correlation
between nonviolence and casualties. The newspaper measure of violence has a much
higher correlation with the casualty measure than nonviolence. To further probe
these correlations, I use the casualty measure as a dependent variable in a linear
model with colony fixed effects and the violence and nonviolence measures as the
main independent variables. The results are presented in 0.9. Violence is a large,
positive, and statistically significant predictor of a British casualty, while nonviolence
has a very small negative effect that is not precisely estimated. These are the ex-
pected patterns and should increase our confidence in the measures of violence and
nonviolence collected from newspaper reporting. Given that the casualty data, when
aggregated to the year level, only compromises 43 observations (out of 1,180) for five
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different colonies in different time periods, and there is no reliable administrative
data on the number of nonviolent actions to serve as a necessary control for these
observations, we are unable to test the larger proposition that violence (as measured









Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.9: This table shows the relationship between the yearly measures of violence
and nonviolence drawn from newspaper reporting with the log of British casualties
in five colonial conflicts. The results show that the measures of violence are strong
predictors of casualty levels, while nonviolence is not. This is, of course, as expected
and should increase confidence in the yearly measures of violence and nonviolence.
This linear model includes colony fixed effects.
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0.24 Exploring Heterogeneous Effects
Evaluating the Effectiveness of Resistance over Time
It is unlikely the effectiveness of resistance on concessions remained stable over time.
While a scope condition of my theory is that an empire must be looking to retrench,
and not expand, the British empire endured a number of important geopolitical
changes after 1918, including World War II and occupation of many of its colonies.
This means that the parameters in the the statistical models estimated above may
not be accurately estimated since the model itself is incorrectly specified due to non-
constant effects.
To address this, I evaluate the effects of violent and nonviolent resistance on colo-
nial concessions over time. I do this by using the Interflex R package (Hainmueller
et al., 2019). In models with interaction terms between continuous variables, the
nonlinearity assumption is easily an often violated, which can severely bias the coef-
ficient estimates. The models included in the Interflex package include statistical
tests to detect if there are nonlinearities, along with diagnostics to see how robust
the nonlinear assumption is. In other words, these models do not assume that change
in the effect of violence from 1920 to 1930 is the same as the change in the effect of
violence from 1950-1960.
Estimating how the effect of violence and nonviolence changes over time has impor-
tant implications for understanding the causes of decolonization. Figure 0.12 shows
that the frequency of colonial concessions increased over time and was markedly
higher in the postwar era. This pattern jibes with the historical literature detailing
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Britain’s efforts to accelerate the process of devolving power to the colonies. Why


























Colonial Concessions over Time
Figure 0.12: This plot shows the total number of colonial concessions that were
granted in each year. The blue line shows the smoothed average. The rate of colonial
concessions increased markedly in the postwar era.
To answer this question, I run models where the effect of violent and nonviolent
resistance on concessions is interacted with the year variable. This allows the effect of
resistance on concession to vary for each year. The dependent variable is the ordered
measure of concessions. Controls include colony and year fixed effects (so that the
interaction with the year variable does not capture the increased rate of concessions),
and a linear time trend to measure the time since the last concession. Standard
errors are clustered at the colony level. I estimate two models, one where violence
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is interacted with the year variable, and one where nonviolence is interacted with
the year variable. For the model where violence is interacted with the year variable,
nonviolence is used as a control, and vice versa.
Figure 0.13 shows the results of the model with an interaction between violent
anticolonial resistance and the year. The upward sloping line shows that the effect
of violence on colonial concessions increases over time and is on average above zero.
The red bars reflect the binning estimates produced by the Interflex package, which
show the assumption of a linear interaction effect is not violated. As Figure 0.14
similar upward trend exist for the effect of nonviolence over time, although this is less
precisely estimated and the magnitude is much closer to zero.
These results are important for understanding the causes of decolonization. Britain
fought major anticolonial insurgencies in Palestine, Aden, Cyprus, Malaya, and Kenya.
All of these occurred in the postwar era. Decolonization accelerated and anticolonial
resistance exploded after the end of World War II, as did the pace of concessions that
Britain granted to its colonies. These results show that the increased frequency of
concessions was driven partly by an increasingly effective violent resistance.
0.25 Conclusion
I have shown that violent resistance in the British colonies during the 20th century
encouraged the colonial state to grant concessions to the colonies. No consistent effect
exists for nonviolent resistance. Null effects for both types of resistance are produced
for colonies whose primary value lies in their strategic importance. The mechanism
115
linking resistance to concessions is metropolitan attention, which reacted more to
violent resistance than nonviolent resistance. Using web-scraped death records, I
show that there were limits to the effect of violence on metropolitan attention during
a colonial conflict. In addition, I show that the concessions granted to strategically
important colonies did not increase the suffrage level within the colony.
My theoretical framework attempts to make sense of how the British empire ac-
tually functioned, and how activity in the colonies led to metropolitan involvement.
Understanding metropolitan involvement is important because the metropole was
in charge of concessions that reformed the constitution or increase representation.
Smaller-scale concessions, such as wage increases or tax relief, remained the province
of the colonial governor. I argued that overseas empires have a common structure
where local officials manage the day-to-day operations of the colonies and metropoli-
tan involvement in that operation varies spatially and temporally.
The empirical results show that there may be limitations to the approach of com-
paring the success rate of violent and nonviolent campaigns. Current approaches code
campaigns are either successful or not, and comparing successes may miss important
variation in the effects of violent and nonviolent activity. Moreover, the value that the
target places on a possible concession affects the likelihood that any resistance will
be effective. It is no coincidence that many of the colonies that were viewed as strate-
gically essential—and thus were denied concessions that increased suffrage—erupted
into large scale colonial violence in the postwar era.
This study has a number of limitations that can be addressed in future work.
The data on violent and nonviolent resistance is culled from British newspapers. One
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advantage of this approach is that it ensures that the metropole is aware, or at least
could be aware of unrest within the colonies. In addition, data on unrest from colonial
archives would suffer from other reporting biases–many reports containing informa-
tion on resistance were compiled by subordinates and sent up the chain of command.
Too much reported unrest suggests a poor performing colonial official. Of course, not
every act of resistance was covered in the press. Many of the foreign correspondents
were located in the colony’s capital or other large cities. Presumably, acts of resis-
tance in the hinterlands were less likely to be reported by these correspondents, thus
making it less likely for these acts to be discussed by the metropole and to have a
meaningful effect on policy. A full model of what types of unrest are reported by the
press and by colonial officials could significant advance our understanding of when
resistance is effective and the inner workings of colonial empires.
The finding that violence was more effective than nonviolence at coercing conces-
sions raises important implications for understanding the fall of the European empires
during the 20th century. Explanations abound for the global transition from empire
to the nation (Emerson, 1962). Much of this work has focused on variation in the
timing of independence for colonies within and across empires (Spruyt, 2005). This
work shows that the transition from colony to nation was not a rupture in hierar-
chical relations between states, but rather was a process where autonomy was slowly
granted in response to violence. For many British colonies, independence was a for-
mality, although this applies less to colonies engaged in a sustained campaign against
colonial rule. The results here suggest that decolonization spanned the 20th century,
accelerated after the end of World War II, and that violent anticolonial resistance
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played an important role in the decolonization process. Moreover, the effectiveness
was not driven by the more commonly studied large-scale colonial conflicts, rather,
concessions were also a response to low-level riots and unrest.
118
Tanganyika NA Trinidad Uganda Zanzibar
Northern Rhodesia Nyasaland Palestine Sierra Leone Sothern Rhodesia Sudan
Jamaica Kenya Malaya Malta Mauritius Nigeria
Burma Ceylon Cyprus Gambia Gold Coast India
Aden Barbados Basutoland Bechuanaland British Guiana British Honduras












































Figure 0.7: This plot shows the distribution of the level of violent relative to nonvio-
lent activity for each colony.
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Figure 0.8: This plot shows the log of the number of times per year that each colony
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Figure 0.11: This plot shows the result of an interaction model where the dependent
variable is the amount of cabinet discussion of a colony and the independent variable is
the number of British casualties interacted with a weekly time trend. The downward




































The Effectiveness of Violence over Time
Figure 0.13: This plot shows the effect of violence on colonial concessions over time.
The dependent variable is the ordered measure of concessions and the main indepen-
dent variable is violent anticolonial activity interacted with the year variable. The
red bars tests for nonlinear effects and show that the interaction is largely linear. The



































s The Effectiveness of Nonviolence over Time
Figure 0.14: This plot shows the effect of nonviolence on colonial concessions over
time. The dependent variable is the ordered measure of concessions and the main
independent variable is nonviolent anticolonial activity interacted with the year vari-
able. While sloping upwards, the effect of nonviolent resistance is much smaller in
magnitude than violent resistance and imprecisely estimated.
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Typology of Resistance
0.26 Comparing Strategies of Resistance
The quantitative empirical analysis presented in Chapter 4 examined two separate
categories of anticolonial resistance: violent and nonviolent. This is a defensible choice
when examining the British metropole’s response to resistance, as metropolitan poli-
cymakers flattened different types of resistance into restrictive categories, but such a
parsimonious approach smooths over important variation. On the ground, there was
important variation within violent and nonviolent anticolonial activity. For example,
the 1930s unrest in the Caribbean started out as nonviolent labor strikes, but the
colonial police often engaged in aggressive actions that transformed the strikes into
riots (Thomas, 2012, 206-234). In Cyprus and Palestine, the policing of labor for
extractive purposes was largely absent. In these colonies, anticolonial resistance—
especially in the postwar era—was directed by leaders of hierarchical organizations
who followed a strategic plan of national liberation. These movements used largely vi-
olent strategies interspersed with nonviolent tactics. In contrast, Kwame Nkrumah’s
1950s plan of “positive action” was an organized campaign of strategic nonviolence
(Presbey, 2012) as was Gandhi’s (Roberts, 2009).
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To provide a more granular and nuanced categorization of the forms of anticolonial
resistance, this chapter presents a typology of resistance. The categorization used in
the quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 0.17 was a simple binary categorization
that divided resistance into its violent and nonviolent types. This categorization
facilitated quantitative empirical analysis. However, the quantitative analysis glossed
over important variation. In Cyprus, the 1931 riots were fundamentally different
than the sustained insurgency campaign launched by EOKA (both of these types of
resistance are studied in Chapter 0.41). The typology presented here introduces an
additional dimension to analyze resistance: that is, the extent to which the resistance
was organized within a hierarchical structure. I then take this typology and use it to
understand different instances of anticolonial resistance and provide detail as to how
the metropole discussed the resistance and how it formulated a response.
This typology is especially useful for understanding anticolonial resistance that
was not hierarchically organized. The difference between a strike and a riot was
not always clear. A commonality between both a strike and riot is that there was
usually some mass gathering of people expressing some political or economic grievance
towards the colonial state. A riot usually occurred in response to the decision of an
individual to escalate. Those decisions were usually made by the colonial police, who
were often poorly trained and quick to panic (Anderson and Killingray, 1992). They
could also have been made by more radical elements participating in an anticolonial
demonstration who knew that the police were liable to use their weapons against
nonviolent protesters. Ultimately, we may never know exactly why an individual
peaceful demonstration escalated to violence. The important point for evaluating my
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theory of imperial response is to understand how the British metropole responded to
riots and strikes, regardless of their proximate cause.
What does the political science literature tell us about why some nonviolent
demonstrations turn violent? Gustafson argues that food price instability and high
unemployment facilitates the escalation to violence because the instability increases
the anxiety and impatience of individual protesters (Gustafson, 2020). Moreover, or-
ganized demonstrations, as opposed to spontaneous ones, sustain nonviolent activity.
Gustafson supports his argument with granular data on African and Latin American
protests from 1991 to 2017. Ives and Lewis offer a similar explanation for the escala-
tion from nonviolence to violence. They show that repressive actions by the state, in
addition to a lack of a hierarchical leadership, explain why some protests turn violent
(Ives and Lewis, 2020). Using the campaign as a unit of analysis, Ryckman (2020)
shows that concessions by the state can placate organized resistance movements and
make it less likely for them to turn violent.
Despite using more recent data, these theorized dynamics and mechanisms are
useful for understanding anticolonial resistance. The organized/spontaneous distinc-
tion has obvious utility: protests organized by Nkrumah and Gandhi (in addition to
the strike actions during the Palestinian Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 and the Cyprus
emergency) were fundamentally different than labor protests in, say, Nigeria or Ja-
maica. The latter protests were made possible by the union’s facilitation of collective
action (Butcher and Svensson, 2016). Declining commodity prices decreased em-
ployment and induced desperation among laborers in the Caribbean, which likely
contributed to the cause of the riots (Thomas, 2012, 206-234). (Ryckman, 2020)’s
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emphasis on concessions jibes with my argument that Britain’s refusal to grant con-
cessions explains why large-scale violent conflicts erupted in some colonies but not
others. In sum, recent political science literature on nonviolent and violent dynamics
offers a theoretical framework that can help differentiate among types of anticolonial
resistance.
Take, for example, variation in violence and nonviolence in the Gold Coast. This
will be explored further in Chapter 0.46, but there were two important types of
anticolonial resistance in the Gold Coast during the postwar era. While no large-
scale violent insurgency occurred, the case of the Gold Coast allows us to explore
dynamics of nonviolent spontaneous protests that turned violent due to the actions of
the colonial state and also organized nonviolence. The former can best be exemplified
by the riots of 1948. Here, colonial police (likely) fired on semi-organized protesters
in the capital of Accra, which led to rioting throughout the colony. A dozen Africans
were killed and over two hundred were wounded. The damages totaled two million
pounds. The riots demonstrated the instability and fragility of colonial rule, led to
substantial constitutional reforms, and paved the way for the rise of Kwame Nkrumah.
In contrast with spontaneous violence driven by repression was the organized
nonviolence of Kwame Nkrumah’s “positive action”. There were three components
of this strategy: pressures for constitutional reforms, newspaper campaigns, and more
active forms of resistance like strikes, boycotts, and protests. While this campaign
was highly organized (many strikers adjusted the timing of their strike to when-
ever Nkrumah ordered it), violence was never completely absent. On January 17
1950, for example, a similar pattern to the events of February 1948 unfolded. Ex-
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servicemembers protested in Accra. After the police provoked them, the protesters
killed two police officers. In response, and despite his condemnations of the violence,
the colonial government arrested Nkrumah and imprisoned him for a year (Presbey,
2012, 59-63). Despite of (or because of) his imprisonment, Nkrumah’s political party,
the Convention Peoples Party (CPP), enjoyed a surge in support while the rest of
the leadership organized voting drives and boycotts. This nonviolent campaign was
obviously successful for Kwame Nkrumah and his CPP: Nkrumah became the first
leader of an independent Ghana in 1957.
Before discussing different types of anticolonial resistance within the British Em-
pire in detail, I begin this chapter by presenting a typology of anticolonial resistance,
which also maps on to more contemporary forms of political resistance. There is
substantial utility in this approach since most current research examines large-scale
campaigns or individual events. The maximalist campaigns studied by political sci-
entists lump a variety of different resistance campaigns together, and their inclusion
criteria includes a level of hierarchical organization and strategic thinking that may be
absent in more spontaneous events (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008; Griffiths, 2016).
For this approach, it is straightforward to assess whether a campaign is successful or
not—did it achieve its stated goals? Another method of analysis uses high-frequency
event data culled from newspaper reports to examine the microdynamics of resis-
tance and repression. This is also useful for exploring the short-term effects of, say,
a protest—did the protest lead to repression by the state? Did more protests follow?
However, it is exceedingly difficult to identify whether an ephemeral type of politi-
cal protest with a wide range of possible effects is “successful”. The goal here is to
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offer a theoretical framework that fills in the gap between the study of maximalist
campaigns and fine-grained event data.
To show the utility of this typology and to assess the effects of different forms of
resistance, I chose a number of events of anticolonial resistance to examine in depth.
These events were chosen because there exists ample historical information about
the events and to select events that varied across the dimensions in the typology.
For violent events with low organization, I chose the 1938 riots in Jamaica and the
1929 Women’s War in Nigeria. The 1938 riots were part of a widespread anticolonial
rebellion in the West Indies that were driven by dissatisfaction with the poor economic
situation that was exacerbated by the worldwide depression. The result of these riots
were increased metropolitan attention and constitutional reforms. The Women’s War
was another mass act of resistance that included violent actions. Importantly, this
event had comparatively low levels of violence. Property was destroyed but no colonial
officials were hurt. The metropole ignored these acts (they were never discussed in the
cabinet) and the colonial state, not the metropole, instituted reforms. The metropole
ignored the Women’s War because the level of violence was low, political activity by
women were generally delegitimized in British society, and the British viewed Nigeria
as exemplifying the power of indirect rule and thus were more likely to allow local
officials to handle political events.
I also run a number of statistical models using data on mass resistance campaigns
to disaggregate violent and nonviolence along the dimension of the level of organi-
zation. These models explore the effects of hierarchically organized resistance on
metropolitan attention and concessions.
128
0.27 A Typology of Resistance
This section introduces my typology of anticolonial resistance. While the quantitative
empirical analysis of Chapter 0.17 breaks down anticolonial resistance into violence
and nonviolent forms, the typology offered here varies on the additional axis of the
level of organization in the resistance. Generally, this helps distinguish between spon-
taneous acts of resistance and resistance organized by leaders of a movement. This
typology treats mass riots resulting from police repression and economic grievances
as fundamentally different than armed insurgencies. For nonviolence, this typology
helps distinguish between organized campaigns of civil disobedience—like those orga-
nized by Gandhi, Nkrumah, or even the Arab National Committee in Palestine—with
more ephemeral strikes and protests that were less coordinated. These often occurred
in the context of a labor movement.
Figure 0.15 presents this typology in a 2 by 2 table. On the vertical axis, the
method of resistance varies according to whether it is violent or nonviolent. On the
horizontal axis, the variation lies in the level of organization, with a hierarchical
form of resistance having a clear leadership and spontaneous resistance being less
elite-driven. This typology presents four discrete and mutually exclusive types of
resistance. In practice, of course, substantial variation existed within each category
and violent activity often coexisted with nonviolent activity.
What separates each category? In chapter 2 I defined violent resistance as re-
sistance where people were hurt or property was damaged. Nonviolent activity is









Figure 0.15: This figure shows a 2 by 2 table showing variation across two dimensions
of anticolonial resistance.
I define hierarchical resistance as resistance where there was some sort of leadership
that either planned, coordinated, or executed the resistance. Hierarchical resistance
is top-down, spontaneous resistance is bottom-up and driven by those actually en-
gaging in the resistance. To evaluate the relative effects of each type of resistance, I
present an abstraction of each type of resistance and then describe an instance of that
abstraction (representing each quadrant of Figure 0.15 in detail. Each ideal-type of
resistance accompanies an in-depth discussion of a type of actual anticolonial resis-
tance that occurred within the British Empire. Doing so can help probe the limits and
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explanatory power of my theory of imperial response. I will pay particular attention
to how the metropole reacted to each type of resistance and whether any concessions
were granted. In addition, I also pay attention to how colonial officials changed their
views on withdrawal or independence. In the postwar era, many colonies had unof-
ficial timelines for independence. These timelines often contracted or expanded in
response to political conditions within the colonies.
0.28 Riots
Why were there anticolonial riots? Riots required high levels of participation—while
a dozen or so individuals could engage in an insurgency, a prerequisite for a riot
was a large number of people concentrated together. Participation in nonviolent
action is easier for the marginal actor than participation in violent action. Within
the British Empire, riots often resulted from repressive actions by the colonial state
against nonviolent political protests. The colonial police often supplied the spark
that transformed a protest into a riot.
Jamaican Riot of 1938
Description
In May of 1938, sugar can workers launched a strike at the Frome estate plan-
tation, one of the largest in colonial Jamaica and owned by the West Indies Sugar
Company. Three thousand workers gathered at the compound’s headquarters early
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on Monday, May 2nd. At 5:30 AM, one hundred police officers arrived at the scene.
By 9:00 AM, the number of strikers ballooned. At this time, there were reports of
some strikers destroying property elsewhere on the Frome estate. Some strikers threw
bricks and stones at the police after the police fired shots into the air in an attempt to
get the crowd to disburse. Adding to the tense atmosphere were the bayonets affixed
to the rifles used to fire the warning shots. The volley fire killed four protesters and
injured nine more. The crowd scattered and began setting fire to the sugar cane
fields (Thomas, 2012, 220-226). This event was part of a larger series of protests that
turned violent after excessive police repression. In his analysis of policing in Jamaica
during this period, Martin Thomas writes that ”The magnitude of these disorders,
their orchestrated destruction and the level of violence used to contain them rever-
berated throughout the island” (Thomas, 2012, 225). Despite directly contributing
to the deaths of a handful of colonial subjects, the police behaved in the way that
they were trained and implemented the best practices that were introduced in recent
policing reforms within the colony. To some colonial officials, this suggested that the
way to prevent future disorders was not better and more policing, but political and
economic reforms. In June 1938, the new governor of Jamaica, Charles Campbell
Wooley, announced a half a million pounds of funding for a land settlement reform
and the alleviation of unemployment (Thomas, 2012, 228). A number of local com-
missions were appointed to investigate the causes of the disorders.
Response
How did the metropole react to these disorders? On May 25 1938, the cabinet
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discussed the events in Jamaica. The pattern of events theorized in Chapter 2 fits
my theory of imperial response: violence occurred, the metropole discussed the vio-
lence, and issued recommendations for reforms. At the cabinet meeting, the Colonial
Secretary, William Ormsby-Gore, described the events as starting from strikes by
dockworkers that escalated when “the control of order had got beyond the powers of
the Police” (Cabinet, 1938, 11). Since these were labor strikes, their goal was clearly
telegraphed to metropolitan policymakers. Ormsby-Gore noted that the “object of
the strike was an all-round increase in wages” and that the outbreak of violence in
the West Indies was “ultimately...due to economic issues” (Cabinet, 1938, 11). The
cabinet then discussed details about implementing a royal commission to ”study this
problem in its fundamentals” and to solve the ”Constitutional problem in Jamaica”
(Cabinet, 1938, 11).
On June 14 1938, the House of Commons discussed the disturbances in Jamaica.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies (and future governor of Kenya) Malcolm
MacDonald, answered questions in parliament. He stressed that the events in Jamaica
were not one-off events, but reflected deep-seated issues that needed to be addressed.
His exhortation is worth quoting at length:
I do not think they are movements simply on the surface, without
roots underneath, which we can dismiss lightly and forget about as each
one apparently comes to an end. I think we must recognise that these
outbreaks express a sense of unrest which is fairly widespread in the West
Indies, which arises from feelings which we must respect and which will
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remain as a source of further trouble unless we can do something effec-
tive, in co-operation with the local administrations, to meet the legitimate
grievances of our fellow-subjects in the West Indies. These feelings of un-
rest are a protest against the economic distress of the Colonies themselves,
a protest against some of the consequences of that economic distress: un-
certainty of employment, low rates of wages, bad housing conditions in
many cases, and so on (Hansard, 1938a).
MacDonald went on to stress that the demonstrators were driven by legitimate
grievances and not by anti-British hostility. For this reason, he recommended sub-
stantial reforms to improve the economic and political situation in Jamaica. Ormsby-
Gore agreed, and told the cabinet that “whatever agencies may have been at work the
primary cause underlying this unrest is the very low standard of economic and social
conditions among the coloured communities; and that this in turn can be traced to
the depressed state of agriculture in those Colonies” (Thomas, 2012, 231).
0.29 Strikes
Copperbelt Strike of 1935
Description
The aptly named Copperbelt was a region of Northern Rhodesia with substantial
copper ore deposits. During the 1900s, a number of mining companies began invest-
ing in the region. Laborers throughout Africa migrated to the Copperbelt to work
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in the mines. These workers were heavily taxed and lacked outside local options for
employment. By 1930, there were about 30,000 African mine workers employed in the
Copperbelt region (Phiri, 2006). The Great Depression reduced demand for mining
labor, and in order to make up the loss in revenue collected, the state increased taxes
on mine workers. The strike started on May 21, 1935, when police announced that
taxes would again be increased. In response, miners refused to go underground. This
decision was spontaneous and resulted directly from the announcement of new taxes
(Henderson, 1975, 87). News about the protest spread and ultimately involved four
major copper mines. At the Roan Antelope mine, protesters surrounded the com-
pound offices, and the police panicked, fired their weapons, and killed six protesters
(Henderson, 1975, 84). The police arrested forty-four protesters (Perrings, 1977, 34).
Thousands of workers participated in the strike. There was little to no destruction
of property and no police were injured. Damages were limited to a broken window
pane and the looting of a small amount of grain (Henderson, 1975, 97).
Response
In response to these strikes, the metropole organized an official commission to
investigate the causes of the disturbances. The commission would be conducted by
the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and the report it issued, known as the Russel
Report, would be presented to Parliament. The commission was established by the
Governor of Northern Rhodesia quite quickly: the events ended in May 1935, and
the committee published the report that October. While the report is quite short
(around 70 pages), the committee by all accounts was quite thorough, interviewing
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Figure 0.16: The Copperbelt Region of Northern Rhodesia.
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61 European and 94 African witnesses, in addition to public meetings with colonial
subjects in Northern Rhodesia. The commission located the cause of the strike in
increased taxes and declining wages, along with the abrupt manner in which the new
tax was announced and the pool of unemployed labors who lived near the mines.
This is supported by the testimony of native participants in the strike, who expressed
resentment at the growing economic burden on miners in the Copperbelt region.
The Russell Report defensively claims that overall tax revenue in Northern Rhodesia
stayed the same and that taxes increased in the Copperbelt largely because those
workers had a higher ability to pay the tax. In addition, the report claims that the
colonial police acted with admirable levels of restraint (Russell, 1935).
The 1935 Copperbelt disturbances did not go ignored in Parliament. This was
partly due to the novelty of the strikes, which had not occurred in Northern Rhodesia
before 1935. Parliament first discussed the strikes a week after they occurred, well
before the publication of the Russell Report. MPs questioned the Secretary of State
for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister. Cunliffe-Lister provided an overview of
the events and assuaged any fears that these strikes portended more intense unrest.
He averred that, as of June 3rd, there was “no actual dispute to settle” between the
striking workers and the owners of the mines, and over 90 percent of the strikers had
returned to work (Hansard, 1935). Moreover, the strike did not represent widespread
discontent but was instigated by a small group of members in a secret society who
wanted to protest a tax increase. These answers, and the information contained
in the Russell Report, must have satisfied any metropolitan critics of colonial rule
in Northern Rhodesia: despite the publication of the Russell Report in October,
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the 1935 Copperbelt Strike was never seriously discussed in parliament again. The
cabinet summaries make no mention of Northern Rhodesia in 1935 or 1936. The
constitution of Northern Rhodesia would not be reformed until 1946.
Sudan Strike of 1947-1948
Description
In 1947 and 1948, the Sudan Workers’ Affairs Association (WAA) launched a
number of strikes by railway workers operating near the ports of Sudan. Labor strikes
among transportation workers in Sudan could seriously damage the colonial economy,
as colonial extraction entailed moving raw materials from the interior into the coastal
ports. Strikes were also easily coordinated along railroads due to information and
personnel connections. Decreasing purchasing power due to inflation and stricter
export controls weakened the economic condition of Sudanese rail workers (Cross,
1997). These conditions gave impetus to the formation of transportation workers
unions, such as the WAA.
The July 1947 strike started in the same way as many other colonial strikes during
this time period: an organized march to a government or employment headquarters
was interrupted by a confrontation with the police. On July 12 1947 railworkers
organized by the WAA marched to the railway headquarters to petition for reforms.
The workers were greeted at the headquarters by police. Skirmishes ensued, with
dozens injured but no one was killed. The following day, the WAA called for a
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strike. Half of the railworkers in the Sudan—approximately ten thousand employees—
participated in the strike. On July 13, the WAA issued a call for a general strike after
police detained members of the WAA leadership. After negotiations between the
colonial government and the WAA, mediated by Sudanese political parties, the WAA
called off the general strike on July 23. Scholars regard the outcome of the strike as a
success for the WAA: they received their prime demands of the government legalizing
trade unions and dropping all criminal charges against the leadership of the WAA
(Curless, 2013). For the next year and a half similar strikes were launched by the
WAA calling for increased pay and better working conditions, which were occasionally
granted (report, p14).
Response
The official public line of the British was that these strikes were instigated by the
Egyptians or communists outside of the Sudan. The annual Report on the Finances,
Administration, and Condition of the Sudan for 1947 located the strike as part of
a worldwide discontent with economic conditions and dismissed anticolonial activity
in the Sudan as having ”a minor character” p13. The report blames the increasing
cost of living which gave rise to the strike as driven by ”external world conditions”
and did not reflect colonial governances p14. The report also blamed ”unscrupulous
ringleaders” for strike action, and not the will of individual workers.
In London, the discourse on Sudan, to the extent that it existed, focused on
Sudan’s relationship with Egypt. An important issue in Anglo-Egyptian relations
was how to manage control over the Sudan, which was ruled by overlapping layers of
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sovereignty. Discussions of Sudan’s constitution and attempts at the British to reform
it also centered around Sudan’s relationship with Egypt. It is likely that British
preoccupation with Sudan’s constitution crowded out any discussion of anticolonial
resistance in the Sudan. The Sudan was also unique because the Foreign Office, not
the Colonial Office, possessed formal authority. However, the metropolitan silence
on the general strikes of 1947 and 1948 is notable. Sudan’s labor unrest were simply
never mentioned in the parliament or the cabinet conclusions during the entirety of
1947 and 1948.
The British did reform the constitution and expand suffrage in 1948. A general
strike in 1947 and a constitutional reform in 1948 would suggest that the strikes
led to the reforms. There is evidence suggesting that this is not the case. For
one, Anglo-Egyptian negotiations over the Sudan’s constitution began in early 1947,
well before the strikes occurred (Hansard, 1948a). Egypt was heavily involved in
the negotiations–with the British ambassador and the Egyptian Minister for For-
eign Affairs (whose approval of the constitution was required by the terms of the
condominium) regularly meeting in Cairo fto discuss Sudan’s constitutional status
(Hansard, 1948a). The timing of the constitutional reform was driven not by British
willingness to increase Sudanese self-government, rather, it was driven by Egyptian
intransigence. As Mayhew remarked in Parliament on May 5 1948, ”We feel we have
done all we can to help forward Sudanese self-government” and the onus for reforms
now lay with the Egyptians” (Hansard, 1938b).
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0.30 1929 Women’s War in Nigeria. Why were
there no Reforms?
In November of 1929 thousands of Igbo women from the Bende District in Nigeria
traveled to the town of Oloko to protest the policies of the Warrant Chiefs. The
seeds of what would be known as the Women’s War started when an Assistant District
Officer in the Bende district conducted a redundant census of villages where he would
begin to count the number of women in the household for tax purposes. The women
in the villages quite reasonably feared that their accounting by the census would lead
to increased taxation. A worldwide depression and a decrease in the price of Nigeria’s
main export of palm oil strained colonial subjects. In response to the threat of a higher
tax burden, women from six different ethnic groups organized a march on the District
Office. They blockaded roads, brought down telephone poles, and released detained
prisoners. On December 13, 1929 a British medical officer ran over two women in
his car. Women attacked stores and banks owned by foreigners. Over ten thousand
women participated in the revolt (Zukas, 2009). The British engaged in widespread
repression to combat the resistance, employing soldiers, police, and even Boy Scouts
(Van Allen, 1975, 22). Many women were massacred, and whole villages were razed.
Scholars estimate over thirty women were killed by colonial soldiers (Umoren, 1995).
My theory of imperial response predicts that the Women’s War should have re-
sulted in increased metropolitan discussion, some assessment by the metropole about
the root causes of the riots, and political reforms that increased the political power of
disaffected colonial subjects. This did not happen. Why? My theory offers an expla-
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nation as to why there were no reforms: the theory of imperial response predicts that
bargaining failures due to the metropole’s unwillingness to grant concessions because
of security concerns would prevent the granting of concessions, but have no effect on
the level metropolitan discussion. This explanation is not satisfactory. While Nigeria
possessed important military bases and metropolitan policymakers viewed the colony
as strategically important, in 1929 strategic concerns were not as paramount as they
would be in the postwar era. More importantly, the Women’s War failed to com-
mand metropolitan attention and involvement. The cabinet completely ignored the
riots, and the parliament only discussed the events sporadically. Bargaining failures
interrupt the causal chain connecting violence to concessions only after violence has
increased metropolitan attention. Investigating why the Women’s War did not lead
to metropolitan involvement can help us interrogate the theory of imperial response
and understand when resistance is successful.
I argue that there are three factors about the 1929 Women’s War that explain
why the metropole was relatively unconcerned with the riots. These are: the high
level of indirect rule in Nigeria, an exceptionally strong and able colonial state that
could effectively implement reforms that would address the grievances of the rioters,
and a general feeling held by colonial authorities that political protests orchestrated
by women were unimportant. Other idiosyncratic factors inhibited any metropolitan
involvement. The report on the disturbances was delayed due to turnover in the
Colonial Secretary and an illness suffered by the Governor of Nigeria, which reduced
interest in the colony by parliament (Hansard, 1930a). Since the colonial state was
relatively strong, symbolized the power of indirect rule, and could handle the demands
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of women, the metropole allowed the colonial state to handle responding to the riots
and granting local reforms.
In a landmark 1975 article, Judith van Allen examined the gendered responses by
the British to the 1929 Riots in Nigeria. The British referred to these events as the
”Aba Riots”, while the Igbo themselves and more recent scholars refer to them as
the ”Women’s War”. For van Allen, this terminological difference was symptomatic
of Britain’s tendency to erase the political agency of colonial women. This led to
Britain’s failure to ”recognize the Women’s War as a collective response to the ab-
rogation of rights” (Van Allen, 1975, 23). District Officers believed that the women
were not acting out of their own accord but were simply following men’s orders. Ac-
cording to van Allen, the British viewed the women’s demands that women serve in
the Native Courts as ”irrational and ridiculous” (Van Allen, 1975, 23). Using colo-
nial officials’ biographies, autobiographies, journals, and memoirs, van Allen argues
that these officials were unable ”to discover and protect Igbo women’s political and
economic roles” because they assumed ”that politics and business are neither proper
nor normal places for women” (Van Allen, 1975, 28).
The local colonial government in Nigeria was able to successfully contain the
rebellion and to implement reforms in response to the Women’s War. When the
demonstrations started in Aba and Opobo, forces from local colonial police were sup-
plemented with troops from the Royal West African Frontier Force (Hansard, 1929).
These reinforcements helped contain the riots and prevented them from spreading.
Regarding reforms, in November of 1930, the government issued an ordinance, with
approval from the Secretary of State for the Colonies, that appointed new Warrant
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Chiefs and deposed of inept ones. The colonial governor was not required to con-
sult with the metropolitan government before enacting this policy change (Hansard,
1930b).
The extent to which indirect rule was practiced on the round varied across empires
and within colonies. In the British Empire, Nigeria was the model for indirect rule.
Regardless of what this meant in practice, metropolitan and colonial policymakers
treated Nigeria somewhat differently than other colonies. The incredibly influential
theorist of indirect rule, Frederick Lugard, was the High Commissioner of the Protec-
torate of Northern Nigeria when he penned his treatise, The Dual Mandate in Tropical
Africa (Lugard, 2013). The result of this orientation to colonial rule was that native
courts administered native law, which meant that much of the punishment doled out
to colonial subjects in Nigeria in the wake of the Women’s War was to be handled by
local courts with little British influence. This principle was discussed in parliament
in the aftermath of the Women’s War and provided justification for leaving matters
related to the Women’s War to the Native Courts (Hansard, 1930c).
An additional explanation for why the Women’s War did not command metropoli-
tan attention is that it simply was not violent enough. There were no British casu-
alties. Those participating in the revolt did not kill anyone; they used cassava sticks
(commonly used as a kitchen tool) as weapons, not guns (Umoren, 1995, 70). They
did, however, do extensive damage to property, including the burning down of several
buildings. Most of these buildings were affiliated with the colonial state or foreign
businesses. What reforms were implemented by the colonial state? The number of
Native Courts were increased and Warrant Chiefs were replaced by a larger number
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of judges elected by villagers (Van Allen, 1975, 23). There was no taxation of women,
the prices of imported goods were reduced, and some women became members of the
new court system (Umoren, 1995).
0.31 Within-case analysis: Palestine 1936-1939
The typology presented above organized resistance along violent/nonviolent dimen-
sions and the extent to which the resistance is hierarchically organized. To study the
different effects on metropolitan discussion and response for violent spontaneous re-
sistance and nonviolent spontaneous resistance, I have compared the effects of strikes
and riots on the metropole across colonies, and across cases. Comparing spontaneous
resistance across colonies did not pose a huge threat to inference because the deter-
minants of both strikes and riots were similar. They were both spontaneous action
directed against the colonial state and agitated for some political or economic reform.
Riots were rarely planned actions, and strikes turned violent due to the actions of
individuals (whether they be colonial police or more radical anticolonial activists).
This facilitated cross-case comparison without massive threats to inference.
Comparing hierarchically organized resistance campaigns is much more difficult.
The civil disobedience campaigns of Nkrumah and Gandhi arose in entirely different
contexts than the insurgencies of the Mau Mau or EOKA. Comparing how the British
responded to civil disobedience with how they responded to insurgencies will tell us
little because the decisions the British made in response to resistance across colonies
directly led to the conditions that facilitated the organization of these campaigns. In
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short, when it comes to making inferences about the effects of hierarchically orga-
nized resistance campaigns, endogeneity between Britain’s response and the type and
intensity of resistance makes causal inference difficult.
To remedy this, I provide an within-case analysis of the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt
in Palestine. The “Great Revolt” started in April of 1936 and, after an extensive
campaign of repression by the British, ended in 1939 (Porath, 2015). There was
substantial temporal variation in the use of violent and nonviolent resistance, both
of which were hierarchically organized by Arab nationalists in Palestine. From April
1936 to October 1936, the Higher Arab Committee (the central political body in
Mandate Palestine) called for a general strike and boycott of Jewish goods. Com-
mittees in Nablus and Jaffa, almost simultaneously, also called for a general strike.
The boycott was followed by a large majority of the Palestinian population for over
a month and a half (Anderson, 2017). While the most frequent type of resistance
during this time period was nonviolent, I argue that colonial officials were much more
interested and concerned about the violent activity that occurred during the general
strike.
In October a revolt that started in Haifa devolved into an armed insurrection in
the countryside. This insurrection later spread to urban areas and targeted British
forces (Norris, 2013, 2008). Rebels launched attacks in September of 1937 with the
publication of the report by the Peel Commission, which recommended partition
between Arab and Jewish states (Banko, 2013). The revolt peaked in the fall of 1938
and greatly tapered by 1939 (Anderson, 2017) Since both forms of resistance in the
revolt were hierarchically organized, this aids inference in comparing the effects of
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both forms of hierarchical resistance within the same colony. The goal of the strike
was to coerce the British to restrict or ban Jewish immigration. More radical peasants
wanted complete independence from the British (Anderson, 2017). In the later stages
of the revolt, a distinct religious and anti-bourgeois sentiment drove rebel violence
(Radai, 2016).
As Figure 0.8 shows, there was a higher level of metropolitan attention throughout
colonial rule toward Palestine than there was in many other colonies. Relative to
other colonies, both the Parliament and the Cabinet discussed Palestine extensively,
even when there was little anticolonial resistance in the colony. This was largely
because the political problems in the colony were potentially explosive and required
frequent discussion and re-visiting through the Mandate period. Generally these
issues revolved around the appropriate level of Jewish immigration into Palestine.
British officials tried to satisfy the Zionist movement, who wanted less restrictive
controls on Jewish immigration into Palestine, while at the same time, the British
limited immigration as a way to placate Arab nationalists in Palestine. For much
of the mandate period, the Arab nationalists’ singular issue was the restriction of
Jewish immigration, which they viewed as a foreign invasion. These issues meant
that the metropole was heavily involved in colonial policymaking in Palestine. As it
had in the United States, Palestine also occupied a unique position in Britain due to
its religious connections.
How did the metropole discuss the general strike in Palestine during the period
of April to October of 1936? To answer this, I plot the number of cabinet summaries
per month that indicate that the cabinet discussed Palestine from 1936-1939, as
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shown in Figure 0.17. The red area indicates the time period where there was mostly
nonviolent activity in the form of the general strike, while the blue portion indicates
the time period where the resistance was mostly violent. The highest number of
cabinet discussions occurred in the beginning of 1939, precisely when the armed
insurgency in the countryside was at its peak and the British responded with extensive
repression. As predicted by my theory of imperial response, metropolitan attention
was higher during the periods of largely violent activity than in periods where there




























Figure 0.17: This plot shows the number of times that the British cabinet conclu-
sions discussed “Palestine” by month. The red portion indicates the period of the
general strike (hierarchically organized nonviolence) while the blue portion indicates
the period of armed insurgency (hierarchically organized violence).
Examining the parliamentary debates tells a more complicated story. Figure 0.18
presents data on the number of times that Parliament mentioned the word “Pales-
tine” during the debates. Contrary to the predictions made by the theory of imperial
response and the plot of the cabinet discussions, this plot shows parliamentary men-
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tions were quite high during the period of nonviolence in the Arab Revolt. Why? The
answer is that there was a vigorous debate about Britain’s policy toward Palestine in
parliament during the Arab Revolt. This debate inflated the number of times that
a Palestine was mentioned. These debates revolved around a number of issues. One
is that MPs without much interest in colonial affairs still had strong opinions about
maintaining control over an outpost in the Middle East bordering a large body of
water and discussed the colony more. Secondly, the terms of the League of Nations
trusteeship meant that the British had to satisfy their obligation to the trusteeship
while still engaging in their standard practices of colonial rule. Figuring out how to
do this was quite difficult. Third, there was heightened interest in Palestine because
of its religious significance. All of these factors fueled public interest in British rule
































Figure 0.18: This plot shows the number of times that the British parliament men-
tioned the word “Palestine” by month. The red portion indicates the period of the
general strike (hierarchically organized nonviolence) while the blue portion indicates
the period of armed insurgency (hierarchically organized violence).
Reading the transcripts of the parliamentary debates shows some of these dy-
namics. There were a large number of mentions about Palestine during the early
part of the revolt because MPs debated what the proper response to the general
strike should be. On June 19th 1936, for example, the House of Commons discussed
Palestine and mentioned the colony’s name 43 times. The debate was facilitated by
forthcoming answers about the political situation in the colony by the new Secre-
tary of State for the Colonies, William Ormsby-Gore, who lamented at this time that
“disturbances, accompanied by strikes of non-Jewish shops, motor transport, the port
workers at Jaffa, and, in short, of almost all Arab industrial enterprises, have now,
I regret to say, continued for some eight weeks” (?). In response to the strikes, the
British metropole decided to appoint a commission inquiring to the causes of the
Arab general strike and increases tension between Arabs and Jews. A commission
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was appointed in part because the alternative would have been to welcome separate
Arab and Jewish delegations, which would have been a political minefield (?).
The commission appointed in August visited the Mandate in November. Known
officially as the Palestine Royal Commission, it is more famously known as the Peel
Commission, named after the head of the commission, Lord Peel. The report offered
a descriptive background to the revolt and a potential solution: abandonment of the
Mandate and the partition of Palestine into Arab, Jewish, and neutral territories.
This was a compromise solution that satisfied no one, and both the Jewish and Arab
leadership rejected the proposal.
What was the character of metropolitan attention during the revolt? A reading
of colonial reports shows that colonial officials were concerned with both violent
and nonviolent activity. A general strike indicated higher tensions between Jews and
Arabs, but interethnic violent conflict signaled that a full-blown civil war could occur.
In their assessment of the situation and in their policy response, the authors of the
Peel Commission were concerned with both violence and nonviolence. In the chapter
of the report entitled, “The Disturbances of 1936”, the report begins its overview
of the events of 1936 abruptly: “The trouble began with the murder of two Jews
by Arab bandits on the night of 15th of April on the Tulkarm-Nablus road. The
following night two Arabs were murdered not far from Petah Tiqva as an act, so the
Arabs believed, of Jewish reprisal” (Peel, 1937, 96). The report then began detailing
the intensity of the general strike: “in May, Arab work and trade were virtually at a
standstill. Jaffa [the main trading port in the Mandate] port was out of action. Arab
shops in Jerusalem and elsewhere were closed” (Peel, 1937, 97).
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However, the main concern of the British government in Palestine during the early
phase of the revolt was the violent actions undertaken by the Arabs both against
British targets and Jewish civilians. The general strike and the violence that en-
sued were not the first time that Arab nationalists in Palestine attempted nonviolent
action. For years, the nationalist leadership tried to achieve their goals through
normal, constitutional channels. The High Commissioner of Palestine, Sir Arthur
Grenfell Wauchope, recognized this and understood the viewpoint of the nationalist
leadership. In the July 4th 1936 Palestine High Commissioner Review, which was an
official report distributed to the Cabinet, Wauchope wrote that: “The contention of
the Arabs is that they have for many years tried peaceful, constitutional methods,
but without avail, and that the failure of His Majesty’s Government to find a remedy
for their grievances has compelled them to adopt forcible methods of bringing their
grievances to the attention of the world. I cannot agree that any of these contentions
of the Arabs are valid, but that they represent generally the local Arab view there can
be little doubt” (Commissioner, 1936b, 643). The report also noted that there were,
on average, about twenty to thirty attacks per day by Arab militias. These groups
would snipe or bomb British troops and Jewish settlements. The report concluded
“that [the Arab militias] constitute a definite rebellion against the Government there
can be no denying” (Commissioner, 1936b, 644). A peaceful Palestine could not be
achieved by military means. In August the High Commissioner wrote to the cabinet
that “far from the situation showing any signs of improvement, there are indications
that it may seriously deteriorate, unless some political action is taken which will bring
about a change in spirit in the Arab leaders and their supporters” (Commissioner,
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1936a, 653).
That same month, the High Commissioner wrote a secret dispatch to the Secretary
of State for the Colonies. In this missive Wauchope lamented that the unrest in
Palestine had lasted for over four months, with 65 Jews killed, 15 British killed, and
hundreds more wounded. Wauchope also expressed that he did not want to make
any political concession as long as the violence lasted, but suggested that since the
situation was so dire, the colonial government may want to implore the Palestinian
leadership to verbally denounce the attacks. This would be a prelude to a political
concession to the Arabs that would hopefully forestall future disturbances. He wrote
that “some concession is the only course open to use by which we can attain the
two objectives” of maintaining law and order and British prestige. The reason that
Wauchope softened his stance toward the Arabs and recommended a concession was
because of the violence. His dispatch concludes: “as the present methods have not
succeeded in restoring order during the last four months, and as acts of violence are
growing more widespread and brutal reprisals more frequent, I consider some change
of policy is now called for” (Commissioner, 1936c, 657-660).
Both violence and nonviolence led to increased metropolitan discussion, but only
violence led to a concession. No concession was made to either Arabs or Jews in
Palestine by the British as a result of the Arab general strike of 1936. It was only
after the Palestinian Arabs launched a hierarchically organized campaign of violence
against British targets that the British government granted a concession to one of
the dominant ethnic groups in Palestine. In May 1939, the British published a White
Paper that reoriented British policy toward Palestine in response to the revolt. It
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satisfied a number of demands made by the Arab nationalists. The White Paper
announced that Palestine would be independent within a decade. Power would be
devolved and self-government would slowly increase. Within the White Paper, the
British included provisions to protect their national security interests: any treaty
between Palestine and Britain would include “such requirements to meet the strategic
situation as may be regarded as necessary by His Majesty’s Government in the light
of the circumstances then existing” (of State for the Colonies, 1939, 6).
The most important part of the 1939 White Paper was that it placed restrictions
on both Jewish immigration into Palestine and land purchases for the next five years.
During this time, only 75,000 Jewish immigrants would be allowed into Palestine,
and after this period, restrictions on Jewish immigration would be lifted only with
Arab consent (of State for the Colonies, 1939, 7-9). Jewish immigration and land
purchases were the main issues surrounding the conflict in Palestine. This change in
policy greatly favored the Arabs and was detrimental to the Jews. For this reason it
has remained a contentious part of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, with some
scholars referring the change in policy as “appeasement” (Cohen, 1973). For the
contemporary Palestinian leadership, the White Paper signaled that violent tactics
were successful. As Grob-Fitzgibbon writes, “the Muslim population in Palestine
had rebelled against British policy and, as a consequence, had been granted their
demands” (Grob-Fitzgibbon, 2016, 10).
The character of mass nonviolence during the first phase of the general strike
was unusually strong and widespread yet was unable to coerce a concession from the
metropole. Ethnic divisions between Jews and Arabs in Palestine eroded other, non-
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ethnic identities, such as class (Lockman, 1996). This enabled the Arab leadership to
marshal Arab ethnic identity into solving the collective action problem that plagued
strikes in areas with higher ethnic divisions. When the Arab leadership was weaker,
it was unable to organize workers into participating in the general strike, which helps
explain the escalation into violence in later periods (Pearlman, 2011). Perhaps most
importantly, the British were extremely fearful of mass ethnic conflict between Arabs
and Jews in Palestine, and were keen to act to prevent the Mandate from erupting
into a full-blown civil war, which of course did happen in 1947 (Sheffer, 1978).
By any metric, Palestine was a strategically important colony (Sheffer, 1978, 313).
Why, then, did the British concede after an episode of violence? The theory of
imperial response predicts that concessions will be rare in strategically important
colonies due to bargaining failures, and concessions that are granted to strategically
important colonies will not increase suffrage and will not sacrifice metropolitan control
of the colony. The White Paper was a concession, but it did not expand the legislative
council nor did it alter the Constitution of Palestine. Suffrage levels remained the
same. The concession was relatively minor and it only empowered one ethnic group,
which meant that the concession did not jeopardize British control over the colony.
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0.32 Quantitative Models: Hierarchical
Resistance and Concessions
Adding more variables reduces the parsimony of a theory. What is the advantage of
further dividing anticolonial resistance into different categories? Doing so serves two
main purposes. The first is that there was important variation within the categories
of violence and nonviolence. This variation matters for understanding the onset of
resistance. The determinants of hierarchical resistance and spontaneous resistance
were not the same. Hierarchical resistance was much more likely to be explicitly na-
tionalist, occurred in the postwar era, and was much more deliberate and strategic in
how it resisted the colonial state. This is not to deny that these factors characterized
spontaneous resistance, only that they were more prevalent in forms of hierarchical
resistance.
Explaining why resistance occurs is important for understanding my theory of
imperial response, but the main goal of the theory is to explain the effect of resistance
on concessions. Is the added dimension categorizing the level of organization of
the resistance important for understanding why the metropole granted concessions
to the colony? In other words, were concessions more likely against hierarchical
or spontaneous resistance, independent of whether that resistance was violent or
nonviolent?
In this section I explore the often countervailing effects that hierarchical resistance—
in both its violent and nonviolent forms—had on colonial concessions. The relation-
ship between hierarchically organized resistance and concessions is not deterministic.
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In Palestine, for example, the metropole granted a concession in the form of the
Passfield White Paper in 1930 after the 1929 spontaneous riots, and granted another
concession after the hierarchically organized violent resistance 1939 of the Arab Re-
volt (Cohen, 2014, 216). The British granted Palestine independence in 1948 after a
sustained campaign of terrorism (Hoffman, 2016). Similarly, in Cyprus, the British
refused to grant any concessions after the 1931 spontaneous riots and during the
campaign of violence launched by EOKA.
What are the reasons why hierarchical resistance would lead to more concessions?
Hierarchical resistance is better able to mobilize colonial subjects into participating
in the resistance. An organized leadership also makes it easier for the resistance
movement to articulate its demands to both the local colonial state and the metropole.
This may make it less likely for the metropole to become directly involved in local
colonial affairs. When a leadership articulates demands after an act of resistance,
there is no need for the metropole to appoint a commission to investigate the causes,
since the metropole can simply query or negotiate with the leadership to see what
policy change could defuse future resistance. Armed with the information about the
specifics of the leadership’s demands, the metropole can strategically use targeted
concessions in scenarios where the most powerful nationalist leadership in the colony is
relatively moderate compared to a more radical flank. This explains the British’s later
embrace of Kwame Nkrumah in the Gold Coast, who they viewed as someone they
could work with. In Cyprus this strategy was debated (although never implemented)
as a way to empower EOKA and marginalize more radical communist groups.
There are also reasons that hierarchical resistance made it less likely for the
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metropole to grant a colony-wide concession. Very often the leadership of an anticolo-
nial movement were in some sort of negotiations or dialogue with the metropolitan
and colonial government. Concessions could still be granted to these movements in
response to resistance, but the concessions need not be colony-wide or even a vis-
ible reform that elevated the status of colonial subjects. Instead of granting these
reforms, the metropole could engage in other, less visible acts that favored the move-
ment rather than the colony as a whole. These targeted acts could include recognition
of a resistance group, publicly meeting with the group’s leadership, allowing a group
to participate in an election, or even verbal assurances by the metropole that the de-
sires of the movement would be satisfied. In addition, colony-wide concessions could
placate an unruly populace and stave off future unrest. Concessions in response to re-
sistance by a hierarchically organized resistance group risked emboldening the group
and encouraging more resistance, not less.
To investigate the effect of hierarchical resistance on concessions I use the data on
violent and nonviolent maximalist campaigns as coded by Stephan and Chenoweth
(2008), known as the NAVCO dataset. Stephan and Chenoweth define a campaign
“as a series of observable, continuous tactics in pursuit of a political objective. A
campaign can last anywhere from days to years. Campaigns have discernible lead-
ership and often have names, distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous
mass acts” (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008, 16). The difference between hierarchi-
cally organized resistance and spontaneous resistance is not always clear and easy to
define. An act of resistance could appear to be a spontaneous act but in reality was
orchestrated by a organized leadership. Indeed, the British tended to blame commu-
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nists for surreptitiously coordinating riots and strikes rather than recognize legitimate
grievances of colonial subjects. The NAVCO data do not categorize individual acts
as violent or nonviolent, rather, the data indicate if a violent or nonviolent campaign
was active in a give year. My modeling strategy is to interact my granular measure
of violent and nonviolent acts coded from newspaper sources with the binary variable
indicating if a violent or nonviolent campaign is active. This enables us to see how
(non)violent activity while a (non)violent campaign is ongoing affects the probability
of concessions. This approach does not allow us to assess the effect of spontaneous
or hierarchically organized individual acts affect the probability of concessions, but it
is the best approach to examine how the level of organization affects the probability
of concessions in the wake of resistance given data availability constraints and the
difficult of identifying hierarchical and spontaneous resistance.
Table 0.10 presents the results of three linear probability models with colony and
year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the colony. The dependent variable
is a binary indicator for whether a concession occurred. All independent variables
are lagged by one year, and the unit of analysis is the colony year.
All models show that my measure of violent anticolonial activity during periods
when there is no violent campaign increases the probability of a concession. In keeping
with the results in Chapter 0.17, nonviolent activity has no effect on the probability of
a concession, regardless of whether it occurs during a nonviolent campaign. Models
1 and 3 interact the violence measure with whether there is a violent anticolonial
campaign ongoing. This captures hierarchical violent resistance. The coefficient on





Violence 0.133∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.045) (0.042)
Violent Campaign 0.140 0.139
(0.199) (0.195)
Nonviolence −0.031 −0.031 −0.037
(0.029) (0.029) (0.028)
Nonviolent Campaign 0.072∗ 0.074∗
(0.042) (0.042)
Violence * Violent Campaign −0.110 −0.095
(0.117) (0.110)
Nonviolence * Nonviolent Campaign −0.070 −0.055
(0.070) (0.061)
Observations 1,153 1,153 1,153
R2 0.192 0.190 0.191
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.131 0.131
Residual Std. Error 0.298 (df = 1071) 0.298 (df = 1073) 0.298 (df = 1073)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.10: This table shows the results of models where violent and nonviolent
resistance is interacted variables indicating if there is an ongoing maximalist campaign
as measured by the NAVCO dataset.
but not statistically significant. Models 1 and 2 interact the nonviolence measure
with whether there is a nonviolent anticolonial campaign ongoing. In both cases, the
effect of violent and nonviolent resistance on the probability of a concession during
an anticolonial resistance campaign are lower than resistance outside of an ongoing
campaign. However, one of the coefficients on the interaction terms are statistically
significant at conventional levels.
In addition I explore how the level of violent and nonviolent activity affects the
probability of a concession when violence happens in during a nonviolent campaign
and when nonviolence happens during a violent campaign. During a ongoing non-
violent campaign, violent resistance could signal to the metropole that anticolonial
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resistance could escalate and erupt into widespread violence, thus inducing a con-
cession. Conversely, nonviolent activity during a violent anticolonial campaign could
induce a concession by signaling to the metropole that a more moderate faction is
increasing in power and could be rewarded with a concession. Table 0.11 shows the
results of models where violent and nonviolent anticolonial activity is interacted with
a dummy variable indicating that a violent anticolonial campaign is ongoing, and
these measures are interacted with a variable indicating that a nonviolent campaign
is ongoing.
The results are presented in Table 0.11. Model 1 interacts both forms of resistance
with a indicator for whether a violent campaign is ongoing, while model 2 interacts
both forms of resistance with an indicator for whether a nonviolent campaign is on-
going. Both models show that when there is no sustained campaign ongoing, violent
anticolonial activity increases the probability of a concession. The relevant interac-
tion term, that is distinct from the interaction terms in models in Table 0.10, for
model 1 is the interaction between a violent campaign and nonviolent anticolonial
activity. For model 2 the relevant variable is the interaction between violent anti-
colonial activity and a nonviolent campaign. The coefficient on the interaction term
between a violent campaign and nonviolent activity in model 1 is substantively large
and not statistically significant. The coefficient on the interaction term between a
violent campaign and violent activity is much smaller in magnitude and not statis-
tically significant. Model 2 interacts violent and nonviolent resistance with a binary
variable indicating if there is a nonviolent campaign ongoing. Both interaction terms







Violent Campaign 0.212 0.030
(0.144) (0.104)
Violence * Nonviolent Campaign 0.151
(0.112)




Nonviolent Campaign −0.0004 0.108∗∗
(0.049) (0.054)
Violence * Violent Campaign −0.038
(0.175)




Adjusted R2 0.131 0.131
Residual Std. Error (df = 1071) 0.298 0.298
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.11: This table shows the results of addition models interacting measures of
violence and nonviolence with binary variables indicating if there is an ongoing violent
or nonviolent campaign.
interaction term between violent activity and a nonviolent campaign is positive. This
suggests that the metropole may be more likely to grant a concession to a nonviolent
campaign if there is a more radical element committing violence in the colony.
What are we to make of the statistical models interacting the NAVCO data on
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violent and nonviolent campaigns with the more granular measures of violent and
nonviolent anticolonial resistance? One consistent result is that violence occurring
outside of a sustained campaign is effective at coercing concessions. In other words,
the finding of Chapter 0.17 that violence is more effective than nonviolence is cor-
roborated and is not driven only by large-scale insurgencies like those that occurred
in Cyprus, Malaya, Aden, Kenya and Palestine. Indeed, the NAVCO data on violent
campaigns rightfully codes all of these insurgencies as maximalist violent campaigns.
This helps us understand why the interaction term between violent activity and a
violent campaign (in models 1 and 3 in table 0.10) is negative, although not statis-
tically significant. This interaction term is estimating the effect of violent activity
during an insurgency campaign. These were scenarios where the metropole was much
less likely to grant a concession in general because these colonies were strategically
important and the metropole was willing to spend almost endless amounts of money
and sacrifice British lives to retain control of the colony. Moreover, the effect of vi-
olent on metropolitan attention declines over time during an insurgency campaign,
as shown again in Chapter 0.17. These factors make it extraordinarily difficult to
tease out whether hierarchically organized violence was simply less effective over-
all or whether the reluctance to grant a concession during episodes of hierarchically
organized violence were driven by British intransigence.
Regarding both spontaneous and hierarchical nonviolent resistance, the results
from these models provide support for my claim that nonviolent resistance does not
lead to concessions. The coefficient for nonviolent resistance is small in magnitude,
often negative, and not statistically significant. There is no consistent or meaningful
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pattern for nonviolent resistance that occurs during a nonviolent campaign. For ex-
ample, the interaction term between nonviolent resistance and a nonviolent campaign
in Models 1 and 2 from Table 0.10 are also small, negative, and not statistically sig-
nificant. Table 0.11 includes models where both granular measures of resistance are
interacted with a violent (Model 1) campaign and a nonviolent (Model 2) campaign.
Here, we see that more nonviolent activity during a violent campaign is associated
with a lower probability of a concession. Model 2 shows the same pattern holds for
nonviolent activity during a nonviolent campaign: more resistance leads to less con-
cessions. Importantly, in Model 2, the marginal effect of any nonviolent campaign
occurring (in other words, when nonviolent activity is very low) is positive and statis-
tically significant. This suggests that nonviolent campaigns not actively engaged in
contentious political activity against colonial rule did receive concessions, but more
aggressive nonviolent campaigns were not rewarded with concessions to the colony.
0.33 Conclusion
The typology of resistance introduced in this chapter adds an important dimension
to anticolonial resistance. By separating resistance into hierarchical and spontaneous
forms, my theory explicitly accounts for the level of organization behind resistance.
This helps differentiate spontaneous acts (such as a riot or a strike) from hierarchically
organized acts (such as an insurgency civil disobedience campaign). I then offer
a brief description of different forms of anticolonial resistance that vary along the
hierarchical/spontaneous and violent/nonviolent dimensions.
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Both the qualitative and quantitative results show that violence is, on average,
more effective than nonviolent resistance. This effect is stronger for violence that
occurs outside of an maximalist anticolonial violent campaign. While not conclusive,
the results do suggest that violent anticolonial activity that occurs while a nonvio-
lent campaign is ongoing is the most effective form of anticolonial resistance. The
metropole may have responded to increased violence with concessions reflecting the
demands of the leaders of the nonviolent campaign as a way to defuse future violent
activity.
A number of caveats are in order. For one, since campaigns required extensive
leadership and organization, their onset and continuation is more complex and deter-
mined by the policies of the metropole than more short-term acts of resistance like a
riot or a strike. This makes it difficult to ascertain whether the effects of hierarchical
resistance are driven by the resistance itself or the policies of the metropole. In addi-
tion, the NAVCO data are not very granular. They simply contain a binary variable
indicating if a campaign is ongoing. What this means is that for some colonies, like
Burma and India, the NAVCO data indicate that an anticolonial campaign was ongo-
ing for decades, making it so the interaction term between resistance and a campaign
capture the effect of that resistance during those decades. Indeed, for India the entire
time period studied here (from 1918 to 1948) a nonviolent anticolonial campaign was
ongoing.
Despite these caveats, this should increase our confidence that violent anticolo-
nial resistance was more likely to lead to a concession that nonviolent anticolonial
resistance. More tentatively, it is most likely that spontaneous violent anticolonial
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resistance was the most effective form of resistance. Indeed, there are a number ex-
amples presented throughout this dissertation showing that the British reacted to
widespread riots with colonial concessions (including the Caribbean in 1936 and the




This chapter examines the parliamentary debates of the British House of Commons
to understand how the metropole discussed colonial affairs. There are four goals. The
first is to describe the British parliament’s role in colonial policy. Doing so can help
us understand how changes in metropolitan politics as a result of anticolonial violence
affected policy toward the colonies. The second goal is to study how Members of Par-
liament (MPs) used euphemisms to describe anticolonial activity in the colonies, and
whether those euphemisms connoted violent or nonviolent activity. Simply counting
the number of times violence or nonviolence were directly mentioned in a parlia-
mentary debate many significantly underestimate the extent to which metropolitan
attention was focused on violent or nonviolent anticolonial activity. The parliamen-
tary debates were littered with euphemisms about anticolonial activity. Determining
what those euphemisms referred to can provide more accurate measurements of the
effect of violent and nonviolent activity on metropolitan attention.
The third goal is to disaggregate and describe the different forms of metropolitan
attention in order to study how anticolonial activity affected metropolitan attention
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and how the different forms of attention affected the probability of a concession. Using
a number of linear models, I try to assess how violent and nonviolent anticolonial
activity affected euphemism use in parliament, and in turn, how that euphemism use
affected the probability of a affected the probability of a concession. I also assess how
the level of organization behind the anticolonial resistance affected the character of
metropolitan attention in parliament.
The fourth goal is to assess the changing relationship between anticolonial activ-
ity and euphemisms over time. In short, the analysis in this chapter tries to ask,
did metropolitan discussions of anticolonial violence become more honest over time?
This has been a matter of some debate in the historical literature, with some schol-
ars arguing that metropolitan politics were relatively unconcerned with Empire and
had little impact on decolonization (Porter, 2006), while others have argued domes-
tic anticolonialism from the left helped inject formerly marginalized critiques of the
colonial project into the mainstream (Howe, 1993; Gopal, 2019). One implication of
the argument that metropolitan politics became more concerned with colonial issues
and the excesses of colonial rule is that anticolonial activity was discussed in more
accurate and honest terms.
To achieve these goals, this chapter uses a number of statistical text analytic
methods. The data consist of every utterance in the House of Commons from 1918-
1970.
The findings here support my broader argument that British policymakers in
London were more concerned with anticolonial violence than nonviolence. When MPs
used euphemisms to describe anticolonial activity, those words—such as disorder,
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unrest, or disturbance—were more likely to refer to violent activity than nonviolent
activity. I use a text-analytic method known as word embeddings that is common
in the machine learning literature to measure the similarity between different words,
based on their context. In addition, I measure the distance between the euphemisms
and their referents (meaning the difference between unrest and say, terrorism and
strikes) over time. The findings show that the distance between euphemisms and
their referents decrease over time, which could be a result of MPs being more honest
about events in the colonies.
The next section reviews how and why the British parliament mattered for colo-
nial policy. Parliament’s formal powers in this arena were quite limited. Colonial
policy was the province of the Colonial or Foreign Office, with frequent involvement
by the Cabinet. MPs, however, could exert political pressure on colonial officials.
During moments of colonial crisis, when the an uprising embarrassed the local colo-
nial officials and invited a metropolitan response, MPs would attempt to hold colonial
officials accountable. In short, there was little regular oversight of colonial policy by
parliament, but parliament became substantially involved when colonial issues occu-
pied metropolitan attention.
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0.35 Background in Parliament’s Role in
Colonial Affairs
This section presents relevant information on the British parliament’s involvement
in and discussion of colonial affairs. Colonial policy was not created in the House
of Commons. However, colonial politics were an occasional, and at times central,
part of parliamentary discussions on foreign affairs. Legislation by the crown had
to be approved by and presented to parliament and had to be enacted by ministers
who were held responsible to the parliament. For many colonies, the parliament could
pass legislation dealing with a variety of issues, including constitutional, legal, defense,
financial, and developmental issues. In his analysis of parliament’s role in colonial
issues during the postwar era, Goldsworthy writes that Parliament “acted as the final
arbiter of the distribution of authority” in the colonial territories (Goldsworthy, 1971,
64-65). Therefore Parliament’s formal powers were quite broad.
MPs could also exert political pressure on those in the Colonial Office and hold
them politically accountable for the status of the colonies. During Question Time
(when the MPs are able to directly question government ministers), MPs would query
colonial office officials about colonial policy and the political situation in the colonies.
Most of the more vigorous debates about colonial policy occurred during Question
Time. During the postwar era, as colonial politics became more relevant to left-
wing MPs (Howe, 1993) and as clashes between metropolitan troops and anticolonial
nationalists escalated into large-scale civil wars, the House of Commons discussed
colonial politics more frequently and with more intense debate. MPs also influenced
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colonial politics in private meetings with colonial officials (Goldsworthy, 1971, 66).
The geographic distance of colonies, their diversity, and their perceived inscrutable-
ness made parliamentary oversight uneven. Moreover, there was no clear distinction
between issues that should be delegated to local officials and those that warranted
parliamentary involvement. Some MPs believed in vicarious representation—that is,
since colonial subjects did not have members in parliament specifically tasked with
representing their interests, like in the French case, British MPs needed to pick up
the slack. One way of doing this was to publicize a hitherto unheard of colonial
problem in the hopes of arousing public sentiment for or against a particular colonial
issue (Goldsworthy, 1971, 65-71). However, this was a relatively rare occurrence and
was mostly confined to discussions of excessive brutality of the colonial state during
counterinsurgency wars.
MPs often discussed colonial issues and specific colonies after the occurrence of
a colonial crisis (Goldsworthy, 1971, 65-74). In his study of anticolonialism among
the British Left, Howe (1993) characterizes parliament’s response to colonial crises
thusly: there is initially a slow response from MPs to an anticolonial revolt. Once
discussion gets underway, a Labour MP will demand more detail on what actually
happened along with a public inquiry. The colonial government will drag their heels
on this front. A vigorous parliamentary debate will ensue between the majority of
MPs who supported a powerful empire and the much fewer but fiercely committed
anticolonialist MPs.
This pattern was first established after the 1935 riots in the Caribbbean. As
Howe (1993) describes it, three months after the riots, MP William Lunn raised
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questions about the St Kitts disturbances and called for a full public inquiry. The
Colonial Secretary averred that they had no official or unofficial information on what
happened. Parliament was quiet on this issue for over a year, until riots in British
Guiana provided an opportunity for anticolonial MPs to discuss the broader imperial
role in the Caribbean. One of those Labour MPs was E.F. Fletcher, who attributed
one of the causes of the riots to the colonial subjects’ demand for self-government
and low wages.
In 1937 three Labour MPs called for a formal inquiry into labor conditions in
the Caribbean islands after a series of riots that lead to the deaths of British troops
erupted in Trinidad. The colonial office continued to drag their heels and failed to
provide official statistics of labor conditions. In parliament the Colonial Secretary,
William Ormsby-Gore, professed that he had no idea what the minimum wage was in
Trinidad. After a series of uncomfortable questions about Ormsby-Gore’s knowledge
of labor relations in Trinidad, anticolonial MP William Lund pointedly asked the
colonial secretary: “Does there have to be a disturbance before the Government will
act?” (Hansard, 1937).
Lunn again spearheaded the more vigorous debate in the parliament in February
of 1938. He demanded a full inquiry into the crisis and excoriated the local colonial
government for creating hostile labor conditions. Lunn’s proposed solution was to
increase native representation and expand the franchise:
Underlying the economic evil is the constitutional question. The franchise
ought to be more widely extended, side by side with a more advanced
system of education. Closer union ought to be promoted. I think that
I shall have the Colonial Secretary with me on that particular matter.
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Opportunities should be given for public opinion to express itself, and I
regret that the Commission did not lay more emphasis on this subject. If
we give the islands a real form of self-government, I have no doubt that
peace and prosperity can be established, not only for a few people, but
for the whole of the inhabitants of the colony, and I hope, for the whole
of those who live in the West Indies (Hansard, 1938c).
Under pressure, Ormsby-Gore agreed that constitutional reforms were needed,
partly because improvements in the economic situation would not lead to real change
without an accompanying political reform. Ormsby-Gore lamented, “at the moment
there are only 26,000 people on the franchise out of a population of over 400,000. The
franchise is far too limited, and the qualification for membership of the Legislature is
far too high. In the Legislature there are only seven out of 26 representatives who are
elected.” He proposed substantial constitutional reforms that would increase native
representation: “I suggest it would be a good thing not only that the franchise should
be broadened and the standard of qualification for membership be reduced, but that
the Governor should no longer preside over the Legislature, and also that there should
be a larger element in the council of elected members” (Hansard, 1938c).
Before the end of World War II, there was little organized anticolonialism in
British politics (Howe, 1993). In the postwar era, however, organized opposition to
empire grew in the left as the British Labour party took over and Britain’s economic
decline encouraged a reevaluation of the importance of colonial possessions. This
resulted in more sustained and higher quality metropolitan involvement in parliament.
Howe (1993, 251) writes that the “MPs’ responses to crises were on the whole better
informed, more vigorous, more rapid, embraced more Members, and aroused stronger
partisan emotions than had been the case a decade before.”
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This brief description shows how and why colonial issues in the House of Com-
mons mattered for the metropole’s response to events in the colonies. Anticolonial
resistance within the colonies propelled colonial issues into parliamentary discussions.
These discussions were spearheaded by a small number of MPs who took a particular
interest in colonial affairs. MPs could query colonial officials and put political pres-
sure on them in the wake of an anticolonial revolt. This pressure was often translated
into colonial reforms that prevented another uprising.
The rest of this chapter conducts a quantitative analysis of the parliamentary
debates. It is mostly descriptive, showing overall trends and patterns of the de-
bates in order to further our understanding of how colonial debates changed over
time and what words were used in discussions of colonial issues. An important ex-
ercise is the analysis of euphemisms for anticolonial activity. The key emphasis of
this dissertation has been on the relative effects of violent and nonviolent resistance
on metropolitan policy. Disentangling the relative effects of different forms of resis-
tance on the parliamentary debates is difficult because many MPs used euphemisms
to discuss anticolonial activity. I use a statistical text analysis method known as
word embeddings to uncover the meaning of these euphemisms, which enables me to
estimate what these euphemisms were really referring to.
The theory detailed in Chapter 2 predicts that violence in the colonies increases
metropolitan attention more than nonviolence, and that metropolitan attention leads
the metropole to grant concessions to the colonies. This chapter examines the char-
acter of that attention. How does violence and nonviolence change metropolitan dis-
cussions of a colony? How do these effects change over time? How does hierarchical
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or spontaneous resistance affect metropolitan discussions? I show that metropoli-
tan discussions of colonies changed more in response to violence in the colonies than
nonviolence. In addition, I assess how these effects change over time. This chapter
also includes results from regression models showing that discussions of violent an-
ticolonial activity increases the probability of a concession, while no effect exists for
discussion of nonviolent anticolonial activity.
0.36 What was an “uprising”?
I begin the analysis with a simple word count of the each colony name from the
parliamentary debates. To do this, I performed a search through the entire corpus
for the time period, starting in 1918 and ending whenever a colony received inde-
pendence. I then count the number of times each colony name is mentioned in the
debates for each year, then take the log of the number of mentions. The plot of this
data is presented in Figure 0.19. The plot shows an number of patterns. One is that,
as expected, India is discussed more than any other colony, especially for the early
portion of the 20th century. The other pattern that this plot shows is a slight upward
trend in the mention of each colony over time. As the global decolonization process
unfolded, colonial issues became more pronounced in the metropole, providing quan-
titative support for Howe (1993)’s narrative about the rise of the anticolonial left in
postwar Britain.
In order to understand how violence and nonviolence affected the rise of colonial
issues it is important to examine the relationship between anticolonial activity within
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Figure 0.19: This plot shows the log of the number of mentions of each colony’s name
in the parliamentary debates for each year. Colonies are removed after they receive
formal independence.
the colonies and the parliamentary discussion of colonial issues. A straightforward
way to do this would be to count the number of times a colony name is mentioned
in proximity to a word referencing violence or nonviolence. If there were many more
instances of, say, “riots” appearing near the words “Gold Coast” than there were
“strikes” near “Gold Coast”, then that would suggest that riots were more of a
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concern of MPs and riots in the Gold Coast were more likely to be discussed in
parliament than strikes in the Gold Coast.
Violence and nonviolence were not directly referenced, however. Numerous eu-
phemisms were used to describe strikes, protests, bombings, and riots in the British
colonies without directly mentioning them. Colonial officials in private documents
would employ euphemisms in order to make their policies look better. Euphemisms
were even more common in public discussions of colonial issues. For example, the
official report on the 1948 riots in the Gold Coast—where over two dozen people
were killed and hundreds were injured—was titled “Report on the Gold Coast Dis-
turbances”, and the commission charged with investigating the riots (the Watson
Commission) was officially titled “Commission of enquiry into disturbances in the
Gold Coast” (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 478). Here I try and assess the extent to which
euphemisms were used in the parliamentary debates, and when those euphemisms
were being employed. When members of parliament referred to unrest, disturbances,
or disorders in the colonies, were they talking about violent or nonviolent activity in
the colonies?
To do this I use word embeddings. Word embeddings are simply a numeric rep-
resentation of a word. These numeric representations—word vectors—are learned
from the context that the word appears in. More technically, these vectors are the
numerical values of an embedding layer in a neural net that is trained to predict a
word from the surrounding word within a specified window. Unlike other forms of
applied automated text analysis in political science, word embeddings take the order
and context of the words in a document seriously. While standard topic models use
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the bag-of-words model, where context and word order are entirely irrelevant, word
embeddings are learned by models that use the information contained by the order
and proximity of words to each other. The core assumption of these models is that
similar words will be used in similar contexts. If there is a very high probability that
two different words are preceded and succeeded by the same set of words, then those
two individual words likely have the same meaning since they are used in similar
contexts.
Word embeddings can thus be used to learn the meanings of words in historical
contexts. British politicians in parliament and in colonial bureaucracies used eu-
phemisms to describe colonial unrest. Instead of referencing riots and strikes, they
would refer to them as disorders or unrest. The core assumption of the present exer-
cise is that the precise meaning of a strike, riot, or bombing has been quite stable over
time, but the meaning of these euphemisms is unclear. Generating word vectors for
each word in the parliamentary debates, and then comparing the similarity of these
words, can help us learn what these euphemisms were referring to. We can thus build
a statistical model to learn the word vector of each word in the parliamentary debate
to ask specific questions, such as how similar are “unrest” and “riot”? Is difference
between “disorder and “strike” bigger or smaller than “disorder” and “riot”? The
goal here is to uncover the meaning of euphemisms used in descriptions of anticolonial
resistance.
The parliamentary debates however cover a wide range of issues. If we are inter-
ested in finding out how euphemisms were used to describe colonial issues, we must
first ensure that the text being analyzed references colonies. To do this, I pare down
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the debates to only include text that appears within a specified range of the mention
of any colony within the British Empire. This is a rather simple method but given
the size of the debate transcripts themselves and the range of the topics discussed,
probabilistic or model based approaches (such as a topic model) prove difficult to im-
plement in practice and are likely to miss offhand mentions of colonial activity that
take place within a larger discussion. Moreover, the temporal range is quite large—
from 1918 to 1970—provides another challenge since topics are unlikely to be stable
over time. My solution is to restrict the corpus to only include text that is within 20
words of the mention of a colony name. In other words, if “Cyprus” is mentioned, the
corpus will include the twenty words preceding the word “Cyprus” and the twenty
words after it. While this drastically reduces the size of the parliamentary debates,
the remaining text is still massive, consisting of over 25 million characters.
To find out the meaning behind words like “unrest” and “disorder”, I run a
word vector embedding on the entire corpus, ignoring the time dimension. I use
the Word2Vec model in the Gensim package in Python to generate the word embed-
dings. I use the following parameters: all words that appear fewer than five times in
the corpus are excluded, the vector length is 200 (higher numbers are more compu-
tationally taxing but capture more nuance), and the window size around each target
word is set to 10 as per the authors recommendations. The skip-gram algorithm is
used to train the model, which predicts the targeted word from the surrounding con-
text. It is slower than the alternative algorithm–the Continuous Bag of Words–but
works better when words are infrequent (Mikolov et al., 2013).
The model produces a vector of length 200 for each word in the corpus. This vector
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is simply a string of 200 numbers. The vector itself represents each word. The vectors
produced by word embedding models have a geometric interpretation: more similar
words will have more similar vectors, and point in the same direction in geometric
space. This enables a easy and straightforward way to compare the similarity of two
words. My approach to finding out the true meaning behind euphemistic words is to
analyze their word vectors to see the other words that they are similar to.
I do this for five words: revolt, disturbance, unrest, disorder, and rebellion. None
of the words have clear and unambiguous reference to violent or nonviolent activity. A
disturbance could refer to a strike in one of the colonies, or it could refer to a bombing
by terrorists. To find out what these words mean in the context of colonies discussed
in the British parliamentary debates, I query the model to find the ten most similar
words to each one of the euphemisms. It is also possible that the euphemisms were
interchangeable and sometimes used to refer to violence and sometimes were used to
refer to nonviolence. There is nothing in the statistical model that assumes that each
euphemism has a one to one correspondence with violence or nonviolence. If the most
similar words to a euphemism included an equal share of words related to violence
and words related to nonviolence, then this would suggest that the euphemism was
referring to both violence and nonviolence in roughly equal proportion. Conversely, if
the list of most similar words includes words related to violence but not words related
to nonviolence, then that would suggest the euphemism is most likely referring to
violence.
The results are presented in Table 0.12. The top row, with the bold text, presents
the word being queried, while the bottom 10 rows presents the most similar words to
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the queried word, in decreasing order. The table shows that the most similar word
to ’revolt’ is ’rebellion’. ’EOKA’–the Cyprus anticolonial organization that used
terrorist methods during the emergency–is the sixth most similar word to ’revolt’.
The most similar word to ’disturbance’ is ’rioting’, which provide strong evidence that
’disturbance’ or ’disturbances’ were a politically palatable way to discuss colonial riots
in the metropole. For the words most similar to ’unrest’, none of them have a clear
violent connotation (although the third most similar word to ’unrest’ is ’disturbance’,
which does have a violent meaning since it refers to riots). Disorder clearly has a
violent connotation: ’bloodshed’, ’violence’, and ’terrorism’ all show up in the query
for ’disorder’. A similar pattern exists for ’rebellion’, with ’rioting’, ’massacres’, and
’EOKA’ being in the list of ten most similar words.
Revolt Disturbance Unrest Disorder Rebellion
rebellion rioting discontent recurrence revolt
recrudescence disorder uneasiness bloodshed conspiracies
incursion disorders disturbance lawlessness disorders
resorted unrest dissatisfaction spared rioting
vilification delays disquiet disturbance insurrection
eoka outbreak prevailing disaffection recrudescence
engineered occurrence deteriorating violence massacres
incite inconvenience prevails terrorism outbreak
excesses dislocating tension disorders curfew
waged prevailing apprehension menace eoka
Table 0.12: This table shows the similarity ten most similar words to five euphemisms:
revolt, disturbance, unrest, disorder, and rebellion. The euphemisms are in bold and
the words directly below them are the most similar words in the House of Commons
debates, in descending order of similarity.
I also graphically present the most similar words to these euphemisms in by using
a dimensionality reduction technique known as t-Distributed Stochastic Neighbor
Embedding (t-SNE). This is a visualization method that is useful for presenting the
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similarity of long vectors, which may contain important nonlinear relationships that
Principal Component Analysis may miss. In effect, this method projects the 200-
dimensional vectors onto a two dimensional space. Similar words will appear near
each other. I plot the reduced vectors of the top ten most similar words to the list of
euphemisms in Table 0.12.
The result is presented in Figure 0.20. The color indicates which word the plotted
word is most similar to. For example, the top ten words related to revolt will have
purple dot, words most similar to rebellion will have a red dot, etc. When the same
word is one of the most similar to two of the queried words (for example, ’rioting’
is similar to both ’disturbance’ and ’rebellion’) two slightly separated dots for the
same word will appear. The orientation of the axis is completely arbitrary. What is
relevant, however, is the proximity of each word to each other, and the proximity of
words within and across a cluster.
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Figure 0.20: The plot shows the clustering of different words in the House of Com-
mons debates. The color represents the group of words that are most similar to the
euphemism being queried. Although the X and Y axis measurements are arbitrary,
similar words are located closer together while more dissimilar words are located
farther apart.
0.37 Euphemisms Over Time
I also explore how the use of euphemisms to describe anticolonial resistance in the
parliamentary debates changed over time. Figure 0.21 plots the number of times each
euphemism is used near the mention of a colony name in the parliamentary debates.
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Figure 0.21: This plot shows the use of euphemisms in the parliamentary debates for
each colony.
To assess how the relationship between violence, nonviolence, and euphemisms
changed over time, I examine how the cosine similarity between words connoting
violence/nonviolence and euphemisms changes over time. The cosine similarity is a
simple geometric measure of the similarity between two vectors. It ranges from 0
to 1, where a higher cosine similarity between a pair of words suggesting that both
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words appear in more similar contexts.
I begin by dividing the parliamentary debates into separate datasets by year. For
each year, I then run a word embedding model. In the word embedding models from
Section 0.36 that ignore the time dimension, the text was filtered to only include
words that appear within 20 words of the mention of a colony name. Since I am
running word embedding models on much smaller datasets (since each year is treated
as a separate corpus) only including words that appear within 20 words of a colony
name severely decreases the size of corpus and compromises the word embedding
model. For this reason, the datasets build on each individual year include all text
where a colony name is mentioned in an entry of the House of Commons debates.
These entries vary from one-sentence questions to longer monologues.
I choose three euphemisms to analyze: disorder, unrest, and disturbance. For
each euphemism, I compute the pairwise cosine similarity between the euphemism
and a word connoting violence (riot, terrorism, violence) or nonviolence (strike, boy-
cott, protest) for each year.9 This procedure generates 18 cosine similarity scores (3
euphemisms with 3 violent and 3 nonviolent words, each). Since the corpus is small,
in some years a euphemism or a word connoting violence/nonviolence may not appear
with enough frequency and will be dropped by the word embedding model.10 In these
cases, the cosine similarity between the euphemism and the target word be computed
as a zero.
9To increase the frequency of these words used and to get more accurate embeddings, I replace
the plural variant of the word with the singular one, except for ’protests’, since ’protest’ often
signifies contentious actions within the parliamentary debate itself.
10The parameter specifying the minimum frequency of a word is set to 3 for these models.
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My goal is to generate scores of the similarity between euphemisms and violence
or nonviolence. To do this, I average over each non-zero cosine similarity between a
euphemism and word connoting violence for each year, and then do the same for each
euphemism and a word connoting nonviolence. This produces a composite score of the
average similarity between a euphemism and words connoting violence/nonviolence
that varies over time. Figure 0.22 displays the results of this exercise using smoothed
estimates of how the cosine similarity changes over time. This figure illustrates two
important features. One is that the euphemisms are on average, more similar to
words connoting violence than nonviolence, as evidenced by the solid black line being




























Figure 0.22: This plot shows the average cosine similarity between words referring to
violence and nonviolence, and euphemisms, plotted over time. This plot shows that
violence is more similar to the euphemisms than nonviolence, and that the distance
between euphemisms and both violence and nonviolence increases over time.
The other important result is that the distance between each euphemism and
words connoting violence or nonviolence increased over time. In other words, words
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like ’disorder’ or ’unrest’ were less likely to be used in similar contexts with both
’strikes’ and ’terrorism’ in the 1950s than they were in the 1920s. This suggests
that MPs became more honest in their discussions of anticolonial resistance in the
postwar era. This is a likely result of the increasing presence of the anticolonial left in
the British parliament. Lobbying groups, like the Movement for Colonial Freedom,
helped organize left-wing MPs to discuss colonial issues more and to hold officials
in the Colonial Office accountable (Howe, 1993). The presence of a sustained and
coordinated opposition to colonial rule in the metropole likely resulted in a more
honest assessment of anticolonial activity, at least among left-wing anticolonial MPs.
0.38 What drove the use of euphemisms?
In this section I use the data on euphemisms on anticolonial activity that were present
in the parliamentary debates to examine how activity in the colony drove the use
of euphemisms, and to examine the effect that these euphemisms had on colonial
concessions.
How did anticolonial activity affect the rate of euphemism use in parliament? To
answer this question I run two linear models where the dependent variable is the
log of the number of times a euphemism is used in proximity to a colony name in
parliament, per year. The main independent variables are the measures of violent and
nonviolent anticolonial activity described in Chapter 4. For controls, I include the
number of times a colony is name is mentioned at all, which in effect normalizes the
rate of euphemisms per colony. Since euphemism use is correlated with mentions of
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violence and mentions of nonviolence, I also include these variables as controls. The
unit of analysis is the colony year. To examine how the effect of violent and nonviolent
activity on euphemism use changes over time, I run separate models where I interact
violence and nonviolence with a linear time trend. I use a flexible kernel estimator
which does not force the interaction term between the form of resistance and the time
trend to be linear.
Figure 0.23 shows the marginal effect of violent anticolonial activity on the rate
of euphemisms over time. Since the controls include direct mentions of violence and
nonviolence, the relevant interpretation here the is that the plot shows the effect of
violent anticolonial activity on the share of euphemism use relative to more ’honest’
discussions of violence. (Indeed, transforming the dependent variable to be a ratio
of the number of euphemisms used to the number of mentions of violence produces
a nearly identical plot.) For nearly the entire sample, violent anticolonial activity
increases the probability of using a euphemism in a parliamentary discussion of a
colony. This corroborates the analysis of word embeddings presented in Figure 0.22,
where the distance in similarity between euphemisms and violent words decreases
over time. In contrast, Figure 0.24 presents the results of a model where nonviolent
activity is interacted with a linear time trend to estimate how nonviolent activity
affects the rate of euphemisms across time. The substantive effect is much smaller
than the effect of violent activity on the euphemism rate, and there is almost no
variation in the effect over time. Taken together, these two plots provide further
evidence that the use of euphemisms were driven by violent activity in the colonies































Figure 0.23: This plot shows how the marginal effect of violent activity within the
colonies affects the number of times a euphemism is used in parliament when dis-
cussing a colony. Starting in the mid-1930s, the effect of violent activity on the rate
of euphemisms becomes smaller over time. This suggests that the British parliament
































Figure 0.24: This plot shows how the marginal effect of nonviolent activity within
the colonies affects the number of times a euphemism is used in parliament when
discussing a colony, and how that effect changes over time. The overall effect of
nonviolent activity is substantively small and relatively stable over time.
0.39 Hierarchical Resistance and Euphemism Use
Were euphemisms used more in when there was hierarchical resistance in the colonies?
To answer this question, I use the NAVCO data from (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008)
on maximalist violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns. I run two normal linear
models where the dependent variable is the number of euphemisms used for each
colony-year. The main independent variables are the granular measures of violence
and nonviolence, along with interaction terms that capture whether this activity
occurs while a maximalist campaign is ongoing. Standard colony and year fixed
effects are included and standard errors are clustered at the colony. For controls, I
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include the number of mentions of violence and nonviolence around a colony name,
along with the number of times that a colony name is mentioned in the parliamentary
debates for that year. Including these controls means models are estimating the effect
of resistance on the share of euphemism use relative to more honest discussion of
violence and nonviolence.
The results are presented in Table 0.13. Model 1 interacts violent and nonvi-
olent activity with a dummy variable indicating if a violent hierarchical campaign
is ongoing, while Model 2 does the same with a variable indicating if a nonviolent
hierarchical campaign is ongoing. For both models, the coefficient for violent activity
is larger than the coefficient for nonviolent activity. This suggests that spontaneous
violent resistance increases the share of euphemism use more so than spontaneous
nonviolent resistance. The coefficients on the interaction terms tell a different story.
In Model 1, the coefficient on violence during a hierarchical violent campaign is large,
statistically significant, and negative. While violent activity and the existence of a
violent campaign both increase the share of euphemisms, the effect of increased vio-
lence on euphemism use decreases when it occurs during a violent campaign. No such
conditional effect exists when a nonviolent campaign is ongoing. Both the interaction
terms between violent and nonviolent resistance during a nonviolent campaign are
small in magnitude and not statistically significant.
What do these models tell us? For one, it provides further evidence that eu-
phemisms were more likely to be used to describe political activity in a colony when
that colony experienced violence relative to nonviolence. Interestingly, euphemism
use is not driven by the presence of a nonviolent campaign and only slightly driven
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by nonviolent activity. The model results suggest that violent activity occurring out-
side of a hierarchical campaign had the largest effect on the rate of euphemisms used
in parliament. However, more violent activity during a violent campaign lowered
the share of euphemisms used. This corroborates the finding presented in Chapter
0.17 that the effect of violence on metropolitan attention within a colonial conflict
decreased over time. Many of the violent campaigns included in the NAVCO data
were anticolonial insurgency campaigns that occurred after 1945. Discussions of these
campaigns in parliament were more honest.
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Dependent variable:
No. of Euphemisms (log)
(1) (2)






Nonviolent Activity 0.118∗∗ 0.112∗
(0.050) (0.062)
Mention of Violence 0.274∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗
(0.078) (0.070)
Mention of Nonviolence 0.204∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.039)
Mention of Colony Name 0.075∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.018)
Violent Activity * Violent Campaign −0.449∗∗
(0.202)
Nonviolent Activity * Violent Campaign −0.040
(0.291)
Violent Activity * Nonviolent Campaign 0.075
(0.103)
Nonviolent Activity * Nonviolent Campaign 0.079
(0.126)
Observations 1,074 1,074
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.13
0.40 Attention, Euphemisms, and Concessions
So far I have shown that violence activity increased the share of euphemism use,
while nonviolence has little effect on increased euphemism use. Regarding the orga-
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nizational dimension, euphemism use is much higher for spontaneous violent activity
than for hierarchical violent activity. Understanding the extent to which euphemisms
were used and their meaning is an important exercise for understanding the character
of metropolitan attention. However, our main research question is trying to under-
stand how resistance affects attention and how attention affects concessions. What
was the effect of euphemism use in the parliamentary debates on concessions?
To answer this question, I run a series of linear models where a concession is
the dependent variable and the main independent variables are mentions of violence,
nonviolence, and euphemism use in the parliamentary debates. Controls include the
number of times that the colony is mentioned in the debates along with country
and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the colony. The results are
presented in Figure 0.14.
Dependent variable:
Concession
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No. of Euphemisms 0.035 0.008 −0.007
(0.023) (0.019) (0.021)
Mention of Violence 0.061∗ 0.058 0.033
(0.036) (0.037) (0.039)
Mention of Nonviolence −0.057∗∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Mention of Colony Name 0.029∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
No. of Euphemisms * Mention of Violence 0.018∗
(0.010)
Observations 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 0.14
All the models in Table 0.14 suggest that that increased euphemism use has little
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effect of the probability of a concession. Violence has a slight positive effect while
nonviolence has a negative effect. As expected, increased discussion of a colony leads
to higher probability of a concession. What happens when both discussions of violence
occur when there is also higher euphemism use? Model 4 interacts euphemisms use
with mentions of violence in the debates. The coefficient on the interaction term is
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that when there was a parliamentary
debate about a specific colony, that colony was more likely to receive a concession
when there was a discussion of violence where euphemisms were mentioned.
I have also argued that parliamentary discussions of colonial violence have become
more ’honest’ over time. How has the effect of euphemisms and discussions of violence
changed over time? To answer this question I run another linear model where the
dependent variable is whether there is a concession in the following year, and the
independent variable is the log of euphemisms that are used within proximity to a
colony name. Controls include the number of mentions of violence and nonviolence,
again to assess how the use of euphemisms relative to more honest mentions affects
the probability of a concession. To see how the effect of euphemisms change over
time, and since we expect that these effects are constant based on the results of other
models, I interact the rate of euphemisms with a linear time trend. The results are
presented in Figure 0.25. As time increases, the effect of a euphemism on a concession
increases as well, although the average effect (the same effect captured by the linear

































Figure 0.25: The plot shows that parliamentary uses of euphemisms (“distur-
bance”,“disorder”,“unrest”) about a colony becomes more likely to lead to a colonial
concession over time.
0.41 Conclusion
In this chapter I have argued that when British colonial officials used words like ’dis-
turbances’, ’disorders’, or ’unrest’ in the colonies, that they were referring to violent
anticolonial activity. I have used a variety of text analytic methods on the parliamen-
tary debates to support this claim, showing that these euphemisms were more likely
to be found in similar contexts to works that explicitly connote violence than words
that explicitly connote nonviolence. In addition I show that these euphemisms be-
came less likely to refer to both violent and nonviolent anticolonial activity over time,
suggesting a more frank discussion of colonial issues in the metropole overtime. This
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accords with the historical research on metropolitan anticolonialism in the postwar
era (Howe, 1993; Goldsworthy, 1971).
Increased euphemism use, combined with increased discussion of violence, were
followed by a higher probability of a colony receiving a concession. This provides
support for my theory of imperial response that metropolitan attention is a key vari-
able connecting anticolonial resistance to concessions. I also show that euphemism
use was driven by violent, rather than nonviolent, anticolonial activity within the
colonies. Models using the NAVCO data to measure the level of hierarchical orga-
nization when resistance occurs suggests that spontaneous violent resistance was the
form of resistant that was most likely to increase euphemism use. These findings
provides strong evidence that colonial issues became more salient over time and that
debates in parliament were more concerned with violent than nonviolent anticolo-
nial activity. This corroborates my theory of imperial response: anticolonial violence
occupied metropolitan attention more than nonviolence. Indeed my examination of
euphemisms show that looking at raw mentions of explicitly violent or nonviolent
activity within the parliamentary debates may underestimate the extent of the dis-
cussion of anticolonial violence since those raw counts would not capture the use of
euphemisms.
The parliamentary debates matter because it enabled MPs to affect colonial policy
in important ways. The Colonial Office was formally answerable to parliament and
political pressure from MPs could politically embarrass colonial officials, especially
when anticolonial resistance exposed the fragility of colonial rule. Some MPs on
the left would highlight and discuss episodes of anticolonial activity as a way to
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undermine the broader colonial project and inject these issues into political discourse.
The parliament also formally approved independence bills and major constitutional




This chapter explores British policy towards Cyprus in the 20th century. The chapter
aims to convince the reader of three facts: that the British viewed Cyprus as a
strategically important colony, that this viewpoint shaped British responses to unrest
within that colony, and that the British were reluctant to grant autonomy to Cyprus in
response to violent unrest largely because they feared that doing so would jeopardize
their use of Cyprus as a strategic asset.
The theory of imperial response outlined in Chapter 2 predicts that in colonies
where successful bargaining between the metropole and the native colonial leader-
ship failed, concessions will not be granted and violence will ensue. This chapter
explores the details of that bargaining failure and argues that the perceived strategic
necessity of Cyprus to the British state made them unwilling to grant concessions in
response to violence. The typology presented in Chapter 5 also helps explain impor-
tant variation in resistance in Cyprus. While most anticolonial resistance in Cyprus
was violent, there was important variation in the level of organization. The 1931
riots were spontaneous violence, while the later campaign of terrorism launched by
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EOKA was hierarchically organized. The imperial response to both types of violent
resistance was to deny any substantial constitutional reforms that would lead to the
expansion of suffrage.
I support these argument by examining the secondary historical literature, archives
containing Colonial Office and Foreign Office dispatches, records of cabinet discus-
sions, and the Parliamentary debates in the House of Commons. These documents
provide import information regarding the private, and sometimes public, explana-
tions for colonial policy. The evidence presented shows that Cyprus was viewed as
strategically essential for the defense of Britain, her allies, and the empire itself. Im-
portantly, I make no claims about the actual strategic utility of Cyprus. As the
evidence shows, a near consensus existed among British policymakers that Cyprus’
location and Britain’s declining power in other parts of the Middle East meant that
Cyprus was strategically essential. Few disagreed. The relevant point is that Britain’s
view toward Cyprus, whether for Orientalist or other mythological reasons, centered
around its strategic utility.
The official goal of colonial policy after 1945 was to prepare colonies for indepen-
dence. Cyprus was no exception. Colonial policymakers understood that the empire
would not last forever. What type of system of hierarchical relations between the UK
and its former colonial possessions would replace the empire? Would some colonies
become commonwealth members? Would others participate in a free trade union with
Britain? For Cyprus, the most likely outcome was to grant sovereignty to the colony,
Enosis (political unification with Greece) would be achieved soon afterwards, and
then Britain could still retain their strategic interests in Cyprus but do so under the
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framework of conventional diplomacy with Greece. The problem with this strategy
was that Greece could not make a credible commitment to Britain that the military
bases in Cyprus would remain accessible indefinitely. Britain feared a takeover of
Cyprus by hostile leftist forces that would demand the abrogation of any treaty with
Britain. Greece was unable to commit to the suppression of any such movement in
Cyprus since the Greek population supported their co-ethnics in Cyprus. For the
Greek government to work to eliminate any movement seeking total independence for
Cyprus would be incredibly unpopular and politically disastrous. The British knew
this, and also knew that their only option for Cyprus was to limit its sovereignty.
Doing so was the only way for the British to maintain the use of Cyprus as a military
outpost.
The case of Cyprus provides strong support for my theory of imperial response.
The evidence shows that the British were obsessed with Cyprus’ almost mythological
ability to satisfy a number of military and strategic goals of the Empire. This con-
ditioned their overall tendency to grant sovereignty to the island in addition to their
reluctance to grant concessions in the wake of violent unrest. The metropole almost
entirely ignored nonviolent resistance by Cypriots—whether it was labor strikes in
the mines or the thousands of hunger strikes that occurred during the emergency.
The district and colonial governor were responsible for handling these disturbances.
The decolonization of Cyprus, of course, was one of the largest colonial conflicts of
the 20th century. The main force of violent anticolonialism in Cyprus was EOKA
(National Organization of Cypriot Fighters)—a Greek Cypriot resistance group lead
be the charismatic Georgios Grivas. Britain’s willingness to launch a full-scale coun-
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terinsurgency campaign in suppression of EOKA and their campaign for Enosis was
directly related to its view of Cyprus as strategically essential. Likewise, EOKA’s
willingness to use violent tactics in an attempt to change British policy stemmed
from Britain’s continued denial of demands for Enosis and the suppression of self-
determination. The relationships between strategic importance, large-scale violence,
and the granting of concessions are, of course, endogenous. Is is this endogeneity that
this chapter explores.
0.43 Violent and Nonviolent Resistance in
Cyprus
There were two large-scale episodes of resistance against British Colonialism in Cyprus
during the 20th century. Both contained mixtures of violent and nonviolent activ-
ity. On October 17th, 1931, Bishop Nicodemos resigned from the Legislative Council
in protest against British policies. The following day eleven other Greek members
resigned. Nicodemos issued a manifesto calling for Enosis and to practice civil dis-
obedience in opposition to colonial rule (Ioannides, 2019, 174-175). On October 21th
of 1931, a series of organized boycotts inspired by Gandhi’s example in India sponta-
neously erupted into mass rioting in a large number of Cypriot villages. These riots
were largely peasant based, directed at symbols of British rule, and lacked any central
authority. The October 31st riots, as they came to be known, took the British off
guard. The most shocking event was the burning of the Government House which
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forced the Governor, Richard Storrs, to flee (Ioannides, 2019, 177). In Limassol the
Commissioner’s House was also burnt down (Marovich-Old, 2018). While of obvious
symbolic import, these attacks also threatened the lives of the British imperial elite.
Cyprus colonial police, supplemented with British forces from Egypt, squashed the
rebellion within a week. Seven Cypriot protesters were killed, along with 68 wounded.
Four hundred people were arrested and ten Greek Cypriot political leaders were de-
ported for life. Over two thousand protesters were convicted in court (Rappas, 2014,
3). Scholars have debated the root causes of the riots, with the most satisfying an-
swer being some combination of a deteriorating economic situation and grievances
directed at British attempts to remove Greek cultural influences (Frendo, 1998). The
riots were short lived but had a long term impact on colonial rule of Cyprus. Many
historians argue that this event reflected a distinct nationalist consciousness and sup-
port for Enosis. The high participation rates among the Greek peasantry, along with
the targeting of symbols of British rule across a large number of villages, support this
claim.
The British chose to respond to the riots of 1931 with repression rather than
concessions. As a result of the 1882 Constitution, the Legislative Council had eigh-
teen members. Six were appointed by the High Commissioner, three were Turkish
Cypriots, and the remaining 9 were Greek Cypriots. The Legislative Council was
dominated by a Turkish-British alliance that crushed any moves to increase Greek
representation (Ioannides, 2019, 165). Instead of reforming the legislative council
to increase the responsiveness of its members to the wishes of the Greek peasantry
in order to prevent future unrest, the colonial government chose to repress elected
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representation (Markides and Georghallides, 1995). On November 12th, 1931, weeks
after the end of riots, Britain abolished the Cypriot Legislative Council and enacted
political suppression and police tactics (Marovich-Old, 2018). Initially, the suspen-
sion of the Legislative Council was a temporary measure until a new constitution
could be drafted and ratified. Instead of reestablishing the legislative council, the
colonial government established an Advisory Council, which the secretary of state
for the colonies said was designed to “postpone indefinitely any future constitution”
(Rappas, 2014, 35).
Repression was targeted only at the Greek population but also stripped the rights
of the large community of Turkish-Cypriots, who largely abstained from the 1931
revolt (Rappas, 2008, 364). The reformed Cyprus Criminal Code outlawed political
activity (Rappas, 2008, 369). Prime Minister Venizelos complied with this repression
because he felt Enosis demands jeopardized Cyprus’ foreign relations with Greece,
Britain and Italy (Markides and Georghallides, 1995, 67). Throughout the 1930s
British practiced authoritarian rule over Cyprus, which was the “only form of gov-
ernment that they believed did not ultimately threaten British sovereignty over the
island” (Markides and Georghallides, 1995, 78). The British practiced brutal repres-
sion over the Greek population of Cyprus. This new era of authoritarian rule was
the responsibility of the Colonial Governor, Governor Sir Herbert Richmond Palmer.
Palmer implemented a wide variety of repressive measures, including curfews, banning
the use of Greek flags and church bells, having political gatherings, and bearing arms.
Palmer heavily censored the press by banning the import of pro-Enosis newspapers
from Greece and censoring telegrams abroad. Thousands were arrested in the wake
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of the 1931 riots. Enosis leaders were deported (Marovich-Old, 2018). Greek Cypri-
ots dubbed Palmer’s rule “Palmerocracy” (Ioannides, 2019, 61). The suspension of
a constitutional government remained in place until Cyprus became an independent
republic (Holland, 1998, 5). Rappas argues that these policies reflected a colonial
mentality determined “to penetrate the local society and understand its inner work-
ings” (Rappas, 2008, 368). This repression originated in the Colonial Governors office,
not in London. The structure of imperial rule, and the extent of the repression desired
by Palmer required metropolitan approval. Palmer convinced the Colonial Office to
grant him extensive repressive powers by stoking fears about another revolt like the
one that erupted in 1931 (Rappas, 2008, 373).
The second large-scale episode of anticolonial resistance against the British in
Cyprus occurred during the 1950s. The campaign against EOKA constituted a
full-scale counterinsurgency war. While EOKA’s hierarchically organized terrorist
violence and Britain’s counterinsurgency strategy has occupied much scholarly atten-
tion (French, 2015), there was actually a considerable amount of nonviolent resistance
against the British that occurred during the civil war. For example, in July of 1957,
the Times of London reported that over one thousand men imprisoned in a camp
on suspicion of terrorism engaged in a 24-hour hunger strike to protest their deten-
tion without any trial. Hundreds of workers marched in support of the detainees in
Nicosia. At Larnaca, workers engaged in a two-hour stoppage in solidarity (Corre-
spondent, 1957). Despite the large number of participants across multiple locations,
this mass nonviolent protest was not mentioned in the House of Commons or by the
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Cabinet.11
Rumblings of anticolonial violence started in the early 1950s when a Ioannis Ch.
Ionnides established KARE (Cypriot Fighters Risk-taking Leaders) in Athens in the
Fall of 1952. KARE’s goal was to ship arms to and foment unrest in Cyprus against
British rule. KARE would later work with EOKA, which was secretly established in
the early 1950s. On April 1st, 1955, EOKA began its violent anticolonial insurgency.
Archbishop Makarios acted as the political leader of EOKA, while George Grivas
was in control of the military campaign. Before EOKA committed any violent acts,
British policymakers and intelligence offers had no idea that a secret underground
organization had planned a campaign against British rule for years (Ioannides, 2019,
268).
While the Emergency and the riots of October were the two largest episodes of
anticolonial resistance in Cyprus, other events occurred,including acts of spontaneous
nonviolence. On Monday, August 31 1936, some 1,500 employees of the Cyprus
Mines Corporation (CMC) went on strike, demanding salary increases and workmens
compensation. A number of strike leaders were arrested and imprisoned. Two years
later, in June of 1938, factory workers in Famagusta went on strike. The strikers
went to the colonial district commissioner with demands for a shorter work day and
higher salary. Thirteen strikers–all women working as spinners–were arrested in July
of 1938. All of them were fired, some were imprisoned (Rappas, 2014, 159-168). In
March of 1940, 40 public workers were arrested during a strike (Rappas, 2014, 177).
11This is based on a search through the Hansard for any mention of any strike during this time
in Cyprus and a qualitative reading of the Cabinet conclusions.
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When the Cyprus delegation returned from the UN after a making their case for
Enosis, tens of thousands of demonstrators lines the streets of the airport in Nicosia
(Ioannides, 2019, 247). There were also number of mass demonstrations in support
of Enosis. In early 1952, mass demonstrations occurred throughout Cyprus on the
second anniversary of the unofficial referendum where Cypriots overwhelmingly voted
in favor of Enosis (Ioannides, 2019, 258). Greek Cypriot Church Council organized
the referendum after the British had refused Archbishop Makarios’s demand for an
official one. Ninety-five percent of Greek Cypriots voted for union with Greece.
0.44 British Views of Cyprus
Metropolitan officials in London viewed Cyprus as an important strategic asset that
was essential for the defense of the empire and British national interests in the Levant
(Holland, 1998, 146). This view originated when the British initially occupied Cyprus
for strategic reasons in the late 19th century (Varnava, 2017, 12). Prime Minister
Benjamin Disraeli told Queen Victoria in 1878 that controlling Cyprus would ensure
the free flow of both trade and communication from Europe to the East and prevent
Russian expansion. He argued that “Cyprus was the key to Asia” (Ioannides, 2019,
34). Cyprus could also be used to defend the Suez Canal (located just 240 miles
away) and the route to India. The small island inhabited largely by peasants lacked
important raw materials or other economic resources. At the time of colonization,
investors ignored Cyprus (Ioannides, 2019, 33-35). Later, investors would establish a
small mining presence on the island (Rappas, 2014, 158).
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Cyprus’ strategic value occupied a prominent place in how the British viewed
the island. Lawrence Durrell, author of the popular literary memoir of his time
in Cyprus, Bitter Lemons, and a former colonial official in the 1930s referred to
Cyprus as an “aircraft carrier” and the “skeletal backbone of the Empire” (Ioannides,
2019, 45). A Colonial Office report that was disseminated to the British Cabinet
characterized the importance of Cyprus as “the third in the chain of British bases
across the Mediterranean [that] has acquired the post-war strategic importance of
serving as a base for protection of British interests in the Near East, for support
to the Baghdad Pact, and for the defence of the southern flank of NATO” (Brook,
2000b, 21).
Some historians have argued that Cyprus’ strategic importance was a myth—
that is, Cyprus occupied a mythological place in the colonial mind and there was
a substantial gap between its imagined importance and its actual strategic utility
(Varnava, 2017, 3). Whether Cyprus’ strategic value was based on cultural signifiers
or the outcome of sober assessments is largely irrelevant for understanding British
policy. The widespread belief that Cyprus was invaluable probably stemmed from
its geographical proximity to Russia, Turkey, and the Middle East. One could easily
glance at a map and conclude that this small island made a great location for a
military base. As John Harding, the Governor of Cyprus, said in response to an
inquiry about why Cyprus was so important: “look at the map” (Holland, 1998, 92).
Knowledge that the soil quality on the coastline was poor and made it difficult to
construct usable naval bases or a deep water harbor was confined to a few dissenters
willing to challenge the conventional wisdom (Markides and Georghallides, 1995, 75).
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Varnava claims that Cyprus’s postwar importance was due to “exaggerated strategic
perceptions” from “imperial strategists that maintained that it was...a very significant
strategic asset” (Varnava, 2017, 278-279).
Britain consistently viewed Cyprus as a strategic asset throughout the 20th cen-
tury but this view was not static. Britain’s acquisition of the Middle Eastern man-
dates after World War I gave Cyprus renewed strategic importance (Rappas, 2014,
59). During World War II “Cyprus became an integral part of the British military
defense strategy in the Middle East and North Africa” (Ioannides, 2019, 192). Cold
War dynamics elevated Cyprus’ strategic role (Johnson, 2000, 114). In the imme-
diate postwar period, the overthrow of King Farouk and the rise of Gamal Abdel
Nasser in Egypt and anticolonial violence in Palestine signaled that both imperial
possessions would not be suitable areas to maintain military forces. Without reliable
access to Egypt and Palestine, the strategic value of Cyprus increased (Holland, 1998,
15),(Ioannides, 2019, 265). The Air Ministry in London concluded that “the strategic
importance of Cyprus has grown enormously since the Second World War” (Holland,
1998, 22). In 1950 the Chiefs of Staff were asked to provide a definitive assessment
of the strategic value of the island. This assessment concluded that Cyprus had ’a
positive and increasing strategic role as an air base and a garrison’ and that the only
way to ensure access to these bases was by maintaining British sovereignty (Holland,
1998, 22). In response the British began building more military bases with the goal
of reconstructing what they had in the Suez Canal Zone (Holland, 1998, 35). These
assessments lead Britain to move its Middle East headquarters from Egypt to Cyprus
in 1954 (Varnava, 2017, 278-279). The proposed withdrawal from Suez in 1956 left
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Cyprus as the only remaining British territory in the area; relinquishing control would
jeopardize Britain’s treaty commitments and weaken Britain’s perceived resolve to
defend its Middle Eastern interests (Johnson, 2000, 115). All of this made Britain
even more reluctant to grant concessions to the Cypriots and loosen their control over
the island.
There were of course important reasons why Cyprus was valued strategically.
Cyprus served as a logistical base for British troops stationed in Greece during World
War I (Ioannides, 2019, 20). Cyprus figured prominently in Britain’s military defense
strategy of the Middle East and North Africa in World War II (Ioannides, 2019, 192).
During the 1956 Suez invasion, unrest made it politically difficult to use Cyprus’
military bases to launch Operation Musketeer, the planned invasion of Egypt. The
invasion required the substantial use of land forces that needed to be transported
by boat. Cyprus posed an obvious first choice for many military advisors. Military
assessments that took into account the unrest in Cyprus led to the choice to use
nearby Malta as a staging ground. The trip to Egypt from Cyprus was shorter than
the trip to Egypt from Malta. Field Marshall Harding partly attributed this Suez
debacle to the longer time that troops were in transit en route to launch a surprise
attack on Egypt. Cyprus also played a prominent role in planning of the coup against
Iranian leader Mohammad Mossadeq (Ioannides, 2019, 268).
Britain’s view of Cyprus as a strategic asset affected their broader colonial policy
toward the island and conditioned how the metropole responded to unrest. One
official in the Foreign Office said that “we are in Cyprus for strategic reasons...and
must remain there until such reasons are no longer valid” (Holland, 1993, 153). In
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1950 the Chiefs of Staff argued their case for “unfettered” control over Cyprus and
in a fit of honesty acknowledge that “we must resign ourselves to being primarily
an occupying power” (Holland, 1993, 153). Harding, a former soldier, himself felt
that policy changes needed to be in accord with “the requirements of the strategic
situation” (Holland, 1998, 92). The British felt that the only way that access to their
military facilities in Cyprus could be guaranteed would be by maintaining “pure and
undiluted” sovereignty over its important imperial possessions (Holland, 1998, 22).
The secondary literature on Cyprus and British Colonialism consistently argues
that Britain’s view of Cyprus as essential to the defense of the Empire prevented
metropolitan reforms and increased Britain’s resolve to fight the Enosis movement.
Varnava claims that Britain’s refusal to grant union with Greece despite the threat
of violence was their “belief in Cyprus’ strategic value after the Second World War”
(Varnava, 2017, 279). Similarly, Holland argues that Britain’s “tenacity” to main-
tain imperial control over Cyprus as the campaign for Enosis ratcheted up “may be
explained as much by the island’s location on the emotional and ideological map of
British power overseas as by any strategic considerations arising from its physical
situation in the eastern Mediterranean” (Holland, 1993, 150-151). Ioannides wrote
that Britain’s “geopolitical interests in the region dictated British policies vis-à-vis
the strategic island” (Ioannides, 2019, 41),
In 1954 after Britain announced that they would move their Middle East head-
quarters from Egypt to Cyprus, the Foreign Office was charged with reviewing British
policy toward Cyprus. In discussions during the review (where Anthony Eden and the
British Ambassador to Greece, Sir Charles Peak, were present) it was concluded that
211
“any British statement of policy for Cyprus should declare self-government and not
self-determination to be the ultimate goal. Cyprus should remain a commonwealth
fortress” (Ioannides, 2019, 270). A month later, in a discussion about Cyprus’s inde-
pendence, the junior Colonial Office Minister stated in the House of Commons that
“it has always been understood and agreed that there are certain territories in the
Commonwealth, which, owing to their particular circumstances, can never expect to
be fully independent” (Ioannides, 2019, 270). Ioannides concludes that this complete
denial of the right to self-determination “inexorably push[ed] Cypriot nationalists
toward the path of violence” (Ioannides, 2019, 271).
0.45 How British Responded to Resistance
Why did the British respond with repression instead of concessions after the outbreak
of the 1931 riots? One answer is that colonial officials feared that granting conces-
sions would embolden more violence. Many adhered to an Orientalist mentality and
believed that Cypriots only understood force and that concessions signaled weakness.
In 1929 the colonial governor said that Cypriots “are apt to regard every concession
which we make to them as proceeding from motives of weakness and surrender” and
that “the grant of responsible government would be hailed as a complete surrender by
Great Britain” (A.J., 1992). After conceding, the result would be more agitation for
Enosis. This view persisted into the 1930s and was the standard response to Cypriot
demands for representative institutions since “concessions [had] been misinterpreted
as weakness on the part of the Imperial government and the secretary of state for
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the colonies had therefore decided against making similar concessions in the future”
(Rappas, 2014, 20). In the weeks after the October riots, the Secretary of State for the
Colonies told the cabinet that “any decisions as to the future Constitution of Cyprus
must be deferred until the agitation had died down both in the island and in Greece”
(Archives, 1931). When that agitation did die down, the response was repression,
largely handled by the colonial governor without metropolitan involvement.
The British did not steadfastly refuse to reform the Constitution of Cyprus. What
they did refuse, however, reforming the Constitution to allow self-determination, since
self-determination would lead to union with Greece and a rejection of British rule.
In 1937, for example, Secretary of State for the Colonies William Ormsby-Gore told
the House of Commons that the Colonial Office had no intention to reform the con-
stitution and increase representation among the central government, instead opting
for a decentralization policy that empowered local officials with heavy training by
the British (Rappas, 2014, 40). Britain’s main concern was that granting reforms
would lead to the loss of British control over the island (Markides and Georghallides,
1995). This helps explain why they fought so hard to crush EOKA–doing so would
remove one of the main pillars of support for Enosis and enable the British to in-
crease Cypriots’ sovereignty without jeopardizing their control. Indeed the removal
of EOKA, the limitation of state interference in education, and the reduction of the
political power of the Church were stated preconditions for British negotiations with
Archbishop Makarios regarding a new constitution (Holland, 1998, 109).
In 1947 the Southern Department of the Foreign Office held a meeting to discuss
their Cyprus policy and floated the idea of ceding control of the island to Greece (Sar-
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gent, 1992). The FO quickly encountered opposition. According to the Colonial Office
and the Chiefs of Staff, this was unacceptable because Cyprus was essential to the de-
fense of Britain. Cyprus was “the sole territory in the [Middle East] region in which,
unfettered by treaties, she could undertake defensive measures” (Ioannides, 2019,
202). After World War II Cypriot nationalists traveled to London and demanded
Enosis. According to Ioannides, the Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones, told
that delegation “in no-unclear terms that Cyprus could not be united with Greece
as the island was too importantly strategically for the British Empire” (Ioannides,
2019, 203).
In a Cabinet meeting held on February 11th, 1947, the Chief of the Air Staff
“view[ed] with the gravest misgivings any proposal to surrender our sovereignty over
Cyprus” since the imperial grip over Egypt and Palestine was weakening. If increased
sovereignty led to a lack of control over Cyprus, the Chief said that “the strategic
foundations of our defence of the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth would be
undermined” (Cabinet, 1992b). The Minister of Defence concurred and reiterated
that it was more important now than before that Cyprus remain a secure military
base (Cabinet, 1992b).
Not all agreed that Cyprus was essential for securing British interests. As it
became clear that British forces would withdraw from Palestine, J. S. Bennett penned
a eloquent memo that attempted to poke holes in the conventional wisdom about
Cyprus’ strategic value. Bennett’s memo carefully criticized the “current thinking
[that] is likely to give new importance to the fact that Cyprus is ’the last British
territory’ and to picture Cyprus as a British strongpoint on the edge of the Middle
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East” (Bennett, 1992a, 84). Bennett argued that Cyprus’ strategic importance by
itself was quite small, and could only be used in conjunction with land forces on a
nearby mainland. Since it was an island, Bennett argued that it required a strong
naval presence to protect and ensure its utility during a conflict. Moreover, Cyprus
did not lie along a potential enemy’s sea supply routes. Bennett concluded that, if
war were to erupt, “Cyprus alone...would surely be an unenviable position for any
British forces located in it” (Bennett, 1992a, 89). Bennett’s memo is important
because it directly acknowledges the extent to which many British viewed Cyprus
as strategically essential. In addition, Bennett’s proscriptions for British policy in
light of his re-assessment of Cyprus’s strategic value highlight the role that a colony’s
perceived value played in discussions about granting concessions that would improve
local autonomy. In short, Bennett’s de-valueing of Cyprus’ strategic value led him
to view Enosis as a possible option for Britain’s Cypriot policy. He says at much:
“it should be possible, when the strategic position of Cyprus has been redefined as
suggested above, to re-assess what would be involved in the union of Cyprus with
Greece and consequently the importance to be attached in future [sic] to the Enosis
movement and the way it should be handled” (Bennett, 1992a, 90). Bennett’s memo
also shows us that the reason so many colonial officials opposed Enosis was because
unification with Greece would undermine Cyprus’ strategic utility to Britain. He
wrote, “the new strategic situation may even make it desirable to reconsider the
objections to” the argument that Cyprus should unify with Greece (Bennett, 1992a,
90).
Bennett’s authority on strategic matters and the force of his argument invited re-
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sponses from Colonial Office officials who disagreed strongly with his position. While
acknowledge Bennett’s expertise, Trafford Smith criticized Bennett’s argument for
assuming that one could know all the possible scenarios that may occur if war broke
out, and that “policy is like a tree which grows organically from year to year and
adapts itself in the process to the changing circumstances which surround it” (Ben-
nett, 1992a, 91).12 Smith recommended that all policy changes be deferred until they
received input from the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office. M. Martin directly
engaged with Bennett’s reassessment and offered a concise statement of the view that
Cyprus was strategically essential:
The strategic importance of Cyprus to the United Kingdom arises not only
from the facts that (a) in war it is strategically so placed as to assist in the
defence of our interests in the Middle East and for offensive operations,
and (b) in peace it provides us with alternative air staging bases and naval
and air facilities for security control of the Eastern Mediterranean (I am
not sure that this control will matter once Palestine has gone), but also
from the fact that we must deny control of the Island to any potentially
hostile power, which might use it as a base for attack (Bennett, 1992a,
92).
In a response to a memo by the Secretary of State advocating constitutional reforms in
Cyprus, Clement Attlee stated that he “was not easy about the proposals” for reform
and reminded the Secretary of State that “the position in Palestine and Egypt has
deteriorated and it is now more than ever necessary from the strategic aspect to keep
our foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean in Cyprus” (Attlee, 1992).
12Smith wrote: “My knowledge of the early and more recent history of the Middle East, and of
the general factors contributing to the formulation of strategic and political policy there as a whole,
does not seem sufficient, in comparison with Mr Bennett’s, to permit me to attempt to challenge
any of his conclusions. (I don’t intend this as sarcasm. It is literally true.)”(Bennett, 1992a, 90)
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On December 22, 1947, the British Cabinet discussed comments by Secretary of
State for the Colonies about Constitutional Reform in Cyprus. The cabinet memoran-
dum noted that “irredentist sentiment [i.e., Enosis] had hitherto proved an effective
obstacle to constitutional progress” and discussed a proposal to grant responsible gov-
ernment to the Cypriots with Britain maintaining control over external and military
affairs (Committee, 1992). Again Attlee expressed caution about granting constitu-
tional reforms “particularly in view of the strategic importance of the island” and the
growing communist presence (Committee, 1992). Some of the ministers supported
the proposal to grant Cyprus provisional autonomy. Others disagreed. The memo
notes that some ministers thought “that it was premature at this stage to contem-
plate the grant of responsible government to Cyprus, even subject to the restrictions
proposed. The strategic importance of the Colony had greatly increased as the result
of recent developments in the Middle East, and no step ought to be taken which
might in any way weaken our control over it...precipitate concessions at this stage
might fatally undermine our position in Cyprus” (Committee, 1992). This argument
clearly articulates the logic of how strategic importance of a colony prohibited the
granting of constitutional reforms and concessions to some colonies.
The proposal for provisional autonomy to Cyprus was again discussed by the
Cabinet Commonwealth Affairs Committee on January 21, 1948. The Governor of
Cyprus was present and supported the proposal. Some ministers expressed fear that,
since the proposed constitution was temporary, “Cypriot leaders would be bound to
regard it as a makeshift and to devote their efforts to securing further concessions”
(Bennett and Martin, 1992). Apprehension about reforms was also expressed due
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to Cyprus’ strategic importance: “Recent developments had greatly enhanced the
strategic importance of Cyprus. No steps ought to be taken which might jeopar-
dise our future strategic requirements in the Island. Moreover, it was in any event
unfortunate that important constitutional changes should have to be initiated at a
time when we were engaged in evacuating Palestine, and when no decision had been
reached about the future of Cyrenaica. It was suggested that, from this point of
view, it would be advantageous if further discussions could have been deferred for
six months” (Bennett and Martin, 1992). Bennett again criticized the proposed re-
forms (arguing instead for full autonomy) and expressed puzzlement at the minister’s
unwillingness to grant concessions due to strategic concerns. Part of his concern
was with the international repercussions for refusing to grant a new constitution for
Cyprus. Bennett acknowledged that “there is a good deal of truth” in the claim that
Cyprus is “fit for self-government but that they can’t have it because of our strategic
interests” but “it would be a gift to Communist propaganda if we said it” (Bennett
and Martin, 1992).
In 1948 the Cabinet discussed a proposal for constitutional reform that granted
limited autonomy to Cyprus. The constitution was designed to grant enough au-
tonomy to be accepted by the Cypriots but without jeopardizing British interests
in the island. In a cabinet memorandum, Lord Listowel noted that “Our strategic
requirements in Cyprus and the Middle East generally have been very much in mind
in framing these constitutional proposals. I am satisfied, and ... there is nothing
in the Constitution now proposed which would prejudice our strategic requirements.
While the minimum essential safeguards for these purposes must be and have been
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inserted, we must avoid being placed in the position where it could plausibly be said
that we were denying political liberties to a developed people like the Cypriots simply
for ’Imperialist’ reasons” (Hare, 1992). Four of the 18 elected seats of the legislative
council were reserved for Turkish Cypriots. Suffrage was increased as well–all male
British subjects over 21 were guaranteed the right to vote. The elected legislature,
however, was free to pass laws relating to domestic affairs but was under considerable
constraints with regards to any external matters that may harm British strategic in-
terests (Cabinet, 1992c). For example, the Crown reserved the “power to revoke, add
to or amend the Constitution and to make laws by Order in Council” (Hare, 1992).
In addition, the constitution prohibited that the legislature “discuss the status of
the Colony within the Commonwealth”, ensuring that any opposition to British rule
would be through extra-institutional means (Hare, 1992). Bennett offered advice on
how to convince the Foreign Office of the need for limited constitutional reforms. He
suggested that the Cabinet make a statement to the FO “openly linking our deter-
mination to stay in Cyprus with the part the Island plays in the scheme of Western
European defence” since there is “no other reason for us holding this European com-
munity in Colonial status and denying them self-determination” (Bennett, 1992b).13
The Greek Cypriots, encouraged by the church leadership, rejected the proposed con-
stitution “insisting on ’Enosis and only Enosis.”’ (Markides and Georghallides, 1995,
79). Denying Cypriots self-determination was essential because, as the CO argued, “it
13Bennett was more knowledgeable about Cypriot affairs than other colonial officials but he still
had difficultly correctly predicting the future course of events: “In many ways the situation reminds
me of Palestine in about 1943/44. We did not show our teeth to the Jews and their foreign supporters
until they were sufficiently strong for it not to be effective. The Cypriots are not, on past form, the
fighters the Palestine Jews proved to be; but if that should ever change, the parallel would become
even more gloomy!” (Bennett, 1992b).
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would be a delusion to suppose that...the establishment of self-governing institutions
would ease the situation. On the contrary, it is more than likely that elections would
result in in control of the legislature by politicians pledged to violent opposition to
the Government and to acceptance of nothing short of Enosis” (Fisher, 1992).
In 1950 the Cabinet requested a formal review of Britain’s strategic interest in
Cyprus by the Chiefs of Staff in preparation of talks with the United States. A
summary of the report written by the Chief of the Air Staff, Lord Tedder, was sent
to Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The memo stated
that Cyprus was strategically valuable because of the number of British troops on
the islands and the location of its air base (Tedder, 1992). Moreover, troubles in
Egypt led to a smaller troop presence and British forces in Libya were expected
to be withdrawn shortly. Because Egypt was unstable, Tedder told Bradley that
“as long as it remains a British possession, [Cyprus] is the only place in the Eastern
Mediterranean which affords the necessary security of tenure. The U.K. requirements
in Cyprus are therefore to be able to station there in peace any part of the forces
of all three Services which might at any time be considered necessary to meet the
strategic situation in the Middle East” (Tedder, 1992). Cyprus’ location meant that
any aircraft based there could reach further into Russia than from any other location
in the Middle East. Tactical aircraft could be deployed from Cyprus to meet any
conflict in Turkey. Tedder stressed that “it is the view of both the U.K. Chiefs of Staff
and the Foreign Office that the facilities mentioned in para. 3 above [the strategic
utility of Cyprus] can only be assured if Cyprus remains under British sovereignty”
(Tedder, 1992).
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The US bought Britain’s argument regarding the strategic utility of Cyprus. In
1951, a confidential State Department memo mentioned that “The position of the
Department of State with regards to Cyprus problem is: There are impelling strate-
gic considerations for the retention of Cyprus by the British as a military base”
(Ioannides, 2019, 256). This had important implications for the ability of the Enosis
movement in Cyprus to garner international support for their cause, as had many
other successful anticolonial insurgencies. Makarios and Cyprus failed to find the
desired support in the UN because of Cold War dynamics. The US also recognized
Cyprus’ strategic utility for Britain in particular and the Western bloc in general.
Like Britain, the US could not afford to lose control over Cyprus. In 1954, the US
helped organize opposition within the UN to the Greek draft resolution that advo-
cated for Cyprus’ self-determination. Due to US opposition this resolution never
reached the floor of the UN. A few months later, on April 1, 1955, EOKA launched
a full-scale armed rebellion in support of Enosis. This took London by surprise and
this unwillingness to cede sovereignty fueled a massive counterinsurgency campaign
against EOKA (Ioannides, 2019, 273).
The alternative to British sovereignty was some sort of agreement with Greece
where Greece maintained control over Cyprus but granted basing rights to Britain.
This proposal was never satisfactory to British interests because Greece could not
credibly commit to maintain the agreement. Cold War dynamics delayed the process
of decolonization in Cyprus by stoking fears about Greek communists taking control
over former colonies and revoking any deal favoring Britain that was signed as a
condition of independence. Tedder said as much in his letter to Bradley. He wrote
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that “Greek authorities have offered, in return for the cession of Cyprus to Greece, to
grant us such military rights as we might require on the island. Although under such
an arrangement the U.K. might initially obtain all the facilities and the freedom of
action she requires for strategic purposes in Cyprus, a Communist Greek Government
might denounce or break any treaty by which these facilities were secured, or even
offer similar facilities to Russia” (Tedder, 1992). It was not communism per se that
threatened the prospect of a credible treaty, but “any regime with extreme nation-
alist tendencies might conceivably attempt to abrogate or whittle down the military
rights and facilities accorded to us, as in the case of Egypt” (Tedder, 1992). Tedder
concluded his letter with a request to Bradley for the US Chiefs of Staff to endorse
his view “as to the strategic importance to our combined military effort of retaining
U.K. sovereignty of Cyprus” and to disseminate this information to the State Depart-
ment (Tedder, 1992). British control over Cyprus was essential because, as Edward
Johnson writes, “Cyprus, as part of sovereign territory, was worth far more to Britain
than it would be as a collection of bases leased from Greece” (Johnson, 2000, 115).
Indeed, Cyprus and Greece both made major concessions to Britain in an attempt
to reach a deal. In 1951, Makarios met with the Prime Minister of Greece in Athens,
Venizelos, to discuss Greece’s policy toward Cyprus. They signed a protocol outlining
both leader’s wishes and how they could achieve them. The protocol acknowledged
Britain’s strategic interests in Cyprus and offered Britain access to Cyprus’ military
bases if Enosis was achieved. The protocol stated: “with Cyprus united with Greece,
Great Britain could maintain its military bases on the island (and perhaps elsewhere
in Greece)” (Ioannides, 2019, 254). Ioannides writes that “the most important com-
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ponent” of this ”historic document...was that Greece and Makarios were willing to
satisfy Britain’s strategic needs in the region in case of Enosis by offering military
bases on its territory...this was an extremely important Greek concession. The British
argument all along had been that England needed Cyprus to defend its strategic inter-
ests in the Middle East. Makarios and Greece were addressing this British concern”
(Ioannides, 2019, 255).
Throughout the emergency Britain used Cyprus’ strategic value as an argument as
to why concessions should not be made. In 1957 the cabinet added a Cold War gloss
to a longstanding argument as to why concessions to sovereignty were unacceptable.
“It is the military view that United Kingdom strategic requirements in Cyprus can
only be fully met by British sovereignty over the whole island. Any system of partition
or condominium would seriously restrict the use of the island as a base from which to
support the Baghdad Pact or British interests and, to a lesser degree, NATO” (Brook,
2000a, 36). The Radcliffe Report of 1956 echoed these sentiments. Sovereignty would
be allowed after EOKA was crushed and only if sovereignty was compatible with
continued British rule (Holland, 1998, 162).
0.46 Conclusion
This chapter has examined British policy toward Cyprus. Colonial discourse around
Cyprus elevated the island to an almost mythological status with regard to its impor-
tance for national and imperial security. Without complete access to Cyprus’ military























Figure 0.26: This plot shows variation in the number of British casualties during
the Cyprus Emergency along with the level of Cabinet Discussion and the number of
times that Cyprus was mentioned during the Parliamentary Debates in the House of
Commons.
were jeopardized. While Britain would be satisfied with a compromised sovereignty
for Cyprus—that is, one that granted representation to the Cypriots but guaranteed
the British military access—this was impossible due to Greece’s inability to credibly
commit to upholding such an agreement. Any agreement was subject to abrogation
by the takeover of the Cyprus government by left-wing nationalists. The result was a
classic bargaining failure. The continued denial of meaningful constitutional reforms
and self-determination meant that the Enosis movement could only achieve their goals
if they engaged in a sustained campaign of anticolonial resistance.
The case of Cyprus highlights important dynamics for my theory of imperial re-
sponse. The evidence presented above clearly shows that Britain viewed Cyprus as
strategically important and because of this they were unwilling to grant concessions
toward self-determination. In response to unrest, the local colonial government insti-
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tuted a sustained campaign of repression. Metropolitan involvement was quite heavy
with a large number of discussions of Cyprus in the cabinet and parliament (see
Figure 0.26). Repressive actions against unrest were largely initiated by the local
colonial governor before the campaign against EOKA and the Cyprus Emergency.
Cyprus was the location of one of the British Empire’s most bloody decolonizing
conflicts because Britain’s view of Cyprus as strategically essential prevented it from
making any meaningful concessions to the Cypriots themselves. The political leaders
of Enosis (Grivas and Makarios) felt they had no choice but launch a sustained violent
campaign after all attempts at securing self-determination were denied.
Strategic considerations made it difficult for Britain to grant concessions to Cyprus.
This reluctance did not last forever, and Cyprus achieved independence from Britain
on February 19, 1959. What changed? Satisfactorily answering this question re-
quires a more detailed analysis of how, exactly, British officials in charge of crafting
policy toward Cyprus changed their views in response to nationalist violence. One
explanation for the timing of decolonization is that in the late 1950s many British pol-
icymakers reevaluated and downgraded Cyprus’s strategic importance. This occurred
for two reasons: Britain’s successful test of the H-Bomb in 1957 made conventional
land and sea forces that could be stationed on Cyprus less important, and the Suez
invasion showed that Cyprus did not possess the strategic benefit that many thought
it did (Johnson, 2000, 123-124). Domestic politics mattered as well. The Conserva-
tive government of Harold Macmillan wanted to decolonize and was free to do so since
the Suez debacle effectively neutralized more hawkish critics. The independence of
Cyprus was a multilateral negotiation, with Turkey, Greece, and the UN all playing
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an important role. Johnson claims that “the changed strategic role for Cyprus was
the vital factor which allowed a British reappraisal but undoubtedly the annual diplo-
matic battle in the UN was a drain on the time and energy of the British government”
(Johnson, 2000, 127).
One of conditions for independence set in the multilateral talks included the guar-
antee of British access to military bases in specific areas of the island. Greece, Turkey,
and Britain held the right to take action to ensure access to the bases if they ever
became jeopardized (Christofis and Kyritsi, 2018, 11). The constitution of Cyprus,
which was drawn up in April of 1959, excluded Britain from any other involvement in
Cypriot affairs. Unlike most other colonies, British involvement in the writing of the
constitution was nonexistent (Holland, 1998, 331). To the bitter end, Britain refused
to grant the Cypriots the right to self-determination and let Greece, Turkey, and the




This chapter reviews British responses and views of anticolonial resistance in the Gold
Coast. I argue that the British responded to violent resistance by granting substan-
tial constitutional reforms that increased suffrage and autonomy. This pattern is best
exemplified by Britain’s response to the 1948 riots in Accra, where over two dozen
people were killed and hundreds were injured. The 1948 riots became an important
topic of discussion in the metropole and were heavily debated in Parliament. Britain
responded by appointing a commission to study the ways in which the political au-
tonomy of the Gold Coast could be increased as a way to defuse future violence and
prepare the colony for independence.
The typology detailed in Chapter 5 differentiates between hierarchically organized
violence and spontaneous violence. Spontaneous violence in the British empire of-
ten occurred after the colonial police reacted to a nonviolent conflict with violent
tactics. Generally, an agitated crowd would gather to express some political de-
mand, and an overzealous colonial police officer would respond to some provocation
with a truncheon or rifle. Much of the violence explored in this chapter consisted of
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spontaneous violence. This type of violence occurred concurrently with nonviolently
activity. While in the later colonial era, after 1950, Kwame Nkrumah’s campaign of
’positive action’ organized nonviolent activity, there was no sustained campaign of
violent political activity organized by an anticolonial movement in the Gold Coast.
As this chapter shows, spontaneous violent anticolonial activity still lead to colonial
concessions. The British responded to violence with concessions because riots in the
Gold Coast threatened the stability of colonial rule and signaled that the local colo-
nial government was ill-equipped to contain colonial subjects. Moreover, violence
threatened the Gold Coast’s reputation as a model colony. The level of violence in
the Gold Coast was relatively low—a dozen people were killed in the 1948 riots that
lead to a new constitution—but this violence was unexpected and portended even
more resistance if it remained unchecked.
The metropole paid little attention to episodes of nonviolent resistance in the
Gold Coast during the late 1930s and mid 1940s. Numerous strikes occurred dur-
ing this period that were ignored by the metropole. Since the metropole did not
become involved in the internal affairs of the Gold Coast colony, they did not grant
any constitutional concessions in response to strikes and protests. What concessions
were granted, however, were granted by the local colonial government in the form of
increased wages and improved working conditions. Increased representation, consti-
tutional amendments, and the institution of elections only occurred after the 1948
Accra riots. This mass act of violence shocked policymakers in London. In response,
they appointed a number of committees and commissions to investigate the cause of
the riots and to offer remedies that would prevent further violent unrest. Metropoli-
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tan involvement resulted in a brand new constitution that expanded the legislative
council and instituted new elections (Hinds, 1999, 100).
The Gold Coast was economically important to Britain. Unlike the case of Cyprus,
the British felt comfortable granting constitutional reforms in the Gold Coast because
doing so did not jeopardize their key interests in the colony. The Gold Coast was
a politically advanced model colony. It offered little strategic value, and its main
benefit to Britain was the production of cocoa. Granting reforms and devolving
autonomy simply did not threaten the level of exports of cocoa from the Gold Coast.
Cocoa production was constantly under threat and this caused anxiety among colonial
officials. This anxiety, however, was not driven by politics. Swollen shoot virus,
spread by mealybugs, was (and remains) a constant problem for cocoa farmers in
West Africa. The virus decreases cocoa production and eventually kills the cocoa
tree. Colonial Office officials spent more time worrying about the impact of swollen
shoot virus than the impact of constitutional reforms on cocoa yields.
The engine of nonviolent resistance after 1948 was Kwame Nkrumah and his Con-
vention’s People Party (CPP). Nkrumah launched a sustained resistance campaign
espousing a strategy of ’positive action’. This program consisted of boycotts, strikes,
and mass protests which were designed to prevent the functioning of the colonial
state, increase the power of the CPP within the Gold Coast, and coerce the British
into granting further colonial reforms. Using documents from the Colonial Office,
I show that the British felt threatened by Nkrumah’s obvious political prowess and
his ability to mobilize the population of the Gold Coast against the colonial state.
However, the CO viewed the CPP’s strategy of nonviolent resistance as threatening
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largely because large-scale political mobilization raised the specter of violence and
not because of the direct costs of the nonviolent acts. While Nkrumah’s campaign
was successful (he ruled the colony at the time of independence), and nonviolence
played an important role in that success, the CO’s preoccupation with the possibility
of violence shows that the major threat to continued colonial rule was not strikes and
boycotts, but riots and violence.
0.48 Background
Officially, the Gold Coast included the Gold Coast Colony, the Northern Territo-
ries protectorate, the Mandate of Togoland, and the colony of Ashanti, which was
administered separately. All of these territories were under the jurisdiction of the
Gold Coast governor and the Executive Council. The Legislative Council, which ex-
perienced gradual expansion throughout the 1940s and 50s, only administered the
southern section (the Gold Coast Colony), although there was some jurisdictional
overlap regarding finances and budgets for other areas within the Gold Coast. For
the remaining areas outside the Gold Coast Colony, the governor held legislative
authority. Reforms instituted in 1925 created provincial councils with local elected
chiefs who were empowered to select members for the Legislative Council.
During the 1930s and mid-1940s, the British viewed the Gold Coast as an advanced
model colony. The population were among the most well-educated in sub-Saharan
Africa (Rathbone, 1992, xxxv). However, it had a reputation for being politically
difficult. Throughout the 1930s ’cocoa hold ups’ would occur, where cocoa farmers
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would strike by withholding the sale of cocoa to protest the monopsony power of firms
run by the British. Theses strike were ultimately ineffective as divisions between rich
and poor farmers prevented sufficient collective action (Rhodie, 1968). The southern
rural kingdoms experienced mild unrest as colonial subjects tried to depose kings and
chiefs that were formally incorporated into the colonial state. The Gold Coast was
at both times an advanced and economically productive colony that was politically
difficult and potentially unstable.
The strategy of the Colonial Office to administer the Gold Coast took into account
the colony’s high level of development and its political instability. Reforms would be
granted to foster development and defuse nationalist demands. This was embodied in
the colonial governor, Sir Alan Burns, who governed from 1941 to 1947. Burns was a
popular governor with colonial employees and the native population, partly because
the war effort provided him with funds to create profitable jobs for the population
of the Gold Coast (Rathbone, 1968). Burns wanted to build up native authorities to
further advance the colony both politically and economically. He favored expanding
the administrative councils to include more native voices and to train colonial subjects
for self-government. The chiefs, many of whom were formally incorporated into the
colonial state, would also be strengthened in order to counterbalance the more radical
nationalists (Rathbone, 1992, xxxviii). The strategy of co-opting and favoring more
moderate elements while marginalizing radical ones would also be used in the 1950s
with Kwame Nkrumah. The result of this strategy was a number of important reforms
that increased local representation and instituted formal councils staffed by natives
that helped craft policy.
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The Gold Coast provides a hard test for my argument that violence was more ef-
fective at garnering metropolitan attention and inducing concessions since nonviolent
activity by Gold Coast farmers had the potential to seriously disrupt the economy of
the entire colony. The Gold Coast satisfied Britain’s economic interests of converting
dollars into sterling which helped boost the value of their currency. Conservative
tribal chiefs and Western-educated elites made British rule stable (Darwin, 1988,
175). The main export that facilitated convertibility of sterling to dollars was co-
coa. By the late 1940s, cocoa from the Gold Coast became important for converting
sterling into dollars, generating $47.5 million, second only to Malaya (Hinds, 1999,
108). Cocoa made the Gold Coast one of the most important colonies within the
sterling area in the postwar period (Krozewski, 2001, 83). The Gold Coast became
even more important to sustaining the value of sterling in 1947 when the price of
cocoa skyrocketed at the same time that sterling experienced a convertibility crisis
(Krozewski, 2001, 83). Cocoa’s convertibility meant that farmers in the Gold Coast
possessed a high amount of bargaining power relative to the colonial government. In
the Gold Coast, where cocoa farmers could potentially inflict serious harm on the
purchasing power of Britain’s currency, strikes and protests by these farmers were
rarely discussed by the cabinet. As the sterling crisis worsened, pressure increased
on Britain’s ability to turn sterling into dollars and prevent the value of sterling from
falling either further. In the 1930s, a number of farmers protested tax increases by
holding up cocoa production. These nonviolent methods of resistance were ignored by
the metropolitan government but did provoke involvement from the colonial governor
(Krozewski, 2001, 21).
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Local colonial officials administered the Gold Coast and were responsible for the
majority of colonial policies. Unless there was departmental infighting or matters
related to imperial defense, the Colonial Office and the colonial governor were left to
run the colony with minimal metropolitan involvement (Rathbone, 1992, xxxiii). As
Richard Rathbone writes, “when major constitutional and political issues were under
consideration, the Governor of the Gold Coast returned to London for discussions at
the CO with the secretary of state and his officials” (Rathbone, 1992, xxxiii). Once
this happened, and as the policy-making process became more publicized, Parliament
became involved and often discussed these colonial issues, which increased pressure
for reforms (Rathbone, 1968, 214).
The Gold Coast was an important colony to Britain largely for economic reasons
related to the management of sterling. In contrast to colonies that were strategically
important, the British were willing to grant concessions in response to violent resis-
tance. As Krozewski succinctly puts it, “Britain’s concessions to nationalist demands
assisted sterling area management” (Krozewski, 2001, 207). Granting concessions and
reforming the constitution did not jeopardize British interests in the colony. For the
Gold Coast, the British were not opposed to increasing suffrage because increasing
suffrage enabled Britain to rely on the Gold Coast to prop up sterling. Reform was
a “means of securing the territory’s cooperation with policies for protecting sterling”
(Krozewski, 2001, 207). Moreover, reforms could be instituted without “derailing
its agenda for economic recovery and the restoration of sterling to convertibility”
(Hinds, 1999, 106). In Cyprus, granting concessions would empower supporters of
Enosis and lead to a political leadership hostile to imperial rule. In the Gold Coast
233
however, granting concessions would “broaden the base of colonial participation in the
administration...without yielding full participation or control over monetary or fiscal
policy” (Hinds, 1999, 108). This dynamic did not change after 1950 when the CPP
came into power. Darwin writes that the CPP “would make little fundamental dif-
ference to Britain’s material interests which were primarily economic...[and] the Gold
Coast held little strategic significance” to the British (Darwin, 1988, 179). Moreover,
accommodating Nkrumah helped empower him, and many British policymakers felt
that despite his nationalist credentials, Nkrumah understood the political benefits
of working with the British rather than being hostile to them. Denying conces-
sions to the Gold Coast risked fracturing Nkrumah’s fragile coalition and threatened
Britain’s post-independence relations. By the 1950s, the British had every reason to
believe that these post-independence relations would be favorable to Britain. The
Gold Coast was a prime example of how Britain s informal economic influence after
independence (sometimes referred to ’neo-colonialism’) could be sustained due to the
depth of economic ties between the metropole and colony. Ultimately, however, the
Colonial Office was more concerned politics than economics. In her study of how
British firms maintained influence in the Gold Coast during and after independence,
Sarah Stockwell writes that “there is scant evidence that the Colonial Office was
much exercised by the fortunes of the West African trade in the post-war period”
(Stockwell, 1995b, 278). Even when independence was formally achieved in 1957,
the new state of Ghana remained in the British Commonwealth, which maintained
economic ties to the metropole, until 1960.
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Figure 0.27: Map of the Gold Coast territories.235
0.49 Riots and Strikes before 1948
The pattern of metropolitan neglect and local concessions is illustrated by a discus-
sion of strikes in the Gold Coast from 1939-1948. The local colonial government,
rather than the metropole, took responsibility for addressing and responding to these
disturbances. For example, after a railway strike in Takoradi in 1941, the colonial
governor established a committee to collect information on pay rates and the cost of
living and established a policy where temporary bonuses would be disbursed when
the cost of living rose. The governor promised that the railway workers would re-
ceive a cost of living bonus, but after a failure to disburse the funds and a threat
of arbitration of the dispute by a third-party, the railway workers struck again, on
November 25, 1941. This strike hindered the movement of essential war supplies,
including the export of manganese and the import of military aircraft. The colonial
government repressed the strike and arrested thirteen ringleaders. The strike, along
with more repression, spread to other areas such as Kumais and Sekondi (Rathbone,
1992, xxxiii).
It was only after the strike spread to other areas that the cabinet discussed events
in the Gold Coast. A departmental report was created, Churchill read it, and re-
sponded “not a good story”. This represented the extent of discussion about the
Gold Coast strikes in the Cabinet. After the workers refused to return to work for
four days, the Governor announced that the cost of living bonus would be disbursed
immediately along with a 20% increase in wages. After this concession, harbor work-
ers at Takoradi returned to work. The strike effectively ended on December 9th, 1941
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when railway workers across the Gold Coast resumed working. In total, 84 people
were arrested. The strike was not ineffectual: the cost of living bonus was formally
instituted, conditions related to the granting of leave and the award of gratuities were
conceded (Morgan, 1980). All three of these concessions were granted by the local
colonial government, while metropolitan involvement remained low.
The departure of Burns as Governor in August 1947 marked a shift in the political
mood in the Gold Coast. Many nationalists felt that the battery of reforms rolled out
during the early and mid-1940s did not go far enough. This resentment, combined
with a deteriorating economic situation due to wartime inflation, the closing of air
bases that pumped imperial money into the local economy, and the influx of fifty
thousand unemployed servicemen, led to increased nationalist agitation. Low rainfall
also exacerbated these problems in rural farming areas, along with the spread of a
virus afflicting trees in the cocoa-growing areas. The local colonial government was
not prepared for what was to come. The new governor, Sir Gerald Creasy, did not
arrive in the Gold Coast until January 1948, leaving the governor’s post unoccupied
for six months (Rathbone, 1992, xlii).
Another strike occurred in the Gold Coast in 1947, with a similar lack of involve-
ment by the metropolitan government and concessions made by the local colonial
governor. Without involvement or even consultation with the Colonial Office, union
negotiations with the Gold Coast government began in July after the government-
run Gold Coast Chamber of Mines refused to discuss minimum rates of pay, overtime
rates, holiday pay, or annual leave. The miners union responded in September with
the notice of a strike. At this point, the London Advisory Committee of the Cham-
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ber of Mines contacted the Colonial Office to discuss the situation in the Gold Coast
and recommended that no further concessions be made. The Advisory Committee
and the miners union accepted having the dispute arbitrated by William Gorman, a
member of the National Arbitration Tribunal. By October, railway strikes prevented
any trains from running. The strike spread to Kumasi, Sekondi, and Accra (Cabinet,
1947). The Gold Coast government, which felt that they had been generous in their
treatment of the railway workers, instituted emergency powers to keep open the ports
of Takordi and Accra so that essential exports and imports could move freely. Arbi-
tration proved successful: on October 29th, 1947, the arbitrator announced that both
parties had agreed to end the strike and workers would return to work the following
week (Morgan, 1980, 129-131). The strike ended on December 10th, after the Gold
Coast government enacted a cost of living bonus to all government employees and a
twenty percent increase in pay (Cabinet, 1947).
In August of 1947, Dr. J.B. Danquah and a group of left-wing lawyers founded
the United Gold Coast Convention. One of their stated goals was “to ensure that,
by all legitimate and constitutional means, the control and direction of Government
shall, within the shortest time possible, pass into the hands of the people and their
chiefs.” The UGCC enjoyed support from those in more urban areas, including young
government employees and ex-servicemen. Kwame Nkrumah became the general
secretary of the UGCC in late 1947. The British viewed Nkrumah as a more radical
alternative to Danquah and noted that his “immediate programme seemed to be the
stirring up of anti-European feelings and the disruption of the country by nationwide
strikes and boycotts” (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 473).
238
None of these acts of resistance upset the Gold Coast’s stability. The traditional
chiefs and urban elites remained united in support of British rule. In 1946 Britain
attempted to formally bind these two groups together and consolidate their rule in
rural areas with the Burns constitution (Darwin, 1988, 175). Established in 1946, this
constitution granted an African majority in the Legislative Council (Creech Jones,
1992a, 91). Britain viewed this reform as a first step on the slow path to full self-
government for the Gold Coast. What Britain did not expect, however, was a rise
in opposition to these constitutional changes. Many felt that the new constitution
did not go far enough at increasing representation and squelched serious opposition
to colonial rule. These grievances, among a litany of others, fueled the 1948 Accra
riots, which completely changed metropolitan views of political development in the
Gold Coast.
0.50 The 1948 Riots and their aftermath
Tensions increased in the Gold Coast during the immediate postwar era due to the
spread of swollen shoot virus and a general deterioration of the economic situation. In
1947 a businessman and traditional chief in Accra, Nii Kwabena Bonne II, instigated
a boycott of foreign owned firms in an attempt to curtail inflation. Support for the
boycott spread throughout the colony, which reflected the degree of discontent. The
boycott continued into January 1948 and ended that February (Gocking, 2005, 83).
Dissatisfaction with the economy was particularly high among ex-servicemen re-
turning home after the war. High unemployment made it difficult for them to find
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work, while high inflation eroded their pension. In 1946 they formed the Gold Coast
Ex-Serviceman’s Union. Union members were enthusiastic participants in Bonne’s
anti-inflation boycott campaign. In 1948 the union organized its members to march
in Accra to the seat of government in Christiansborg Castle to petition the colonial
governor. En route, the servicemen encountered the police, who attempted to stop
the procession. In response to thrown stones, the superintendent in charge of the
police grabbed a rifle and opened fire on the protesters. Two servicemen were killed
and many others were wounded (Rathbone, 1968).
The procession returned to the center of Accra where protesters had already been
engaging in the looting and arson of foreign owned firms. When news of the shooting
spread, these activities intensified. Rioting occurred in a nearby prison, where some
prisoners escaped. Over the next few days rioting spread to Koforidua, Nsawam,
Akusa, and Kumasi. The colonial government’s response was to declare a state of
emergency. The metropole ordered colonial troops stationed in Nigeria and Gibraltar
to suppress the riots in the Gold Coast (Rathbone, 1968, 214). In total, twenty-nine
people were killed in the 1948 riots and 266 were injured (Gocking, 2005, 84).
The 1948 riots profoundly influenced the course of decolonization in the Gold
Coast. They occurred at a time when the Gold Coast became particularly important
for the protection of sterling (Hinds, 1999, 106). The riots also had an interna-
tional dimension, and both the USSR and the US criticized Britain for how they
practiced colonial rule in the Gold Coast. The riots signaled the political urgency
of decolonization. The timetable for devolving power and granting independence to
the colonies—especially African colonies—was not solely the result of each colony’s
240
ability to practice “self-government” or the desires of the Colonial Office. The 1948
riots showed the British that colonial subjects could exert a profound force on the
timetable of decolonization.
In 1946 the introduction of the Burns Constitution made the Gold Coast the first
colony in British Africa to have a majority of Africans on the Legislative Council,
with eighteen elected and twelve unelected members. The high level of representation
in the Gold Coast made the outbreak of riots in February of 1948 a complete shock
to those in London (Klose, 2013, 58). In his initial telegraph to London, Governor
Creasy blamed communist influence for the unrest. Creech-Jones, the Colonial Sec-
retary, replied to Creasy’s telegram by granting him blanket powers to make it so
that those attempting “to disrupt the ordered life of the territory...will be given no
opportunity of succeeding. I must necessarily leave to your discretion what active
and specific measures you take to achieve this object” (Creech Jones, 1992h, 159).
Creech-Jones was skeptical that communist intrusion caused the riots and also pushed
hard for a serious investigation of their causes. A committee of inquiry known as the
Watson Commission was quickly established and headed by Aiken Watson. Accord-
ing to Creech-Jones, the goal of this committee was “to enquire into and report on
the disturbances and their underlying causes and to make recommendations”. This
issue was “one of first-class political importance” and the riots required “urgent in-
vestigation” (Creech Jones, 1992b, 63).
The Watson commission did not draft a new constitution, rather, what it did was
propose principles of constitutional change. These principles were: the democratiza-
tion of local authorities, the establishment of regional councils, an enlarged Assembly
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consisting of elected members, an Executive Council of eight ministers, five of whom
would be Africans (Creech Jones, 1992e). The franchise would also be extended and
the Legislative Council would be expanded to include native Africans (Rathbone,
1992, xlv). Few of the Watson Commission’s recommendations were completely new.
The slow transfer of power to Britain’s most political advanced African colony was
always part of the plan in the postwar era. What the riots did, however, was to
greatly accelerate this timetable. For example, the Agenda Committee on the Con-
ference of African Governors said that in May 1946 that “in Africa the period before
self-government can be granted will be longer than in most other parts of the Colo-
nial Empire...it may be said in the Gold Coast, the territory where Africans are most
advanced politically, internal self-government is unlikely to be achieved in much less
than a generation” (Rathbone, 1992, xlv). Rathbone writes that “the February ri-
oters and the Watson Commission Report were together to decisively destroy that
complacent timetable” (Rathbone, 1992, xlv).
In response to the Watson Commission’s recommendations, the CO appointed an
entirely African committee tasked with formulating a new constitution. This com-
mittee, known as the Coussey Committee, produced the first draft of the new con-
stitution. The Coussey Constitution drew on other colonial institutions in Jamaica,
Ceylon, and Trinidad to promote constitutional development. In general, there were
few points of disagreement between the Coussey Committee and policymakers in
London. What disagreements did persist, however, revolved around whether the leg-
islature should be unicameral or bicameral and relations between the Legislature and
the Executive. After the Coussey Committee published a report with their recom-
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mendations a year long debate ensued regarding the details of the constitution and
the implementation of elections between African members of the Legislative Council,
officials in the Gold Coast Government, and the Colonial Office (Creech Jones, 1992a,
91).
On October 13, 1949, the cabinet approved the recommendations of the Coussey
Committee to reform the Gold Coast constitution (Cabinet, 1992a). Cabinet Secre-
tary Brook, in a discussion with Attlee, expressed misgiving about the weakness of
the proposed constitution, but acknowledged the difficulty of granting representation
while maintaining British rule (Brook, 1992). The committee’s recommendations in-
cluded the expansion of the legislative council so that eight of the eleven seats were
elected, thereby ensuring a majority African representation on the council (Parsons,
2014, 151). In addition the committee recommended a nationally elected assembly
(Gocking, 2005, 93). There were limits to the Coussey Constitution’s reforms, how-
ever. The Executive Council, while including more African voices, remained under
the jurisdiction of the governor. The governor still held veto power over any policy
changes. The constitution itself could be revoked at any time. These limitations
fueled both the UGCC and Nkrumah’s agitation for more autonomy and reforms.
Full self-government did not arrive until 1954 (Rathbone, 1992, liii).
In addition to the constitutional reforms, the Accra riots significantly changed
the mindset of colonial officials regarding the timeline for constitutional advance
and autonomy for the Gold Coast. As late as 1947, “many of the colonial officials
attending a summer school in Cambridge were doubtful about plans to evolve the
Gold Coast towards self government ’in a generation”’(Furedi, 1993, 92). The riots
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changed all this. In November of 1948 Creech-Jones addressed the West African
Council and listed a number of important ways that power could be devolved the Gold
Coast. These included, increasing African representation in government, conferring
responsibility to regional bodies within a colony, and increasing rural representation
in elections for the Legislative Council (Creech Jones, 1992e, 198-199).
0.51 After 1948
In 1949 a number of strikes occurred in the police force, prison warders, and the
civil service. The response by the colonial government was to prohibit civil servants
from being politically active and to temporarily increase their cost of living allowance
(Arden-Clarke, 1992, 477). In May 1949 workers at the Oil Storage Company of
Takoradi launched a strike that persisted for a month. The strike throttled the fuel
supply, disrupting the shipment of food to urban areas (which were transported by
cars) and preventing the operation of flood-prevention pumps in the gold mines. The
government’s response was to use the army to distribute the necessary supplies. In
March and April strikes occurred at the trade and technical schools in Asuansi and
Takoradi. The colonial government instructed school administrators with punishing
teachers who participated in the strike (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 477). The colonial gov-
ernment enacted other repressive measures. To prevent further strikes the colonial
government told the railway, public works, and posts & telegraph unions that strikers
who did not return to work by a certain date forfeited their jobs. In preparation of
the publication of the Watson report, emergency legislation was enacted. Sedition
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was outlawed and anticolonial groups were prohibited. The government also required
newspapers to be registered (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 478).
Britain’s hope in reforming the constitution was that its influence would continue
to safeguard their interest by empowering conservative urban elites and rural chiefs.
They were wrong. Britain profoundly underestimated the skill of Kwame Nkrumah
and the appeal of his Convention People’s Party (CPP). Nkrumah had resided in
London during the 1940s and helped organize trade union workers in opposition
to British rule. He returned to the Gold Coast and in March of 1949 Nkrumah
announced his plan of ’positive action’ which consisted of nationwide strikes and
boycotts designed to cripple the colonial government. Part of Nkrumah’s strategy
was also to criticize the Coussey Committee as “Quislings” for collaborating with the
British (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 475). The colonial government jailed Nkrumah in 1950,
but the appeal of the CPP continued. Nkrumah’s party won the election in 1950,
forcing Britain to release him from jail to become chief minister of the new assembly
(Darwin, 1988, 177).
On January 6, 1950 the CPP and the TUC called for a general strike after the
colonial government refused to meet their demands for a reinstatement of the em-
ployees who were fired for prior strike activity. Pobee Biney led the strike by walking
out with the Railway Engine drivers on midnight of January 7th with a call for other
unions to join. The strike spread to Sekondi, where electricity and telegraph workers
started to strike the following night. The strike crippled transport services through-
out the colony. On January 9th the colonial government issued repeated warnings
that a general strike was illegal. On January 11th the strikes spread to Kumasi
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and workers in the telephone and electricity supply industry participated. At this
time the colonial government feared that the rising tension throughout the colony
would lead to violence if the strike continued. For this reason the Executive Council
unanimously supported emergency legislation, increasing the repressive powers of the
colonial state.
The state of emergency was declared on January 12th at midnight. Curfews were
imposed, traffic was restricted, and public services were cut off. According to the
colonial office, “police action against hooliganism and intimidation was immediately
intensified” (Arden-Clarke, 1992, 490). The police began mass arrests of those par-
ticipating in political activity, including CPP leaders. In response, the CPP cut main
telephone wires and sabotaged the railway lines in Takoradi. Just a few days later,
workers returned to work and stores re-opened. The colonial government told its
employees that if they did not return by the 20th of January then their jobs would
be forfeited. On the 20th, police arrested Nkrumah and many of his associates. By
the 23rd most employees had returned to work.
In March of 1949, R. Scott sent a dispatch to Authur Creech-Jones discussing
agitations for self-government in the Gold Coast. Scott discussed his assessment of
Nkrumah plan’s to launch a general strike and boycott so that “the Government would
be rendered incapable of maintaining essential services.” Scott also mentioned strike
threats from the Gold Coast Mines Employee Union and the Gold Coast Trades Union
Congress (TUC). The threat of widespread civil resistance against the Governor did
not worry Scott: “in the economic field, there is no apparent danger point as present,
although the campaign against swollen shoot might produce demonstrations in certain
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rural areas which would be contagious” (Creech Jones, 1992d, 212). The real problem
was that mass demonstrations raised the possibility of violence. Farmers, for example,
“if exacerbated by the inconveniences and contentious of strikes” could “very quickly
be brought to a frame of mind in which violence appeared to be just ’retaliation”’
(Creech Jones, 1992d, 212). Scott describe Nkrumah’s growing involvement in the
Police Service and Christian Churches, which could be future sites of unrest. To defuse
potential discontent, one of EGG Hanrott’s recommendations was to “improve the
organization of sport” in order to divert “political excitement into other channels”
(Creech Jones, 1992d, 214).
A dispatch from TRO Mangin to Creech Jones in May of 1949 further shows that
the Colonial Office kept a keen eye to subversive anticolonial activity throughout the
Gold Coast and feared that this activity could escalate. Mangin’s note discussed the
“disorders and strikes that occurred in some educational institutions during the dis-
turbances of last year” (Mangin, 1992, 218). Mangin feared that discontent among
students in the schools and universities would “join with similar nuclei in the Gov-
ernment service generally and in the Trade and Ex-servicemen’s Unions in a general
outburst of violence” (Mangin, 1992, 218). The dispatch also assessed the level of
discontent in the police forces and how the local governor could defuse this feeling
by firing unruly officers and improve the working conditions of the police. Mangin
assured Creech Jones that it was not the case that “matters have reached a stage
where a general conflagration is about to break out” (Mangin, 1992, 220). Mangin
however thought it important to defuse or contain this discontent, and recommended
an executive order like the ones issued in Kenya and Cyprus that prohibited Govern-
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ment employees from belonging to a political organization. Mangin concluded that
“present circumstances in the Gold Coast are far from normal and that drastic action
is essential if the situation is not further to deteriorate” (Mangin, 1992, 221). In his
response, Creech Jones agreed that an executive order was needed. He summarized
Nkrumah’s plan as “adopt[ing] the tactics of non-co-operation, to bring about a sit-
down strike and to make the work of the Administration impossible by non-violent
methods. It seems unlikely in the present political temperature of the Gold Coast
that these methods could be widely employed and still stop short of degeneration into
violence” (Creech Jones, 1992g, 224).
In October 1949 Creech Jones prepared a cabinet memorandum on the Gold Coast
constitution. The memo built on the Watson Commission of Enquiry’s recommen-
dation (with Cabinet endorsement) to increase African representation. Creech Jones
further affirmed that if local opinion supported these recommendations that the Colo-
nial Office would be “prepared to make arrangements for their early implementation”
(Creech Jones, 1992c, 68). Creech Jones resisted some of the Coussey Committee’s
recommendations. In particular, he argued that colonial Governor should have re-
serve powers over the legislature in case of emergencies. Ultimately, Creech Jones
expressed support for the Coussey Committee and that “immediate constitutional
advance is necessary” that would grant a “considerable degree of African participa-
tion in the control of policy, while preserving the Governor’s ultimate responsibility”
(Creech Jones, 1992c, 71). The Committee itself reflected moderate nationalist opin-
ion, and by accepting their recommendations, the colonial government could placate
moderate elements while sidelining more radical ones.
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Nkrumah and the CPP organized a general strike in January of 1950. The strike
never became fully ’general’, and strikes only occurred in the railway sectors and
some other public services. Creech Jones criticized Nkrumah’s strategy of “positive
action”, writing that “while it is claimed to be ’constitutional’ and ’non-violent’, a
programme of political strikes directed at the Government is in fact unconstitutional
and illegal and was repeatedly declared to be so by the Gold Coast Government”.
Creech Jones also mentioned that the colonial government “warned Nkrumah person-
ally that political strikes against the Government were illegal and were bound, under
African conditions, to lead to violence and disorder”. In the view of the Governor,
“this deliberate challenge to constituted authority would, if not checked, inevitably
lead to violence and bloodshed such as occurred in February and March, 1948”. The
response to the strike was handled purely by local officials. The colonial police ar-
rested the leaders of the Convention People’s Party and members of the Gold Coast
Trades Union Congress. African members on the Legislative Council denounced the
strike. The Governor declared a state of emergency in January 12th. Striking workers
steadily returned to work, and my late January normalcy had returned (Creech Jones,
1992f, 240-242).
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0.52 Unrest in the Gold Coast and British
Parliamentary Debates
How did anticolonial activity in the Gold Coast affect the British parliamentary
debates? My theory of imperial response predicts that violence will be more likely
to be discussed in the metropole than nonviolence, because nonviolence can safely
be handled by the local colonial government while violence requires the resources
and involvement of the metropole. The examination of the dynamics of violence and
nonviolence in the Gold Coast and their impact on debates in the British House of
Commons provides support for my theory. Recall that the 1948 riots started with
a widespread boycott of foreign goods that started at the end of 1947 and ended
in February of 1948. The boycotts were never discussed in parliament. Indeed,
parliamentary discussions ignored the Gold Coast during this time period, except for
a brief discussion about diseased Cocoa Trees (Hansard, 1948b).
Things changed when riots broke out on February 28th and 29th. On March 1,
1948, MPs questioned the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, David Rees-
Williams about the “disorders at Accra”. Rees-Williams offered his account of what
happened in Accra. He describes a parade organized by the ex-Servicemen’s Union
that “got out of hand” and had a “very ugly temper” partly because many of those
in the parade were drunk. Rees-Williams also claimed that the protest turned into
a riot after the police tried to disburse the crowd, but in the process were injured.
At that point, “after two police officers had been injured shots had to be fired”. The
MPs posed a variety of questions to Rees-Williams. These related to whether there
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was any communist subversion, what type of investigation would be undertaken, and
whether the Gold Coast had recently experienced a large increase in pubs, which
many explain the public drunkenness. At this point, however, MPs in particular and
metropolitan officials in general had little information about the events in the Gold
Coast (Hansard, 1948c).
On March 10th, Rees-Williams presented information on the extent of the dam-
age that resulted from the rioting. He reported that 26 Africans were killed and
227 were injured. Fifteen non-Africans were injured as well. The financial conse-
quences were large as well. Rees-Williams claimed that looting cost over one million
pounds sterling, with an additional million pounds sterling lost by retailers due to
damaged merchandise. None of these estimates included damage to building or other
infrastructure. Rees-Williams assured parliament that a full investigation into the
proximate and root causes of the riots would be undertaken. In April, parliament
questioned the Arthur Creech Jones, and tried to extract more information about the
disturbances, but he had little to add (Hansard, 1948d).
Subsequent parliamentary debates in about the Gold Coast concentrated on Wat-
son Report and the Coussey Committee. Given the extent of the reforms, this debate
was actually quite limited. Part of the reason why the Gold Coast’s constitutional
reforms were neglected in parliament likely can be attributed to the competence and
thoroughness of the Watson Report and Coussey Committee. An additional expla-
nation is Arthur Creech Jones’ cagey behavior regarding discussing the Gold Coast
after calm was restored to the colony and the constitutional reforms were accepted.
In Creech Jones’ view, the House of Commons should leave well enough alone. In
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November 1949, Cyril Dumpleton asked Creech Jones if the Coussey Committee had
“created a very favourable and helpful impression in the Gold Coast”. Creech Jones
replied: “Yes, and I think that on the whole the Gold Coast has received the Report
with very great calmness and is giving it most serious consideration. It would be
unfortunate if anything said in this House were to provoke difficulties” (Hansard,
1948e).
0.53 Conclusion
Kwame Nkrumah’s hierarchical campaign of nonviolent positive action began in 1950
and reached its peak in 1954. This campaign was successful on its own terms. The
day after Nkrumah’s release from prison in 1951, he was invited to form a new gov-
ernment and assume the role analogous to that of a Prime Minister. At this point,
the CPP and the colonial government in effect ruled the Gold Coast in through a
power sharing agreement. Reforms were gradually rolled out in response to high-level
negotiations between the CPP and the British government. Cooperation between
the British and the CPP served two purposes: it helped defuse resentment by colo-
nial subjects that fueled the more contentious politics of the late 1940s and also
marginalized regional parties, such as the National Liberation Movement in Ashanti.
These actors threatened the stability of the Gold Coast and risked fracturing the colo-
nial state, which was bad new both for the British and Nkrumah. The constitution
was reformed again in 1954. These reforms strengthened the parliament headed by
Nkrumah and eliminated European seats on the Legislative Assembly (Hargreaves,
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2014). Suffrage did not, and could not, increase—the 1950 constitution drafted by
the Watson commission in response to the 1948 riots had already ensured that all
colonial subjects were free to (at least nominally) vote in elections.
On March 6 1957 the Gold Coast received independence from Britain. This fol-
lowed repeated negotiations between the British and Nkrumah, along with a series
of elections. Internal struggles between Nkrumah and both moderate and extrem-
ists nationalists characterized domestic politics in the Gold Coast during the 1950s.
Rumblings about violent secessionism in Ashanti worried British policymakers, but
when independence came, even those in the Ashanti Region celebrated the birth of
Ghana (Gocking, 2005, 112).
The Gold Coast was economically important to the British. Except for the use of
military bases in remote regions during World War II, the colony had little strategic
utility. Britain could grant concessions to the Gold Coast without jeopardizing their
key interest in the colony of economic extraction. Since the 1940s, the British insti-
tuted a plan of the gradual transfer of power to their model colony. The 1948 riots
in Accra changed that, and accelerated the timetable for independence. In response
to the riots, policymakers in London appointed the Watson Commission to study
the causes of the riots, which in turn appointed an all-African Coussey Committee
to make recommendations on constitutional advance. The British instituted most
of the Coussey Committee’s recommendation and devolved autonomy and increased
suffrage to the Gold Coast.
The effects of the 1948 riots provides support for my theory of imperial response
and the effectiveness of violence. Numerous strikes, boycotts, and protests occurred
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throughout the Gold Coast in the 1940s and 1950s. The metropole largely ignored
these, while the local colonial government made adjustments to wages and taxation to
defuse these actions. When over two dozen people were killed and hundreds injured in
February 1948, the House of Commons and the Cabinet discussed the events and the
metropole appointed a committee to investigate the causes. Reforms were granted to
the Gold Coast, which increased suffrage and autonomy. An analysis of documents
from the Colonial Office show that officials in the CO were concerned about nonvio-
lent activity, especially when that activity was spearheaded by the obviously skilled
Nkrumah. The biggest threat to the British from this nonviolent activity, however,
was not the immediate impact of a boycott or strike. Rather, colonial officials worried
that these instances of mass collective action portended more violent events in the
future. Violent anticolonial resistance in the Gold Coast was a much bigger threat to
the colonial state than nonviolent resistance.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has argued that violent anticolonial resistance was more effective
at coercing concessions from the British metropole than nonviolent anticolonial resis-
tance. The British metropole was overwhelmingly concerned with violent activity in
their colonies and could safely ignore nonviolent resistance. In most cases, the local
colonial government could defuse nonviolent resistance. Strikes and protests were
often met with wage increases, lowered taxation, or other concessions that placated
the colonial masses but did not command metropolitan involvement or resources.
Violence, however, overwhelmed the resources of the local colonial government.
A key variable in my theory connecting resistance to concessions is metropoli-
tan attention. In the same way that violence against civilians in a modern civil war
commands the attention of and possible intervention by the international community,
colonial subjects were better able to coerce the metropole into granting concessions
after the metropole became involved in local colonial politics. Violence was the best
way to increase metropolitan involvement. The British cabinet and parliament in the
aftermath of a violent episode in a colony would discuss the state of that colony. In
most cases, the metropole responded with policy reforms that increased the represen-
tation of colonial subjects.
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Negotiating and implementing these concessions were not always feasible. In
strategically important colonies, granting concessions and expanding suffrage risked
undermining the British military presence in the colony. Maintaining access to over-
seas bases was a primary concern of the British metropole. While economic interests
propelled the colonial project and help explain the rise of European imperialism, in
the decolonization era the British metropole was not overly concerned with colonial
extraction. The 20th century was the era of imperial decline. The British recognized
this and in most cases developed policies to ensure that post-independence relations
with their former colonies would be favorable.
A number of factors help explain why Britain’s management of decolonization was
more concerned with security than economics. The British Commonwealth system,
established in 1949, offered a way for former colonies to maintain close economic
relations with Britain without sacrificing any of their territorial autonomy. The image
of khaki-clad British soldiers stationed on a staid military base aroused nationalist
sentiment in many colonies. Informal economic influence and favorable trade relations
with Britain incited less resentment among formerly colonial subjects. The metropole
could devolve power without sacrificing many of the important economic benefits of
colonialism. The restructuring of the global economy reduced trade barriers between
states and meant that many British firms and the financial sector in London did
not need to rely on formal imperialism to do business in the former colonies. In
addition, Britain’s postwar decline and the rise of the Soviet threat also meant that
Britain’s island colonies near the Russian heartland assumed a more important role
in safeguarding metropolitan security.
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This dissertation has also offered a typology of resistance types. One dimension
of resistance is whether it the resistance is primarily violent or nonviolent. This is
useful for understanding the effectiveness of broader strategies of resistance and how
states respond to these strategies. The second dimension in the typology is the level
of organization behind the resistance—is the resistance spontaneous or hierarchically
organized? A violent insurgency was different from a mass riot, and in the same
manner, a campaign of civil disobedience or positive action is not the same as a labor
strike. Introducing this typology and the dimension of organization complicates the
theory but does so in a way that illuminates how anticolonial activity affected both
metropolitan attention and colonial concessions. Hierarchically organized violence
was less effective at coercing concessions that benefited colonial subjects than spon-
taneous violence, and was also less likely to garner metropolitan attention. There are
two reasons for this. One is that spontaneous violence threatened the colonial order.
A riot signaled that the local colonial government was incapable of managing the
colony—indeed, Xu (2018) shows that colonies with governors that were appointed
to their position as a form of patronage rather than for merit were more likely to ex-
perience unrest. The mass and unorganized character of this type of violence showed
the metropole that the problems of the colony were deep and not confined to a se-
lect few radical nationalists. In cases where these radical nationalists did launch an
insurgency campaign, variation in the level of violence does not explain metropolitan
attention. There was a shock value to spontaneous violence. Imperial rule suffered
from principal-agent problems, and violence helped reveal to the principal that the
agent needed more effective monitoring and assistance. Violence during a hierarchi-
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cally organized campaign was expected, and the longer the campaign lasted, the more
the metropole became inured to anticolonial violence.
A potential counterargument to both my theory and empirical analysis is that
all types of anticolonial resistance that varied across the two dimensions resulted
in a concession. Spontaneous nonviolent resistance encouraged the local colonial
government to placate discontent with wage increases and tax decreases. Hierarchical
nonviolent resistance pressured formal institutions like the Indian National Congress
to cave to some of the demands of the resistance movement. Hierarchical violent
resistance did not result in constitutional reforms but did force the metropole to
recognize the leadership of the resistance movement as legitimate leaders of the colony.
In response to this violence, the metropole was less likely to increase suffrage and
more likely to sit down and negotiate with the rebel group. An implication of this
counterargument is that choosing colony-wide concessions instituted by the metropole
as the dependent variable ignores all the other types of concessions that were granted
by the metropole to the colony in response to nonviolent resistance or hierarchically
organized violence.
This is a fair criticism but undergirding this counterargument is the assumption
that these concessions were somehow of equal importance. They were not. Lower
taxes, increased wages, recognition of a rebel group, etc. were all important develop-
ments that shifted the balance of power from the metropole to the colony. Yet colony-
wide policy concessions marked the most important change in metropole-periphery
relations. They increased native representation, reduced the power of the local colo-
nial state, and increased suffrage of colonial subjects. These were important develop-
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ments. Native representation and political control were what anticolonial nationalists
were fighting for. For many of these nationalists, formal independence was the end
goal of anticolonial resistance (for others, decolonization was not a legal process but
also a cultural and economic one). Metropolitan concessions to the colony were an
incremental step on the way to dissolving formal colonialism.
Independence was overdetermined. The granting of complete legal sovereignty to
a colony was driven by a variety of international and domestic factors (in both the
metropole and the colony). This makes it exceedingly difficult to assess the effec-
tiveness of resistance on the timing of independence. Independence days celebrated
in postcolonial states marked the end of a long process of metropolitan disentangle-
ment from colonial affairs. Concessions were important junctures in the process of
decolonization.
By showing that violence was a more effective strategy of coercing concessions from
the metropole to the colony than nonviolence, this work provides an important piece
of the puzzle as to why decolonization of the British Empire occurred and when. At
the end of World War I, Britain was at its peak, having acquired a number of former
Ottoman territories in the Middle East. It had ruled the Indian subcontinent for
centuries. Fifty years later, most of its colonies were independent and British soldiers
were dying in a failed counterinsurgency campaign in Aden. What happened?
The financial sector of London provided the impetus for the expansion of the
British Empire, as Cain and Hopkins have masterfully shown (Cain and Hopkins,
2014). The restructuring of the global economy in the 20th century and the erosion
of barriers to trade and financial flows meant that many British firms could enjoy the
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benefits they received from operating in colonial territories without formal imperial-
ism. This, so the argument goes (Gartzke and Rohner, 2011), is why there is no more
British Empire. The new global economy removed the justification for imperialism,
and the British state responded by dismantling the empire without any coordinated
resistance by international firms. British institutions hoped to maintain influence in
a postcolonial era, so they worked to ensure that their network of ties in colonial
territories remained after independence (Stockwell, 2018).
This argument is plausible but incomplete. It is certainly the case that British
firms and the financial sector did not put up as big a fight against decolonization
in the postwar era as they would have in the 19th century. In the metropole, how-
ever, discussions of economic relations between the metropole and colony were largely
absent. Within the colonies, the Colonial Office could manage decolonization with
little interference from British firms (Stockwell, 1995b). Economic interests were not
generally in favor of decolonization, but they also did not get in the way of the pro-
cess and metropolitan officials were keen to ignore the ’gentlemanly capitalism’ of the
financial sector.
The theory and empirics that I present here attempts to synthesize competing
explanations for decolonization. Many historians have treated the Cold War, anti-
colonial nationalism, and British domestic politics as separate explanations for the
end of the British empire (Darwin, 1988; Hyam, 2007). This dissertation shows that
these phenomena all interacted and were mediated by each other. British domestic
politics and views of empire did change during the 20th century, but as my analysis
in Chapter 0.33 demonstrates, anticolonial violence within the colonies helps explain
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how and why that change occurred. Parliamentary debates about colonies reacted
strongly to spontaneous violence by colonial subjects, and became more honest about
violence in the colonies over time. The Cold War made strategic outposts more im-
portant to the British, which in turn made it even more difficult for the British
to relinquish control over these colonies. In these cases, Cold War dynamics made
decolonization more difficult, rather than less.
This work makes a number of contributions to the political science literature on
empires, political resistance, and changes in the international system. Perhaps the
most important finding is that violence was more effective at coercing concessions
than nonviolence. This is at odds with a strain of research finding the opposite
conclusion regarding the success rate of violent and nonviolent campaigns. I show the
benefits of disaggreating different forms of resistance using more granular data. My
research design that estimates the effect of resistance on metropolitan attention—
the mediator between resistance and concessions—using high-frequency data helps
alleviate endogeneity concerns.
My explanation for why I find that violence was effective while research focusing
on more recent political resistance campaigns finds the opposite effect can partly be
attributed to the structure of modern overseas imperial rule. The structure of these
empires mean that local colonial officials were relatively insulated from metropolitan
involvement, and the metropole can selectively engage and disengage from its colonial
states. Since violence overwhelmed the capabilities of these states and commanded
metropolitan involvement, violence led to changes in colonial policy. An important
scope condition of my theory is that these dynamics only apply to the era of imperial
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decline. In the era of imperial expansion, violence that overwhelmed the local colonial
state was often met with repression and the consolidation of imperial control. This
suggests that metropolitan response to peripheral resistance was conditional on the
change in relative power of the metropole.
By arguing that spontaneous violent resistance was the most effective form of
anticolonial resistance in the British empire, this work also relocates the impetus for
changes in the international system away from states and toward nonstate actors.
Metropolitan influence over formal colonies constituted a hierarchical relationship
between states in the international system. Colonies were not fully sovereign entities,
but they were not completely subsumed by the metropole. This work examines how
interstate relations between states in a hierarchical relationship were contested, nego-
tiated, and severed partly due to the activities of nonstate actors in the subordinate
state.
0.54 Limitations & Future Work
This dissertation has a number of limitations that could be addressed in future work.
The theory development and testing are all built from studying the British Empire.
The British Empire, relative to other overseas European empires, has a stark division
between metropole and colony. How do the variables of resistance, attention, and
concessions map on to and explain dynamics in other imperial polities? The differ-
ences and similarities across empires requires more development. Here I offer a brief
comparison with anticolonial resistance in the French Empire.
262
A number of works have drawn explicit comparisons of decolonization in the
French and British Empires (Kahler, 2014; Spruyt, 2005; Thomas, 2014b; Smith,
1978). Generally, these works have argued that the French decolonized hastily in
some regions but were more likely to drag their feet in the process of devolving au-
tonomy in others. In the latter cases, French intransigence led to the large-scale
insurgencies of Algeria (Horne, 2006) and Vietnam (Logevall, 2012). France’s three
North African colonies (Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria) all experienced hierarchically
organized nonviolent campaigns that devolved into violence after the colonial police
violently repressed these demonstrations. (Stephan and Chenoweth, 2008).
The French also instituted reforms to stave off unrest as it declined. In the late
1950s, Vietnamese Nationalists defeated French at Dien Bien Phu, violence erupted
in Morocco and Tunisia (Joffé, 1985), the FLN’s campaign of terror in Algeria was in
full swing, and mass anticolonial movements were beginning to rumble in sub-Saharan
Africa (Chafer, 2002). The metropolitan National Assembly assessed the deteriorat-
ing situation throughout the empire and decided that reforms were necessary. In
June of 1956, France introduced a new empire-wide framework, known as the loi-
cadre, that increased autonomy and self-government in France’s colonial possessions
(Schmidt, 2007, 96).
The case of riots in 1953 Morocco are an example of violence leading to colonial
concessions. In the Moroccan case, these were not constitutional reforms that de-
volved autonomy. Rather, the French responded to riots by removing the pro-French
sultan. Intra-elite disputes led Thami El Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakesh in August
of 1953 to called on Sidi Mohammed (the de facto leader of the Moroccan Nationalist
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movement who more radical elements viewed as overly accommodating to French re-
quests) to step down and be replaced. To support this, El Glaoui dispatched a band
of rebels to Rabat. French security forces clashed with these protesters, opening fire
and killing several. Elsewhere in Oujda, eighteen Moroccans were killed. Zisenwine
writes that “the impact of these events, and concerns about further deterioration in
Morocco led the French government to change its position with regard to the sul-
tan” (Zisenwine, 2010, 217). The French metropole endorsed the removal of Sidi
Mohammed, although this decision was not made unanimously One cabinet minis-
ter, François Mitterand, resigned in protest. It is unclear how much the metropole
knew about the intricacies of Moroccan politics at this time, and evidence exists that
the hardline French residency within Morocco presented a sensationalized picture of
Moroccan politics to policymakers in Paris. Nevertheless ministers in Paris chose to
depose the sultan and appease more radical elements after a wave of violence because
they feared that a civil war was imminent (Zisenwine, 2010, 215-220).
Resistance and French decolonization cannot be properly understood without
some discussion of France’s brutal war in Algeria. More than any other overseas
colony (with the possible except of Ireland), to many French, Algeria was a part of
France (Shepard, 2008). Why was Algerian decolonization so violent ? What was
the effect of this violence? Satisfactorily answering these questions is outside the
scope of this project, but the general consensus regarding the first answer was that
French colonialism was particularly brutal in Algeria, the French responded to an-
ticolonial resistance with widespread and violent repression (Smith, 1974), and the
mountainous terrain of Algeria combined with urban concentration led to conditions
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that facilitated a sustained insurgency (Garcia-Ponce and Wantchekon, 2015). The
FLN was also a highly skilled rebel group that practiced a variety of tactics and was
able to cultivate a base of support that sustained the insurgency (Hutchinson, 1978).
In Algeria, violence resulted from bargaining failures. The large and powerful settler
population impeded any chance for meaningful reforms (Paine, 2019). Leftists in
mainland France did try to defuse the violence with increased autonomy for colonial
subjects through a “federalist” framework that maintained autonomy for the set-
tlers but granted Algerians more local control, but these reforms never materialized
(Smith, 1974).
Security concerns were paramount as well. The Mers-el-Kébir base, located in
Algeria, was a “first rank strategic base” that was essential to the French war effort
during World War II (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009, 60). The base was even fortified
against attack from a nuclear weapon. The Evian Accords signed between the FLN
and the French in 1962 granted continued French access to the base while relinquishing
French control elsewhere. Before these negotiations, the French were unwilling to
divide sovereignty over Algeria. Cooley and Spruyt write that “France’s relative
decline [in the postwar era] was not apparent to French decision makers...Empire was
considered a sine qua non for great power standing with fears of becoming ’Greece’
or ’Portugal’ without such holdings” (Cooley and Spruyt, 2009, 61). Smith agrees,
writing that “the loss of Algeria meant the irrevocable decline of France to second
power rank” (Smith, 1974).
The British prepared for decolonization long before the French did. While inde-
pendence for many of Britain’s colonies was inevitable, or at least viewed as inevitable
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at the time, the French viewed Algeria as part of France and some believed that it
would remain that way indefinitely. One reason that French views may have changed
is the intensity and sophistication of violence launched by the FLN in Algeria and
the Viet Minh in Vietnam. In his studies of France’s wars of decolonization, Clayton
concludes that the debate about the effect of violent anticolonial nationalism on in-
dependence “is largely irrelevant in the case of the French Empire” since anticolonial
nationalism played “the lead role...in achieving flag independence” (Clayton, 2014,
186).
The French Empire differed from the British Empire in the level of integration
between the metropole and the colony. The French constitution governed the colonies,
and many constitutional changes, such as the 1958 referendum on whether to adopt
the constitution of the Fifth Republic, were empire-wide and were not targeted at a
specific colony. Future work could explore the extent to which there was variation
in metropolitan attention to its colonies in the French Empire that was analogous to
the British Empire.
None of this is to say that my theory of imperial response applies to the French
Empire specifically or other European overseas empires in general without any mod-
ification. The theory I advance applies to the British Empire in the era of imperial
decline that began after World War I. Both the theory and empirical work offers
insights that I hope will help us understand contemporary political resistance and
dynamics in other imperial polities. Ultimately this study is a form of historically
bounded political science research that is not designed to uncover universal laws but
to explain a specific historical process with implications for understanding related
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phenomena (Fordham, 2020).
Violence committed by sugarcane cutters, cocoa farmers, and stevedores desta-
bilized colonial rule and coerced the British into relaxing control over their colonies
during the 20th century. This is fitting. As Fanon argued, violence undergirded
the colonial project. Colonial rule was impossible without conquest or the threat
of violence to keep dissenters in line. Colonial states ruled through violence and
co-optation rather than more durable forms of legitimacy. Gandhi’s practice of non-
violence fundamentally changed colonial politics and inspired movements around the
globe. Nonviolence did not, however, coerce Britain into increasing native represen-
tation or expanding suffrage of colonial subjects. The largest polity in world history
did not erode because of the spread of international law or the restructuring of global





0.55 List of Concessions
Aden
• 1934 - (1) - Treaty of Sanaa. Native representation increased.
• 1947 - (2) - Legislative Council inaugurated.
• 1955 - (2) - Legislative Council elections held for first time. Four out of 18
council seats were elected.
• 1959 - (3) - New Constitution. 12 out of 23 members of the legislative council
elected.
• 1967 - (3) - Independence.
Barbados
• 1943 - (1) - Property qualifications reduced. Franchise extended.
• 1947 - (2) - Power of European legislative assembly reduced.
• 1950 - (1) - Universal adult suffrage adopted.
• 1954 - (2) - Elected members of Barbados executive committee increased to five
members.
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• 1958 - (2) - Advanced to full self-government with responsibility for internal
affairs.
• 1961 - (2) - Internal self-government granted.
• 1966 - (3) - Independence.
Bechuanaland
• 1960 - (3) - A new constitution established a legislature with an elected majority.
• 1965 - (2) - Internal self-government granted.
• 1966 - (3) - Independence.
British Honduras
• 1935 - (3) - New constitution. Franchise extended and voting restrictions lifted.
• 1945 - (1) - Nominated officials were dropped from the legislative council.
• 1954 - (3) - New constitution with expanded legislative council and universal
suffrage.
• 1960 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1972 - (3) Independence.
Burma
• 1921 - (1) - Dyarchy introduced.
• 1935 - (3) - Government of Burma Act - Provided for responsible government in
which a Cabinet of Burmese ministers was answerable to a Westminster-style
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legislature.
• 1937 - (2) - Burma was given responsible government in domestic matters. The
Governor still had ‘reserved’ powers over defense and foreign policy. The Lower
House was all elected, although there was now a Senate, half of whose members
were nominated. Burmese held all government portfolios and officials ceased to
sit in Parliament.
• 1947 - (3) - Independence.
Ceylon
• 1920 - (2) - First Manning Reforms included an extension of Legislative Council:
16 of the 37 members were now elected.
• 1923 - (2) - Second Manning Reforms. The Second Manning Reforms of 1923
increased membership of the legislative council from 37 to 49, of which 12 were
official and 37 were unofficial.
• 1931 - (2) - The Legislative and Executive Councils were replaced by a Council
of State. This consisted of 60 members: 8 appointed (4 European, 4 ‘native’)
and 52 elected on a territorial basis. Elections were by universal suffrage but
with a five-year residence qualification.
• 1946 - (3) - New constitution. Ceylon now had complete internal self-government,
although defense and foreign policy were still ‘reserved’.
• 1947 - (3) - Ceylon Independence Act.
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Cyprus
• 1925 - (1) - Made a crown colony. Legislative council expanded from 18 to 24.
• 1943 - (1) - First municipal elections introduced.
• 1960 - (3) - Independence.
Gambia
• 1947 - (3) - New constitution with elected members to the Legislative Council.
Other ‘unofficial’ members were nominated. Unofficial members, both elected
and nominated, were eligible to serve on the Executive Council.
• 1954 - (2) - Unofficial members had 7:5 majority on the Executive Council.
Unofficial members also had a majority on the Legislative Council.
• 1960 - (3) - Franchise extended to all adults and legislative council enlarged.
• 1964 - (1) - Internal self-government granted.
• 1965 - (3) - Independence.
Gold Coast
• 1925 - (2) - Allowed Africans to be elected members of the legislative council.
• 1946 - (3) - New constitution. Required legislative council to have an African
majority.
• 1950 - (3) - New constitution.
• 1952 - (1) - Local government enlarged.
• 1954 - (3) - This constitution made the exercise of the governor’s powers, in
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relation to the Public Service, subject to the recommendation of the native led
Public Services Commission.
• 1957 - (3) - Independence.
India
• 1919 - (3) - Government of India Act.
• 1933 - (1) - White Paper printed, offered draft of new constitution.
• 1935 - (3) - Government of India Act of 1935.
• 1946 - (1) - Cabinet Mission to plan independence.
• 1947 - (3) - Independence
Jamaica
• 1944 - (3) - New constitution provided for (a) a House of Representatives of
32 elected members under Universal Adult Suffrage and with power to elect a
speaker; (b) Executive Council of five of those elected, with three officials and
two nominees presided over by the governor, and (c) a Legislative Council of
nominated members with the power of review only.
• 1953 - (3) - Constitution modified to allow for elected government ministers
of parliamentary body. Executive council created with a majority of elected
legislators who would be appointed and removed on the advice of the leader of
the majority party to be known as the Chief Minister.
• 1957 - (2) - the Executive Council was replaced by a Council of Ministers and
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the powers of the Governor reduced
• 1959 - (2) - Full internal self-government.
• 1962 - (3) - Independence.
Kenya
• 1927 - (2) - The Legislative Council was reconstituted with 20 official, 11 elected
European, 5 elected Indian and 1 elected Arab members. There was to be one
nominated member to speak for African interests there.
• 1954 - (1) - A council of ministers was created in 1954 with some African and
Asian membership.
• 1956 - (1) - Enlarged African representation in the legislature
• 1957 - (2) - First direct elections of native leaders to the Legislative Council
• 1960 - (2) - Legislative Council expanded. Conference, representing all the main
Kenyan groups, held at Lancaster House in London. This agreed in principle
to an African majority on the Legislative Council.
• 1962 - (1) - Second Lancaster House constitutional conference held.
• 1963 - (3) - Independence.
Basutoland
• 1960 - (2) - Legislature and Executive Council established.
• 1964 - (1) - Constitutional conference.
• 1965 - (3) - New constitution.
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• 1956 - (3) - Independence.
Malaya
• 1948 - (3) - Legislative Council established, consisted of six elected members,
three members chosen by the Chambers of Commerce (European, Chinese and
Indian), four European ex-officio, members, five nominated European officials
and four nominated Asian unofficials.
• 1951 - (2) - Legislative council extended. Three additional elected seats were
conceded, thus making a total of nine out of a Council of twenty-five.
• 1956 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1957 - (3) - Independence.
Nigeria
• 1922 - (3) - New constitution. The Legislative Council of 46 included 15 nomi-
nated and 4 elected members.
• 1946 - (3) - New constitution. The central government now included a Leg-
islative Council, responsible for the whole country, with 16 official and 28 non-
official members; of the latter 24 were nominated and 4 elected.
• 1954 - (3) - New Constitution. Federal Elections held.
• 1957 - (1) - Partial self-government of East and West Nigeria.
• 1960 - (3) - Independence.
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Nyasaland
• 1931 - (2) - Indirectly elected representatives of various groups introduced into
the Legislative Council.
• 1955 - (3) - New constitution which provided that 6 of the 22 members of
the Legislative Council should be directly elected by Europeans and Asians,
but that the 5 African members should be indirectly elected by the Provincial
Councils.
• 1960 - (1) - African majority of the legislature ensured.
• 1964 - (3) - Independence.
Palestine
• 1922 - (1) - Churchill White Paper restricting Jewish immigration.
• 1930 - (1) - Passfield White Paper restricting Jewish immigration.
• 1939 - (1) - White Paper restricting Jewish immigration.
• 1948 - (3) - Independence.
Sierra Leone
• 1924 - (2) Legislative Council members now elected.
• 1951 - (3) New constitution: 7 members of the Legislative Council were to be
directly elected from the Colony and 14 indirectly from the Protectorate. The
Executive Council was to have equal numbers of official and unofficial members.
• 1961 - (3) Independence.
276
Southern Rhodesia
• 1953 - (1) - Federation with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.
• 1961 - (3) - New constitution for Southern Rhodesia approved in referendum .
Sudan
• 1944 - (2) - Advisory Council established with 24 Sudanese and 4 foreign mem-
bers.
• 1948 - (3) - A new constitution was adopted. The Legislative Assembly had
75 members, most of whom were elected by male voters with certain property
qualifications but 13 were chosen by chiefs and councils in the South and 10
nominated by the Governor-General.
• 1952 - (3) - Executive council established. It consisted of twelve to eighteen
members, of whom at least half were Sudanese. The Executive Council approx-
imated in functions to a cabinet.
• 1956 - (3) - Independence.
Tanganyika
• 1925 - (2) - The Legislative Council had 13 official and 7 unofficial members,
comprising 5 Europeans and 2 Asians. African membership was considered a
matter for the future.
• 1955 - (3) - New constitution. This was based on equal representation for
Europeans, Asians and Africans.
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• 1961 - (3) - Independence.
Trinidad
• 1941 - (1) - Slight increase in the elected element of legislative council.
• 1945 - (2) - Universal adult suffrage established.
• 1950 - (3) - New constitution permitted a majority of the executive council
to be chosen from among the elected legislators by the legislative council as a
whole.
• 1956 - (2) - Elected majority of legislative council expanded.
• 1960 - (1) - Last official member of the executive council removed.
• 1952 - (3) - Independence.
Uganda
• 1921 - (2) - Legislative Council formed.
• 1954 - (2) - Legislative Council expanded. An important step was taken in
1954 when the African council membership increased to 14 out of a total of
28 nonofficial members; the 14 were selected from districts thought to be more
natural units of representation than the provinces that had previously existed.
• 1955 - (2) In 1955 a ministerial system was introduced, with 5 nonofficial African
ministers out of a total of 11.
• 1958 - (1) Direct election of the legislature introduced.
• 1961 - (2) Constitutional convention.
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• 1962 - (3) Independence.
Zanzibar
• 1926 - (2) - Legislative Council established.
• 1946 - (2) - Legislative Council expanded to include native representation.
• 1955 - (2) - Legislative Council restructured to give equal representation to
Africans.
• 1963 - (3) - Independence.
Mauritius
• 1947 - (3) - New Constitution. Legislative Council established.
• 1955 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1957 - (2) - Ministerial system introduced.
• 1958 - (2) - Universal Suffrage granted.
• 1961 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1965 - (1) - Constitutional conference held.
• 1968 - (3) - Independence.
British Guiana
• 1928 - (2) - Crown Colony Government Introduced. The old constitution was
abolished, and a Crown Colony type of legislative council was created with
nominated officials and elected members together constituting a majority over
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the officials but with the elected members in the minority.
• 1943 - (1) Nominated officials removed. Elected members now a majority.
• 1945 - (1) Property and income qualifications for voting reduced.
• 1953 - (2) Adult Suffrage extended.
• 1956 - (2) - Bicameral Legislature instituted.
• 1961 - (1) - Full internal self-government.
• 1962 - (1) - Constitutional conference.
• 1966 - (3) - Independence.
Malta
• 1921 - (2) - Bicameral Legislature established.
• 1936 - (3) - Constitution amended to provide for nomination of members to
Executive Council.
• 1939 - (3) - Constitution amended to increase elected seats in Council of Gov-
ernment.
• 1947 - (3) - Self-government instituted with an elected legislature.
• 1960 - (1) - Constitutional convention.
• 1964 - (3) - Independence.
Northern Rhodesia
• 1948 - (3) - Constitution reformed.
• 1954 - (2) - Legislative Council expanded.
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• 1962 - (3) - New Constitution. Native seats on legislative council expanded.
• 1964 - (3) - Independence.
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0.56 Cabinet Archive
Below are examples of a cabinet summaries.
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